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ABSTRACT 
The primary objective of this research effort is to identify failure modes and hazards associated 
with the concept vehicles and to perform functional hazard analyses (FHA) and failure modes and 
effects criticality analyses (FMECA) for each.  Boeing also created a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
for each of the concept vehicles, as the FTA contains the connectivity between systems and is an 
accepted, top-down method to analyze the safety of an air-vehicle.  Conceptual design of notional 
powertrain configuration for each of four (4) NASA RVLT Concept Vehicles were developed in 
as much detail as was necessary to support the reliability and safety analysis for this project.  Func-
tional block diagrams from each of the conceptual powertrain configurations were created and 
used to order the FHA, FMECA, and FTA.  Hazards were identified and the severity of each were 
categorized in the FHA for use in a follow-up FMECA.  The FTA took inputs from the FMECA 
and the functional block diagrams to develop the connectivity and develop a quantitative architec-
ture that could be used to perform sensitivity studies, as related to vehicle safety. 
Guidelines for reliability targets for both the air vehicle and the operation in the UAM mission are 
discussed.  An industry literature search was performed in order to assess gaps in existing govern-
ment regulations and industry specifications.  The industry literature search led to air-vehicle and 
operational reliability discussions, as related to Distributed Electric/Hybrid-Electric Propulsion 
(DE/HEP) system operating in the UAM role.  A discussion of results and recommendations for 
future work is also provided. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has advanced technology within the 
Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) community for decades.  Recently, NASA identified a 
need to extend the state-of-the-art in the more disruptive airspace of Distributed Electric/Hybrid-
Electric Propulsion (DE/HEP) and Urban Air Mobility (UAM).  Through programs such as GL-
10, Greased Lightning, and X-57, Maxwell, NASA has helped pioneer DE/HEP air vehicle con-
cepts and is continuing research in these topic areas through the Revolutionary Vertical Lift Tech-
nology (RVLT) Program.  More recently, the RVLT Program developed a series of conceptual 
rotary wing airplanes for the UAM mission.  NASA has historically used concept vehicles to guide 
research and aim industry partners toward common goals and objectives. 
In recent history, NASA used the Civil Heavy Lift Rotorcraft concept vehicles to guide research 
topics.  NASA traded designs and configurations for tilt-rotors, tandem-compound, and advancing 
blade concept vehicles.  Through the noted trade studies, NASA found that the Large Civil Tilt 
Rotor (LCTR) concept showed the most promise for the specified mission of carrying 120 passen-
gers for 1,200 nautical miles (ref. 1).  Research efforts focused around the LCTR advanced power-
train, noise, and slowed rotor technologies, among others, which are applicable to today’s thrust 
towards UAM. 
The RVLT Concept Vehicles that were used in the current effort are intended to follow a similar 
research model, in which vehicle requirements and technology assumptions required to meet the 
stated mission objectives are used to drive system and sub-system research topics and open forum 
discussions.  Four concept vehicles were defined and assessed in this research; all are intended to 
mature technologies required for similar aircraft that meet UAM mission objectives.  Each concept 
vehicle was designed to be piloted, though future trade studies may include the impacts of incor-
porating various levels of autonomy. The focus of the research presented in this document ad-
dresses hazards and failure modes associated with the powertrain system of each of the RVLT 
concept vehicles.  
1.1 Research Objectives 
The primary objective of this research effort is to identify failure modes and hazards associated 
with the concept vehicles and to perform functional hazard analyses (FHA) and failure modes and 
effects criticality analyses (FMECA) for each. More specifically, this research aimed to and was 
successful in accomplishing the following objectives: 
• To perform a conceptual design of the powertrain configuration for each configuration, in 
as much detail as is necessary to conduct subsequent elements of this research. 
• To create functional block diagrams from each of the conceptual powertrain configurations 
in order to facilitate the FHA and FMECA. 
• To identify potential hazards and perform a FHA for each configuration. 
• For each configuration, identify and quantify the effects of the identified hazards, the se-
verity and probability of their effects, their root cause and the likelihood of each cause.  
• To discuss guidelines for development of reliability targets to compare the results con-
tained herein against a benchmark and to enable the certification of similar UAM air-vehi-
cle concepts.    
NASA/CR—2019-220217 1
 
  
 
 
 
1.2 Air-Vehicle Concept Configurations 
Four RVLT air-vehicle concept configurations were used in this research effort, namely: a 15 pas-
senger Tilt-Wing, a single-occupant Quad-Rotor, a six (6) occupant side-by-side, also referred to 
as a Lateral-Twin and a six (6) passenger Lift+Cruise concept vehicle that was included in the 
optional effort. A description of each of the RVLT concept vehicles is provided below. 
1.3 Tilt-Wing Air Vehicle 
The 15 passenger Tilt-Wing is shown in Figure 1 (ref. 2).  It was designed to have a turboelectric 
powertrain, a 3,000 lbs payload, and a 400 nm range.  The configuration includes four (4) rotors, 
two (2) rotors arranged on each tilting wing such that the wings are immersed in prop-wash.  The 
Tilt-Wing under consideration was designed to have collective and single axis cyclic control at 
each rotor and interconnecting shafting between each rotor for emergency conditions.  The in-
stalled power is provided by conventional aviation fuel powering a turboshaft engine, which sup-
plies shaft-power to a generator.  The generator provides electrical power to a battery network and 
four (4) 731 horsepower (HP) motors.  The batteries are intended to be charged prior to flight and 
then recharged during the spec mission.  The tip speed was set to 550 ft/sec in hover and 275 ft/sec 
in cruise for sizing runs; sizing runs resulted in 12.20 ft diameter rotors, or rotor shaft speeds of 
861 RPM in hover and 431 RPM in cruise. 
 
Figure 1:  Tilt-Wing Air Vehicle 
1.4 Quad-Rotor Air Vehicle 
The single passenger Quad-Rotor is shown in Figure 2 (ref. 2).  It was designed to have a fully 
electric powertrain, a 250 lbs payload, and a 50 nm range.  The rotors and supporting pylon struc-
ture are arranged in an “X” configuration with the rear rotors being higher than the forward rotors.  
The Quad-Rotor under consideration was designed to have, collective control at each rotor, artic-
ulated rotors, and interconnecting shafting for emergency conditions. A second powertrain config-
uration was also evaluated for the Quad-Rotor vehicle concept, one that removed the interconnect-
ing shafting in favor of a direct-drive arrangement, still through a speed reducing gearbox for 
weight savings. The installed power is provided by a battery network that is charged prior to flight 
and which sends power to four (4) 21.6 HP motors.  The tip speed was set to 450 ft/sec for sizing 
runs, resulting in rotor diameters of 12.62 ft or 681 RPM Rotor Shaft Speed. 
NASA/CR—2019-220217 2
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Quad-Rotor Air Vehicle 
1.5 Side-by-Side (Lateral-Twin) Description 
The six (6) passenger side-by-side, or Lateral-Twin, configuration is presented in Figure 3 (ref. 2). 
This configuration was sized to accommodate a 1,200 lbs payload over a 200 nm range with a 
parallel hybrid propulsion system. The configuration features a single rotor attached to a pylon, 
outboard of the fuselage on each side of the aircraft. The 11.8 ft radius, four bladed rotors are 
indexed in order to enable intermeshing of the side-by-side rotors above the fuselage. The installed 
power is provided by a parallel hybrid-electric system that is primarily driven by two (2) 187 HP 
turboshaft engines, with power being augmented by a single 100 HP electric motor. The tip speed 
of each rotor is 550 ft/sec and the rotor diameter is 23.6 feet, resulting in a rotor speed of 444 RPM.  
 
Figure 3:  Side-by-Side (Lateral-Twin) Air Vehicle 
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1.6 Lift+Cruise Description 
A six (6) passenger Lift+Cruise concept vehicle is presented in Figure 4 and features a fuselage 
configuration similar to that of the Lateral-Twin. The Lift+Cruise configuration is intended to rep-
resent a class of aircraft that feature distributed electric propulsion. In this effort, the Lift+Cruise 
configuration features eight (8), two-bladed rotors distributed across the wingspan, plus a single 
pusher propeller. Data are presented for this configuration performing an UAM mission with a 
1,200 lbs payload over a 37.5 nm radius (ref. 3). The design gross weight (DGW) of the resulting 
Lift+Cruise air vehicle is 6,013 lbs. The powertrain features a single 3,376 HP turboshaft engine 
that drives an Alternating Current (AC) electric generator to provide power to the distributed elec-
tric motors at each rotor/propeller. The distinctive feature of this configuration is that the lifting 
rotors are stopped during cruise and aligned with the oncoming flow, effectively separating the 
sources of lift and propulsive force. The tip speed of each rotor is 546 ft/sec and the rotor diameter 
is 10.0 feet, resulting in a rotor speed of 1,043 RPM. 
 
Figure 4:  Lift+Cruise Air Vehicle Concept 
1.7 Mission Profile 
The RVLT Concept Vehicle payloads, range, type, propulsion system, and gross weight are 
summarized and listed in Table 1, for reference (ref. 2, 3).  Note that the Lift+Cruise vehicle was 
sized for a shorter 37.5 nm mission radius. 
Table 1:  Mission Profile Summary of NASA RVLT Concept Vehicles 
Passengers Range Type 
Propulsion  
Architecture 
Design Gross 
Weight Reference 
15 400 nm 
(8 x 50 nm) 
Tilt-Wing Turbo-electric 14,039 lbs Ref. 2 
1 50 nm Quad-Rotor All Electric 1,252 lbs Ref. 2 
6 200 nm 
(4 x 50 nm) 
Lateral-Twin Parallel Hybrid 3,950 lbs Ref. 2 
6 75 nm 
(2 x 37.5 nm) 
Lift+Cruise Turbo-Electric 6,013 lbs Ref. 3 
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2 WORK SCOPE 
In order to accomplish the noted research objectives conceptual powertrain configurations were 
developed with enough detail to support the FHA and FMECA.  Functional Block Diagrams were 
created in order to support FHA and FMECA development and a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was 
performed for each vehicle configuration to examine the dependencies one system may have on 
another. 
2.1 Conceptual Powertrain Configurations Scope 
A conceptual powertrain configuration was developed for each of the four (4) RVLT air-vehicle 
concept configurations used in this research effort.  The complexity and functional requirements 
of DE/HEP systems required that each RVLT air-vehicle conceptual powertrain configuration in-
cluded a rotating system, a flight control system, and a thermal management system. 
The rotating system was defined as the components or sub-assemblies within the powertrain that 
provided rotary motion to the rotor system.  This included generators, motors, gearboxes, and in-
terconnecting shafts.  An initial trade study was performed to optimize the weight of the system 
within current state-of-the-art technology.  Additional weight savings may be observed by further 
increasing reduction ratios, but additional technology development is recommended in order to 
increase the reduction ratio between the motor and rotors further.  Rotating system schematics 
consisted of stick diagrams identifying gear ratios, mechanical interconnections, and rotational 
speeds at each junction.  Each schematic was intended to provide enough detail to define the in-
terconnections between major components; the input powers and speeds, output powers and 
speeds, intermediate or emergency interconnecting shafts, and accessories required for thermal 
management and primary airplane functions were conceptualized. 
The flight control system was defined as the components or sub-assemblies within the powertrain 
that send/receive control signals to the primary propulsion system.  Typically, the flight control 
system will send/receive signals from primary flight controls, pilot inputs, and the environment, 
among others.  However, the research objectives for this study focused on the powertrain config-
urations and the reliability/safety, thereof.  The typical flight control system functions were as-
sumed to be unrelated to the current work because the reliability/safety of the typical functions of 
the flight control system were assumed to be unchanged when adding in the functions closely 
coupled to the powertrain, itself.  The amount of coupling between a flight control computer and 
the propulsion system varies depending on architectural decisions related to flight control archi-
tectures or the location of feedback and control loops that command speed or power inputs to a 
propulsion system.  In variable pitch, constant speed flight control systems, the propulsion system 
and flight control system are loosely coupled, but as functions are added to the propulsion system, 
as in the case of variable speed, constant pitch flight control systems, the coupling between the 
two (2) systems becomes tighter as they share tasks to complete a specified subset of functions.  
For this study, however, the flight control computing system reliability was considered to be a 
pass-through value in the reliability and safety assessment because government regulations and 
industry standards are available to guide the design of safe flight control computing systems.  In 
practice, dual, triplex, or quad-computing architectures may be adopted in order to make the flight 
control computing system acceptably safe for the specified mission. 
The thermal management system was defined as the components or sub-assemblies within the 
powertrain that are (1) required to regulate the temperature of powertrain components and (2) not 
associated with another systems integral lubrication or cooling system framework.  The engine, 
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engine bay, generator, and rectifier (as applicable), the battery network, Electronic Speed Control-
lers (ESC), motors, and gearboxes were assumed to require thermal management system provi-
sions.  However, the engine and gearbox cooling have historically been performed by their own, 
independent cooling and lubrication systems and engine bay cooling is generally different from 
engine to engine, even within the same power class.  For this activity the components that were 
cooled by the thermal management system included rectifiers, battery networks, and ESC’s.  Gen-
erators and motors were assumed to be cooled by a shared lubrication system with the gearbox due 
to their proximity to an already existing cooling/lubrication system. 
2.2 Functional Hazard Assessment Scope 
The FHA was executed per Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Aerospace Recommended 
Practice (ARP) 4761. The scope of the FHA was to encompass the propulsion system for each air 
vehicle concept under study. A separate FHA was provided for each concept vehicle.  The Quad-
Rotor was analyzed for two (2) configurations.  The baseline Quad-Rotor was assessed with the 
noted interconnecting shafts and an alternate configuration was assessed with the interconnecting 
shafts removed, similar to a direct-drive Quad-Rotor. 
The format was a combination of aircraft level and system level FHA, as applicable. Systems 
aligned with, but not directly tied into providing propulsion for the air vehicle (flight controls, 
computer functions located in propulsion LRUs, but not directly related to propulsion) were ad-
dressed to the extent that they affect the availability of propulsion.  
Typical items feeding into the loss of propulsion were individual and dual motor failures, electrical 
(battery, low and high power supply) failures, gearbox failures, cooling failures (both liquid cool-
ing and forced air as applicable), electrical control LRU failures and generator failures. 
Flight conditions were assessed from the perspective of the One Engine Inoperable (OEI) or One 
Motor Inoperable (OMI) avoid region.  This defines the time at risk (TAR) where a single propul-
sion unit failure will result in loss of lift necessary to continue the flight.  The air vehicles are 
uniformly assumed to spend 20% of their flight time within the OEI/OMI avoid region, in which 
a single loss of a propulsion unit’s ability to provide torque to a rotor will result in power required 
exceeding power available and a hard landing sufficient to cause Critical or Severe damage to the 
aircraft or occupants.  
For the hybrid-electric propulsion vehicle concepts, the FHA considered the loss of the turboshaft 
engine driving the main power AC Generator as a complete loss of propulsion.  The battery only 
flight capabilities of the vehicles were addressed as part of the FTA. 
Loss of control will be captured in the FHA with relevant effects being related to failures of the 
propulsion system. Since the topic of the trade study is uniquely looking at the architecture of 
hybrid propulsion systems, air vehicle control systems (cyclic actuators, flaperons, elevators, etc.) 
will not be evaluated for inducing loss of control in the FHA. Loss of control due to loss of pro-
pulsion or inability to provide thrust/lift will be evaluated and further explored in the FTA. 
2.3 FMECA Scope 
Functional block diagrams were created for each of the concept vehicles based on the conceptual 
powertrain configurations.  Functions were defined at the equipment level to facilitate the devel-
opment of meaningful functional failures.  Each function was reviewed and potential failure modes 
were postulated for each function and assigned failure mode identification codes (FMECA ID 
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Code).  The failure effects were based on assessment of each air-vehicle, as derived from the 
NASA technical papers (ref. 2, 3)   
Failure rates can vary significantly based on detailed design, application, and use.  Reliability is 
designed into equipment based on requirements, which would be developed based on the conse-
quence, severity, or criticality of the failure effect, among others.  Similar equipment to that of the 
conceptual equipment defined for this study were used to define failure rates. 
Current, state-of-the-art components designed for specific DE/HEP airplane applications may be 
higher than the historical values used herein.  However, these components likely take years to 
develop and the reliability of new components must be validated initially through analysis before 
entering a certification test program in order to validate component reliability in test.  Once the 
component is fielded, then a tracking a records keeping process must be adopted to determine if 
reliability through the components life is meeting expectations or if earlier retirement lives or in-
spections intervals must be adopted. 
2.4 FTA Scope 
FTA is a top-down analysis meant to capture the propulsion components and to examine their 
interrelationships and allow the definition of cut-sets to show areas where system improvements 
would improve the top-level number. The roll-up of the propulsion FTAs are done so that loss of 
propulsion may also include loss of control, depending on air vehicle configuration. The FTA is 
meant to document a Catastrophic or Severe outcome top level, though lesser severity hazards may 
become evident due to FTA structure and execution. 
Overall, the propulsion specific systems and their failures to provide propulsion function are what 
roll-up to the top-level hazard. The unique all-electric or hybrid-electric aspects of the propulsion 
system, the electronics that control the motor, the motor itself, batteries, thermal management sys-
tem, and charging system were captured in the FTA. Systems that may be shared between propul-
sion and flight controls (e.g., rotor RPM and collective pitch) are examined only in their contribu-
tion to the top level loss of propulsion hazard. Loss of multiple propulsors may cause control 
problems that are considered a part of the loss of propulsion top level hazard. 
The top level hazards defined from the propulsion system FHA were used to inform the top level 
of the fault tree. The FTA was done to a level of detail sufficient to show architectural impacts to 
the top-level hazard. The FTA may capture system effects that roll up to higher losses of functions 
captured in the FHA. 
FTA was accomplished on the following configurations: 
1. Tilt-Wing with hybrid electric propulsion in which a turboshaft engine charges batter-
ies and provides electric motors with electrical power. 
2. Quad-Rotor with electric propulsion with cross-shafting so that individual propulsion 
fails, with the exceptions of the local gearbox, can be compensated for by the remaining 
propulsors. Individual propulsor fails can conditionally roll up to the top level hazard 
if occurring in the OEI avoid region of low-speed, low-altitude flight. 
3. Quad-Rotor with electric propulsion without cross-shafting so that if an individual pro-
pulsor fails, thrust must be reduced so that a measure of control can be maintained. It 
is assumed that a loss of motor/propulsor in this configuration would likely result in a 
Catastrophic or Severe outcome. 
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4. Lateral-Twin with turboshaft power and with electric motor to supplement for takeoff 
and landing. It is assumed that the electric propulsion is necessary to ensure adequate 
power during the hover. Additionally, due to the rotor overlap, the collector gearbox 
and interconnecting shafts are considered flight critical to avoid rotor to rotor contact 
and subsequent catastrophic outcome. 
5. Lift+Cruise with hybrid electric propulsion in which a turboshaft engine charges bat-
teries and provides electric motors with electrical power.  It is assumed that one pro-
pulsion unit failure is not flight critical; however, the pusher propeller is used to aid in 
pitch control of the aircraft. 
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3 BACKGROUND 
3.1 Literature Review 
There exists a significant number of specification documents that provide guidelines for the design 
of various systems and sub-components on the aircraft. This sections presents a summarized de-
scription of a selection of documents which are pertinent to vertical lift vehicles with potential 
distributed propulsion/flight control designs.  
The European Union’s (EU) civil aviation safety organization is the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA). Concurrent with the execution of this work scope, EASA published a draft of a 
proposed Special Condition (SC) for small category VTOL aircraft (SC-VTOL-01) with input 
from industry and academia. This document is largely aimed at providing regulatory guidelines 
for the design of distributed lift/thrust unit vehicles with the assumption that autorotation and/or 
gliding is not possible. The document proposes characterizing vehicle reliability requirements to 
be a function of operating area (congested/non-congested) and number of on-board passengers 
(less than 5). These guidelines as presented are meant for vehicles with a gross weight of less than 
4,400 lbs regardless of the autonomous capabilities of the vehicle.  
SAE has published numerous documents pertaining to providing guidelines for recommended 
practice of the design of aircraft. ARP94910, as such, provides reliability metric guidelines for 
flight control systems (FCS) of military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). The document pre-
sents a scheme to characterize the FCS reliability based on two notional axes; Unmanned Aerial 
System (UAS) group and Operating Area. The UAS grouping is further discretized by vehicle 
weight, operational altitudes and speed. The operating area coverage ranges from restricted all the 
way to uncontrolled airspace (using International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) definitions 
of airspace). The guidelines provided are intended for rotorcraft and fixed wing UAV’s alike.  
SAE also have published aircraft design standard documents, including AS94900. This document 
provides reliability requirement design thresholds for flight control systems for military manned 
vehicles. Discretization of these thresholds is based on aircraft weight and maneuverability for 
fixed wing aircraft, whereas, for rotorcraft only a single threshold is provided.  
The United States Department of Defense publishes and maintains a handbook (MIL-HDBK-
516C) that provides guidance to achieve airworthiness certification for military aircraft. The con-
tents of this documents applied to manned and unmanned fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The doc-
ument is a resource for guidelines for sub-system reliability targets which are characterized differ-
ently based on the sub-system level details. 
Aside from the above mentioned SAE documents, ARP4761 and ARP4754 cover the recom-
mended practices with regards to processes and methods to conduct aircraft safety assessments 
and the overall aircraft development process respectively. These documents are intended to apply 
to both manned and unmanned fixed and rotary wing aircraft. 
The Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data (NPRD) document provides a very useful historical da-
tabase of fielded parts reliability data. This document is a great resource to be used for safety and 
reliability assessment of a new aircraft design.  
In the United States the civil aircraft airworthiness requirements are provided by Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FAR) parts 23, 25, 27 and 29. Parts 23 and 27 apply to normal category (general 
aviation) fixed wing and rotorcraft respectively. Parts 25 and 29 apply to transport category fixed 
wing and rotorcraft respectively. While the parts themselves do not provide reliability metric de-
sign requirements they are provided in associated advisory circulars for part 23, 25 and 29 aircraft 
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(AC23.1309, AC25.1309 and AC29.1309). The advisory circular associated with part 27 aircraft 
(normal category rotorcraft, AC27.1309) does not explicitly provide quantitative reliability guide-
lines for the aircraft level but instead references other documents as sources for guidelines (MIL-
HDBK-217, manufacture reports and laboratory part life tests). 
3.2 Nomenclature & Taxonomy 
In order to facilitate the discussion of the coverage and gaps with regards to the design metrics for 
reliability it is important to provide a foundation for the organization of the various types of air-
craft. It is proposed to organize the various types of aircraft as presented in Figure 5. The organi-
zation is based on two independent axes: Number of powerplants and Number of propulsors. The 
term powerplants refers to an onboard device which converts stored energy (fossil fuels, electrical 
energy etc.) to mechanical power output (torque and rotational speed), e.g. turbine engines, tur-
boshaft engines, electric brushless motors etc. Propulsors on the other hand refer to aerodynamic 
force and moment generating devices on board the vehicles (e.g. rotors and propellers). Each of 
these axes is discretized into two levels; 1-3 and 3+ powerplants or propulsors. Note the intention-
ally introduced overlap in the levels; this has been done to recognize the non-discrete nature of 
aircraft design decomposition.  
As noted in the table, aircraft with 1-3 powerplants and propulsors are categorized as conventional. 
These type of aircraft generally have good coverage from existing published design documents in 
terms of reliability metrics. These aircraft generally include a drive system to transmit and provide 
load sharing of the mechanical power (torque and rotational speed) between the on-board power-
plants and propulsors. Typically, variable pitch (collective and cyclic) control schemes are imple-
mented for these type of aircraft. Examples of these type of aircraft include but are not limited to, 
H-47, V-22, AH-64, H-6, H-60, R22, R44, S-76, and MH-139. Note that this category of vehicles 
can include electric powerplants. 
Aircraft with a combination of either 3+ powerplants/1-3 propulsors or 1-3 powerplants/3+ pro-
pulsors are referenced as Distributed Propulsion (DP) or Distributed Flight Control (DFC) vehicles 
respectively. These types of aircraft typically have load sharing drive systems to transmit torque 
between the powerplants and propulsors. The configurations can have electric motors and/or tur-
bines as their powerplants whereas the propulsors are typically controlled via a variable pitch 
scheme. Note that the variable pitch scheme can be collective only for the case of distributed flight 
control configurations. It may be possible to extend reliability metric guidelines presented for the 
conventional aircraft to this aircraft configuration type. Examples include the lateral twin config-
uration presented in this report (2 turbine, 1 electric motor powerplant with 2 rotors with variable 
pitch control).  
Aircraft designs with 3+ powerplants and propulsors are categorized as distributed propulsion and 
flight control configurations (DPFC). These type of aircrafts typically involve the capability of 
direct torque transmission between the powerplants and the propulsors. Furthermore, variable 
speed control schemes are as likely to be used on these platforms as variable pitch control schemes. 
These type of configurations would be likely be designed to integrate either an all-electric or a 
hybrid electric propulsion system; deemed Distributed Electric/Hybrid Electric Propulsion 
(DE/HEP). There is little to no coverage of these type of vehicles with regards to reliability metric 
guidelines in existing publicly available literature. Examples this type of configuration include the 
Tilt-wing, Lift+Cruise and the Quad-rotor configurations discussed in this report. 
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Figure 5:  Proposed Vehicle Configuration Taxonomy. 
Traditional aircraft platform system have a specific distinction between flight control and propul-
sion systems which is reflected in publicized guidance and specification documents. DPFC sys-
tems, on the other hand, have a much tighter coupling of flight control and propulsion functions. 
Current specification and guideline documents don’t reconcile flight control/propulsion functional 
allocation for this aircraft propulsion/platform type. For example for variable speed flight control 
scheme systems reliability metric specifications tend to be applied to both flight controls and pro-
pulsion systems leading to potential conflict, overdesign and/or infeasible configurations. A dis-
cussion of this tighter coupling is detailed in section 5 of this report. 
3.3 Functional Overlap of Distributed Propulsion and Distributed Flight Controls 
Functions at an air vehicle level may be shared by sub-systems; however, critical functions, such 
as pitch control and thrust, are generally segregated so that one (1) failure provides an opportunity 
for the pilot to land the airplane safely.  DE/HEP concepts may be segregated into to smaller cat-
egories, wherein control is provided by a variable pitch rotor system which has a light functional 
coupling to the propulsion system, or wherein control is provided by varying the speed of the rotor 
system, which tends to create a tight functional coupling between airplane control and propulsion.  
Figure 6 uses some example airplane functions to depict the overlap of typical variable pitch and 
variable speed DE/HEP systems.  As more functions, and therefore more functional failures, are 
attributable to the Propulsion System, then either the reliability requirements for the Propulsion 
System increase or the vehicle architecture must be designed with appropriate levels of safety in 
failure mode conditions. 
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Figure 6:  Flight Control and Propulsion Systems’ Functional Overlap for (a) Typical Vari-
able Pitch DE/HEP Systems and (b) Typical Variable Speed DE/HEP Systems. 
Airplane functions, and thereby functional hazards, associated with DE/HEP systems can be ex-
tensive depending on whether the propulsion system includes control of the vehicle.  Either the 
FHA may include more functions in the air-vehicle level FHA or, as is in the case of this FHA, 
apply loss of control or other hazards up through the primary, loss of propulsion hazard. 
3.4 Vehicle Level Reliability Metrics 
Current FAR parts 23, 27, 25 and 29 provide guidance for reliability metrics for airworthiness of 
manned fixed and rotary wing (normal and transport category) aircraft. These aircraft are labeled 
“conventional” using the nomenclature described earlier (Figure 5). Depending on the specific 
aircraft configuration these regulations can be extended for manned DP or DFC scheme aircraft. 
For example, the EASA proposed special condition (SC-VTOL-01) is an attempt to cover distrib-
uted flight control scheme vehicles and is an adaptation of the FAR part 23 as is applicable.  
Note that these documents do not provide coverage of guidelines of unmanned vehicles. Manned 
aircraft in this context are defined as vehicles with onboard crew stations and as a corollary un-
manned aircraft are defined as ones that have no onboard crew station. Unmanned aircraft can be 
remotely piloted or operated. Manned aircraft for existing FAR guidance implies on-board crew is 
providing piloting functions and is not only limited to operator functions. While coverage of un-
manned systems is important and requires the attentions of the various pertinent stakeholders, 
however, given the current surge in DE/HEP system designs there is a more pressing need for 
reliability metric guidelines for DE/HEP manned systems.  
The existing regulations also do not provide coverage of any DPFC systems and by extension 
DE/HEP aircraft configurations. The FAA, currently, has not published any official guidelines that 
cover DPFC aircraft configurations explicitly. The Quad-rotor and the Lateral-Twin configura-
tions discussed in this report are the only two configurations that would be covered under the 
EASA special condition guidelines. The other configurations would have no direct civil aviation 
reliability guideline specification available to apply. Note that the MIL-HDBK-516 document does 
provide metrics for military aircraft of similar size but with no distinction provided for DE/HEP 
configurations. 
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A gap exists in current publicly available documentation on design guidelines/specification for 
reliability metrics of distributed electric/hybrid-electric propulsion (DE/HEP) aircraft. This docu-
ment pertains primarily to VTOL concepts and as such the following discussion is with regards to 
rotary wing vehicles only. 
ARP94910 is a military UAS flight control system design document published and maintained by 
SAE.  This document provides a suitable example to draw upon for developing DE/HEP system 
reliability metrics. To facilitate discussion consider the following configuration: Light UAS, 50 
lbs. with a DE/HEP configuration operating around Class B/C airspace with an operating altitude 
limit 3500 above ground level (AGL) and an operating cruise speed of no greater than 30 knots. 
This aircraft under ARP94910 would be required to ensure that VMS failures that causes aircraft 
loss of control to occur no more often 10-6 per flight hour. As a rule of thumb this would result in 
an aircraft level equivalent catastrophic failure rate of 10-5 per flight hour. If this same aircraft 
were to be evaluated using EASA rules, assuming that the quantitative requirements are applicable, 
the required reliability metric for aircraft catastrophic failure rate is 10-9 per flight hour. The ap-
parent difference in the reliability metric specified by both of these documents for the same aircraft 
can also be seen even if an order of magnitude correction was added to the ARP94910 value to 
account for civil aircraft considerations. The EASA special condition document, too broadly ap-
plies the most stringent recommendation across a wide variety of DPFC aircraft types operating in 
congested environments. If adopted as a regulation, this proposed special condition may poten-
tially limit the economic growth of the relatively new sector of DE/HEP configurations. In con-
junction with aircraft airworthiness definitions it is important to consider the regulations as they 
apply to operational use as well. FAA part 121 and 135 are the prime applicable regulation in the 
context of the aircraft configurations discussed in this report. Part 121 covers air carrier configu-
rations which would typically use FAR 25 and 29 aircraft types. This regulation is developed in 
consideration with a scheduled service operational model. Part 135 covers on-demand commuter 
aircraft which can utilize FAR 23, 25, 27 or 29 aircraft types. This regulation is developed in 
consideration of on-demand, lower frequency and relatively short range service model (as com-
pared to Part 121). Generally, the UAM concept has identified Part 135 regulation as the closest 
fit regulation to their proposed operational model (ref. 4). The paper further specifies that UAM 
vehicles will be designed to exceed the Part 135 operational catastrophic failure rate by four times. 
A gap in coverage of the Part 135 document exists, as its development is not consistent with the 
high frequency short flight operational model that coincides with overarching, UAM objectives. 
Furthermore, part 135 does not cover non-traditional airport traffic which is the primary model for 
UAM, i.e. high frequency operation in congested areas. In particular, the white paper argues that 
this model is required for economic viability. 
It is recommended that additional guidance be developed to cover manned DE/HEP aircraft con-
figuration types with regards to airworthiness, reliability and safety. Furthermore, additional con-
sideration should also be given to operational requirements for the emerging high frequency, short 
haul, on-demand air-taxis service models aimed at densely populated metropolitan areas. This con-
sideration, is recommended, to not be limited to simple extension of existing FAR’s to DE/HEP 
configurations due to the tighter coupling of propulsion and flight control functions. 
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4 METHODOLOGY AND COMMON ASSUMPTIONS 
In order to evaluate the reliability and safety of the NASA RVLT Concept Vehicles, improved 
powertrain configuration schematics needed to be developed in order to illustrate the connectivity 
between sub-systems and the major components of each sub-system.  A process was developed in 
which “stick” diagrams could be utilized to develop enough detail to facilitate development of 
functional block diagrams, which could then, in turn, be used to populate the FHA, FMECA, and 
FTA.  An example of a “stick” diagram is shown in Figure 7.   
Rotors, low voltage batteries, flight control computers, wires, and other components that are 
typically found in helicopters that do not facilitate the operation of the powertrain were left out of 
the functional block diagrams and FMECA’s because they were considered to be pass-through 
reliability values in 
the fault tree and the 
criticality number 
of these would be 
high enough in the 
FMECA that they 
would affect the Se-
verity I criticality 
value.  These com-
ponents have been 
being designed for 
decades in an ac-
ceptably safe man-
ner and it is ex-
pected that they will 
continue to be de-
signed in such a 
manner, even 
though electrical 
energy storage is 
being utilized.  For 
example, the low 
voltage batteries 
can be wired in a 
fail-safe and 
switched architec-
ture with minimal 
weight penalty us-
ing decade’s old 
techniques.  For the 
finalized air-vehicle 
entering prelimi-
nary or critical de-
sign reviews, the ro-
tor system and low Figure 7:  Example Stick Diagram with Rotating, Flight Control, and 
Thermal Management Systems overlaid. 
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voltage batteries would be included, but this study focused on the novel distributed electric pro-
pulsion architectures. 
Items that were included in the functional block diagrams, FMECA’s, and fault trees were 
critical in performing the safety assessment of each vehicle.  For example, the gearboxes depicted 
in the “stick” diagrams have accepted reliability and are generally developed in safe manners, but 
the function of providing mechanical interconnection between rotors was deemed critical to com-
pleting the reliability and safety analysis of the NASA RVLT Concept Vehicles. 
The process developed to analyze the safety of the NASA RVLT Concept Vehicles used the 
“stick” diagrams to develop functional block diagrams, in which ID codes and primary functions 
were developed.  Sub-tier functions and hazards were then postulated in the FHA, in which end 
effects and severities were assigned to each functional failure.  The data generated in the FHA was 
then passed into the FMECA, where additional sub-tier functions, reliability values, end effects, 
next higher effects, and other critical information sets were populated.  The FTA then compiled 
information from the functional block diagrams, FHA, and FMECA to build the fault tree archi-
tecture and populate the failure rates for a given failure mode and next higher effect.  The process 
flow is depicted in Figure 8.   
As can be seen in Figure 8, the amount of data used to facilitate each analysis step steadily 
increases when moving through the reliability/safety assessment process.  Historical data or anal-
ysis was used where appropriate; however, in some cases, assumptions had to be made that should 
be turned into derived requirements, if the airplanes continue along in their development.  As-
sumptions needed to be developed because of the conceptual nature of the airplanes under scrutiny.  
Configuration, FHA, FMECA, and FTA assumptions were documented so that derived require-
ments and verification may take place as the airplanes mature. 
4.1 Configuration Assumptions 
As is common with the aircraft conceptual design process, design assumptions were defined and 
documented in order to enable the analysis described in this document.  Some design assumptions 
were common across multiple vehicle configurations, while others were configuration specific.  
Design assumptions were used to address and document the state of technology used in each con-
figuration and the scope covered in each of the configurations. 
In many cases design decisions had to be made that could not be comprehensively assessed with 
the amount of design detail available; it is in these cases where assumptions were made based on 
experience, anticipated regulations, cursory analytical results, or other applicable and relevant in-
formation. In practice, design assumptions made early in the program are intended to keep the 
design space open and design assumptions that limit the design space may become system require-
ments as the program matures. 
Hazards for this study will focus on in-flight mission reliability, assume flight over populated, 
metropolitan areas, and assume that flight controls and neighboring systems unaffected by the 
change to an electrified propulsion system meet reliability requirements.  Ground based hazards 
should be assessed as the systems mature. Examples of such hazards include overheating during 
charging, arcing, and fuel leaks.  The UAM mission is intended to be flown over major cities to 
reduce roadway congestion and travel time (ref. 4); therefore, the UAM aircraft assessed here will 
be assessed against the metric that they operate over populated, metropolitan areas (ref. 4). 
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Figure 8:  Process Flow Used to Assess Reliability and Safety of NASA HA/FMECA 
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Flight controls, environmental systems, or other sub-systems that are not directly impacted by 
the change from conventional propulsion to all-electric or hybrid-electric propulsion are not as-
sessed because it is assumed that the safety and reliability of these systems are expected to be 
invariant when introducing various propulsion system configurations, except as noted herein. 
Hazards for this study are limited to power-on mission segments.  Autorotation and power-off, 
wing-borne flight are excluded from the current study.  The ability to autorotate or maintain an 
intended flight path with primary power turned off requires complex analysis and/or test, depend-
ing on configuration.  The Quad-Rotor without cross-shafting, for instance, may be theoretically 
able to autorotate, but in practice controlling the speed of all four (4) rotors independently may 
prove difficult.  
Temperature limits considered in this study include a maximum ambient temperature of 125 
degrees Fahrenheit (˚F), a maximum box temperature of 131˚F for speed controllers and invert-
ers/rectifiers, an operating temperature range of 59˚F to 113˚F (15 degrees Celsius (˚C) to 45˚C) 
degree for batteries, and a maximum box temperature for motors and gearboxes of 250˚F. 
In order to manage risk and to develop inherently safe architectures, some components were 
intentionally physically or functionally isolated from others.  The Flight Control Computer (FCC) 
was isolated from the motors by integrating motor control authority into each motor’s individual 
ESC; thereby isolating the function of speed regulation in the event signal is lost between the FCC 
and ESC.  The ESC has the ability to regulate rotor speed through a local control loop and can 
revert to a set speed if FCC signal is lost.  Specifically, for this exercise, the ESC’s will revert to 
their last recorded speed. 
The rotors and cross shafting were isolated from each electric motor via emergency disconnect 
system in case of an ESC or motor failure.  In some cases the emergency disconnect system takes 
the form of an overrunning clutch and in other cases takes the form of a friction disc clutch.  Using 
the term “emergency disconnect system” was intended to provide design freedom while still main-
taining the function of an overrunning clutch or friction disc clutch.  ESC failure could result in a 
transient torque spike or similar physical event that could overload components and cause down-
stream components to fracture.  Motor failures could include rotor/stator contact or locked rotors, 
in which case fire or large braking loads could cause fracture to downstream components. 
A common reduction ratio rotor gearbox (RGB) was used for both the Quad-Rotor and Tilt-Wing 
RGB.  The common reduction ratio was 17.42:1, which is a comfortable reduction ratio for a two 
(2) stage planetary system.  Using the noted reduction ratio, the Quad-Rotor would utilize an 
11,683 RPM Motor and the Tilt-Wing would utilize a 14,998 RPM motor, nominally.  The torque 
capacity of the RGBs would be scaled from the 58 ft-lbs final stage design torque of the Quad-
Rotor to the 1,920 ft-lbs final stage design torque of the Tilt-Wing.  The baseline vehicles assumed 
8,000 RPM motor output shaft speeds.   
A weight trend to show the impact of the noted higher speed motors can be easily developed using 
the US Army Aeroflightdynamics Directorate (AFDD) Drive System Weight Model AFDD00 and 
the NASA Motor Weight Model, NASA15, both of which are for weight buildups in NASA Design 
and Analysis of Rotorcraft (NDARC) (ref. 5).  A weight trend was developed for the Tilt-Wing, 
assuming a Rotor Speed of 861 RPM and Motor of 731 HP Maximum Continuous Power (MCP) 
and 1,462 HP Maximum Rated Power (MRP).  The weight trend was developed for a single Prop-
Rotor, so a Main Rotor value of “1” was used for this weight trend.  Figure 9 shows a 46 lbs weight 
savings per rotor by utilizing a 14,998 RPM Motor, resulting in nearly 200 lbs total weight savings 
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in the Propulsion System.  A similar weight trend can be developed for the Quad-Rotor which will 
showing a notable weight savings over the baseline, 8,000 RPM Motor. 
  
Figure 9:  Weight Trend for one (1) Prop-Rotor Propulsion System of  
NASA RVLT Tilt-Wing Concept Vehicle. 
The additional reduction ratio applied to the RGB was intended to reduce empty weight.  
Weight savings using the NDARC weights buildup estimates ~200 lbs saved in the drive system 
for the Tilt-Wing, which would result in ~500 lbs empty weight savings due to the iteration loop 
of typical VTOL airplane sizing (ref. 6).  It is expected that fail-safe ESC’s are required to meet 
projected reliability targets, which will add weight to the propulsion system; the added weight of 
the fail-safe ESC’s could be offset by the weight savings of the gearboxes and motors for a weight 
neutral impact.  Aircraft center of gravity was not considered, but Boeing recommends that future 
work includes a mass balance record of all airplane sub-systems to assess cg location. 
4.1.1 Tilt-Wing Design Assumptions 
It was assumed that the aircraft starter system, whether electric or conventional auxiliary power 
unit (APU) starting, is isolated from the primary propulsion system.  Isolating the starting system 
significantly reduces the probability of failures of the lower-reliability starting system to generate 
failures in the primary propulsion system.  The aircraft starter system was isolated from the pri-
mary propulsion system so that faults related to the starter system did not propagate into the pro-
pulsion system.  The term “isolation” means, in this context, that a failure in the starter system will 
not cause a category I or II failure in the propulsion system, but the starter system and the propul-
sion system will still be coupled together as required for the starter system to perform its function. 
Battery arrays were assumed to be physically isolated from one-another within the battery network 
of the Tilt-Wing configuration.  The battery arrays were conceptualized to be placed near each 
electric motor and ESC; this assumption complicates battery thermal management and may require 
independent cooling loops for each battery array. 
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Hazards and FTA will focus on hover (rotary-wing-borne flight) and level-flight cruise (fixed-
wing-borne flight) mission segments, considering percent time spent in each segment.  Conver-
sion/transition and climb/descent segments were not included in this analysis.  
Hazards and FTA will assume the fuel system meets reliability requirements regardless of propul-
sion system for the Tilt-Wing.  Both conventional (turboshaft engine burning fossil fuels turning 
rotors) and series-hybrid electric (turboshaft engine burning fossil fuels turning generator) will 
require effectively the same fuel system. 
4.1.2 Quad-Rotor Design Assumptions 
Battery packs were assumed to be distributed and isolated from one-another inside the fuselage.  
Although represented as a single block of High Voltage Batteries in the configuration diagrams, 
they were conceptualized to include fail-safe switching and are assumed to be physically isolated 
from one-another such that a failure in one module does not propagate to all modules. 
4.1.3 Lateral-Twin Design Assumptions 
It was assumed that the aircraft starter system, whether electric or conventional APU starting, is 
isolated from the primary propulsion system.  Isolating the starting system significantly reduces 
the probability of failures of the lower-reliability starting system to generate failures in the primary 
propulsion system.  The aircraft starter system was isolated from the primary propulsion system 
so that faults related to the starter system did not propagate into the propulsion system.  The term 
“isolation” means, in this context, that a failure in the starter system will not cause a category I or 
II failure in the propulsion system, but the starter system and the propulsion system will still be 
coupled together as required for the starter system to perform its function. 
Battery packs were assumed to be distributed and isolated from one-another inside the fuselage.  
Although they were represented as a single block of High Voltage Batteries in the configuration 
diagrams, they were conceptualized to include fail-safe switching and will be physically isolated 
from one-another so that a failure in one module does not propagate to all modules. 
Hazards and FTA will assume the fuel system meets reliability requirements irrespective of pro-
pulsion system for the Lateral-Twin.  Both conventional (turboshaft engine burning fossil fuels 
turning rotors) and series-hybrid electric (turboshaft engine burning fossil fuels turning generator) 
will require effectively the same fuel system. 
4.1.4 Lift+Cruise Design Assumptions 
It was assumed that the aircraft starter system, whether electric or conventional APU starting, is 
isolated from the primary propulsion system.  Isolating the starting system significantly reduces 
the probability of failures of the lower-reliability starting system to generate failures in the primary 
propulsion system. 
Battery packs were assumed to be distributed and isolated from one-another inside the fuselage.  
Although they were represented as a single block of High Voltage Batteries in the configuration 
diagrams, they were conceptualized to include fail-safe switching and will be physically isolated 
from one-another so that a failure in one module does not propagate to all modules. 
Hazards and FTA will assume the fuel system meets reliability requirements irrespective of pro-
pulsion system for Lateral-Twin.  Both conventional (turboshaft engine burning fossil fuels turning 
rotors) and series-hybrid electric (turboshaft engine burning fossil fuels turning generator) will 
require effectively the same fuel system. 
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4.2 Functional Hazard Assessment Assumptions 
Hazards for this study will focus on in-flight mission reliability, assume flight over populated, 
metropolitan areas, and also assume that flight controls and adjacent systems unaffected by the 
change to an electrified propulsion system meet reliability requirements.  Ground based hazards 
are not considered as part of the initial FHA. Examples of such hazards includes overheating dur-
ing charging, arcing, and fuel leaks.  The UAM mission is intended to be flown over major cities 
to reduce congestion and travel time (ref. 4); therefore, the UAM aircraft assessed here will be 
assessed against the metric that they are operate over populated, metropolitan areas. 
Flight controls, environmental systems, or other sub-systems that are unaffected by the change 
from conventional propulsion to all-electric or hybrid-electric propulsion are not generally as-
sessed in the FHA because it is assumed that both design authorities and regulating agencies are 
able to adequately assess the safety and reliability of these systems. Those systems will only be 
assessed to the extent that they uniquely interface into the propulsion system, especially in light of 
the FTA assessment feeding back potential common-cause failures as contributing to loss of func-
tion in the FHA  
Hazards for this study are limited to power-on mission segments. Autorotation and power-off, 
wing-borne flight are not examined in this FHA. Autorotation and power-off flight will be consid-
ered as states the air vehicle reaches after the onset of the loss of examined function.  The aircraft 
may be able to enter autorotation or power-off flight in the phase of flight under consideration, but 
additional stability and control and TAR analysis must be completed.  The ability to autorotate or 
maintain an intended flight path with primary power turned off requires complex analysis and/or 
test, depending on configuration.  The Quad-Rotor without cross-shafting, for instance, may be 
theoretically able to autorotate, but in practice control the speed of all four (4) rotor independently 
may prove difficult. These states and difficulties are noted as required in the FHA. 
4.2.1 Tilt-Wing FHA Assumptions 
It was assumed that the aircraft starter system, whether electric or conventional APU starting, is 
isolated from the primary propulsion system.  Isolating the starting system significantly reduces 
the probability of failures of the lower-reliability starting system to generate failures in the primary 
propulsion system. 
The vehicle configuration of the Tilt-Wing allowed to physically isolate battery arrays from one-
another within the battery network.  The battery arrays were conceptualized to be placed near each 
electric motor and ESC; the FHA assumes a common battery cooling system with two (2) pumps 
acting in parallel, either one capable of supplying adequate flow and pressure. 
Hazards and FTA will focus on hover (rotary-wing-borne flight) and level-flight cruise (fixed-
wing-borne flight) mission segments, considering percent time spent in each segment.  Conver-
sion/transition and climb/descent flight are not considered in the current analysis.  
Hazards and FTA will assume the fuel system meets reliability requirements regardless of propul-
sion system for Tilt-Wing.  Both conventional (turboshaft engine burning fossil fuels turning ro-
tors) and series hybrid propulsion (turboshaft engine burning fossil fuels turning generator) will 
require effectively the same fuel system. 
Loss of the turboshaft engine or other components necessary to keep the batteries charged will 
result in the air vehicle relying on batteries alone for propulsive power. The batteries are assumed 
to last two (2) minutes, and the air vehicle is assumed to be within two (2) minutes of a suitable 
landing zone 60% of the time. 
NASA/CR—2019-220217 20
 
  
 
 
 
Prop-rotors are assumed to connect by cross-shafting. This is done to mitigate potential propulsion 
imbalance, uneven lift, and attendant controllability issues. Single loss of gearboxes that will result 
in one of the prop-rotors is assumed to be non-catastrophic due to adequately sized controls to deal 
with any adverse yaw. Any dual gearbox loss is assumed to be catastrophic due to lack of thrust 
and potentially due to controllability issues.  
4.2.2 Quad-Rotor FHA Assumptions 
Battery packs were assumed to be distributed and isolated from one-another inside the fuselage.  
Although they were represented as a single block of High Voltage Batteries in the configuration 
diagrams, they were conceptualized to include fail-safe switching and will be physically isolated 
from one-another so that a failure in one module does not propagate to all modules. 
Two cross-shafting configurations were evaluated. In the cross-shafted configuration, all four (4) 
rotors are interconnected via common collector gearbox and associated drive-shafts. In the config-
uration without drive-shafting, all rotors are driven independently by their propulsors (motor and 
gearboxes).  
For the Quad-Rotor without cross-shafting, any single loss of a propulsor is considered loss of air 
vehicle due to the rotors not being cross-shafted together. The system may be configured to auto-
matically reduce lift on the diagonal side rotor. This will result in reduced controllability and con-
trol coupling. The reduction in lift from two propulsors (one lost, the other pulled back automati-
cally) will result in an autorotative approach, and the feasible outcome for this scenario is a loss 
of air vehicle/occupants. By contrast, in the example where the Quad-Rotor is cross-shafted, a loss 
of a single propulsor is Minor at altitude, and only potentially Catastrophic when the air vehicle is 
being operated in the OEI avoid region. 
Additionally, the effects of the position of any dual rotor failures is separately examined in the 
FHA for the Quad-Rotor air vehicle that is not cross-shafted. Controllability impacts are different 
for whether the propulsors are diagonal to each other or not, though in all cases the likely outcome 
for a dual propulsor failure is Catastrophic in all flight conditions. 
The two FHAs are color coded to assist the analyst in identifying changes between the two con-
figurations. The “Effect of the Failure” Column is color coded yellow where differences exist 
between the cross-shafted Quad-Rotor and the example without cross-shafting. Additionally, the 
“Classification of Failure” column is colored red in the FHA for the Quad-Rotor without cross-
shafting if the failure effect is more severe than the equivalent fail in the cross-shafted Quad-Rotor.  
4.2.3 Lateral-Twin FHA Assumptions 
The lateral twin has two conventional turboshaft engines driving rotors and an electric motor 
driven by a battery used for takeoff and landing. The lateral twin has cross-shafting so that the loss 
of any propulsor will not affect the ability to provide lift through both rotors. The loss of any of 
the given propulsor, either of the turboshafts or the electric motor, is examined in the FHA. 
4.2.4 Lift+Cruise FHA Assumptions 
The loss of any single propulsor, even in OEI, will not result in loss of lift sufficient to result in a 
hard-landing outcome. The air vehicle is, per the NASA Urban VTOL paper (ref. 3), capable of 
hovering with the loss of one propulsion unit, with the differential thrust being balanced out with 
a power reduction on another unit to control potential roll or yaw excursion. 
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Single propulsor fails are assumed to include the components that allow that propulsor to function: 
the gearbox, Motor, ESC, ESC Power, and the high voltage (HV) battery power. Any single pro-
pulsor failure is considered a Minor failure; dual propulsor failures are considered Major failures. 
Gearbox failures are assumed to be the same outcome as loss of propulsor in the hover region due 
to the RPM based thrust control, and the lack of interconnection between the engines. The FHA 
separately examines loss of the ability to align the propellers edge-wise to the relative wing to 
reduce drag. Drag increase due to one propeller is minor, as are two on opposite wings, but yaw 
control authority with two failed gearboxes on one wing where the propellers are not able to be 
turned edgewise to minimize drag may result in a Major outcome due to degraded yaw control. 
The turboshaft engine and associated gearbox, AC Generator, and AC/Direct Current (DC) con-
vertor are grouped together so that the loss of any of those components will result in the air vehicle 
relying on battery power alone for continued flight. If within 2 minutes of an acceptable landing 
spot, the failure of the charging components is considered Severe. If more than 2 minutes from an 
acceptable landing spot, than the outcome is assumed Catastrophic. 
4.3 FMECA Methodology & Assumptions 
A FMECA is a tabular document containing postulated failure modes of the propulsion system.  A 
FMECA was performed on the four (4) NASA RVLT Concept Vehicles to determine system fail-
ure modes and their associated criticality characteristics from a bottoms-up, function analysis.  
This examination of the system aids in identifying potential safety concerns.   
The FMECA process is a methodology for comprehensively identifying the failure modes for 
a system or component.  It progresses and matures in line with the design process and increases in 
detail along with the design.  The FMECA process begins in the conceptual design phase with 
initial planning and requirements review.  This lays the groundwork for the actual FMECA itself.  
System models and block diagrams are typically developed in this stage to aid in the identification 
of functions and functional decomposition.  Figure 10 shows the approximate alignment of 
FMECA development with the design process similar to what is described in SAE ARP5580 (ref. 
7). 
 
Figure 10:  FMECA Development and Design Flow. 
The first level of analysis occurs in the preliminary design phase with the functional analysis.  
This approach postulates the functions and functional failure modes associated with overall system 
performance.  It creates the basis by which the system level FMECA is constructed in detail to 
support the design elements as they are defined (at Critical Design Review), and indicates compo-
nent level candidates which may become the subject of separate FMECA efforts.  This functional 
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FMECA purposely focuses on the overall functions of the system elements.  In this sense, many 
of the components are analyzed as “black boxes,” with detailed internal functions and functional 
failure modes reserved for analysis at the individual component level. 
As the details of the design become more refined, so does the FMECA.  The second level of 
FMECA refinement is captured in the interface analysis, which incorporates the known features 
responsible for interfacing with other systems (e.g. where a gearbox is mounted to airframe struc-
ture or where an oil temperature sensor interfaces with the electrical system).  This assessment is 
typically developed early in the detailed design phase after preliminary design has been completed.  
In some cases, enough detail is available that some of the interface information can be incorporated 
prior to preliminary design completion. 
The FMECA is completed as the detailed design phase comes to a close in support of detailed 
or critical design reviews.  This analysis may explore sub-systems of the functional analysis’ sub-
systems or even deeper.  The FMECA captures failure modes to the level necessary to support 
follow-on safety, R&M, and logistics analyses. 
The FMECA also serves the purpose of providing a basis for validation throughout the lifecy-
cle of the system.  System testing and production phases are used to validate the existence of the 
postulated failure modes, their frequency of occurrence, and the effectiveness of cited compensat-
ing provisions.  This lifecycle validation helps to identify opportunities for future designs. 
Each phase of FMECA development follows a similar process after the FMECA is initially 
planned and functional requirements are analyzed (during the conceptual design phase).  The plan-
ning and block diagrams are used to identify functions and function (one at a time).  These are 
used to postulate failure modes for each functional failure (one at a time).  These failure modes are 
analyzed for their consequences from which severity codes may be assigned.  Severity is divided 
into four categories as defined in MIL-STD-1629A (ref. 8).  Severity category is assigned to pro-
vide a qualitative measure of the worst potential consequences resulting from design error or item 
failure.  The severity classifications are described in Table 2. 
Table 2:  Severity Classification Used in FMECA Worksheets. 
Category Severity of Effect 
I Catastrophic:  A failure which can cause death of system loss (i.e. aircraft, tank, missile, ship). 
II Critical:  A failure which can cause severe injury, major property damage, or ma-jor system damage which will result in mission loss. 
III 
Marginal:  A failure which may cause minor injury, minor property damage, or 
minor system damage which will result in delay or loss of availability or mission 
degradation. 
IV Minor:  A failure not serious enough to cause injury, property damage, or system damage, but which will result in unscheduled maintenance or repair. 
Finally, failure mode frequency is determined for each failure mode.  A flow chart of the 
FMECA development process which was adapted from SAE ARP5580 (ref. 7) is shown in Figure 
11.  For this study, failure rates of similar equipment were taken from various sources, then, de-
pending on the source information and engineering judgment, environmental factors were applied 
to generate a failure rate that is realistically achievable with state-of-the-art technology.  Table 3 
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contains a summary of each item, base failure rate, data source (reference material), applied envi-
ronmental factor, and the applied failure rate.  The base failure rate was taken from the noted data 
source and multiplied by the applied environmental factor, in which engineering judgment was 
used to apply environmental factors in accordance with MIL-HDBK-217 (ref. 9). 
 
Figure 11:  FMECA Development Flow Chart 
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Table 3:  Applied Failure Rate (FR) used for FMECA and FTA. 
Item 
Base FR 
(failures 
per 106 
hours) 
Data Source 
Reference 
Applied  
Environmental 
Factor 
Applied 
FR 
(failures 
per 106 
hours) 
Turbine Engine 2.67 Ref. 10 1 2.67 
Generator, AC 13 Ref. 11 10 130 
Gearbox assembly 0.5 Ref. 12 10 5 
Gearbox assembly, manual 4.8 Ref. 12 10 48 
Gearbox assembly, motor driven 2.6 Ref. 12 10 26 
Battery, lithium 9.31 Ref. 12 10 93.1 
Controller, motor 4.75 
Aircraft 
Maintenance 
Data 
10 47.5 
Motor-Generator 19.72 Ref. 13 10 197.2 
Electric Motor, General 9.24 Ref. 13 10 92.4 
Pump, general 43.65 Ref. 13 1 43.65 
Electronic Motor Drive 54 Ref. 14 5 270 
Air conditioner  
[Battery cooling system] 508 Ref. 13 1 508 
Heat exchanger 8.08 Ref. 13 1 8.08 
Motor cooling system 51.73 
(pump + 
Heat ex-
changer) 
1 51.73 
Airborne power supply 200 Ref. 15 1 200 
Clutch, General 5.01 Ref. 13 1 5.01 
Clutch, Overrunning 0.42 Ref. 12 1 0.42 
Shaft, General 0.93 Ref. 13 1 0.93 
Drive Link Assembly (drive shaft) 1.495 Ref. 13 1 1.495 
4.4 FTA Methodology & Assumptions 
The FTA are developed in parallel with, and are informed by, the Functional Block Diagram. 
The FMECA provides the numbers utilized in the fault trees. The FTA component assignments 
are titled after the FMECA ID code where applicable. In some cases multiple FMECA codes are 
covered by one FTA event. In this case the FTA title block will reflect the associated FMECA 
codes.  
The failure rate or failure criticality number will be used as appropriate in the fault tree. In 
some cases the individual failure to function in the FMECA will not roll up to the top level hazard. 
In this case the failures associated with the appropriate functions will be utilized, weighted by their 
corresponding Alpha (Mode Ratios). 
Common points of failure are modeled on the fault tree. Mitigations and system redundancy 
are modeled through appropriate gating. Cut-sets help show independence in system architecture. 
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4.4.1 Tilt-Wing FTA Assumptions 
The Tilt-Wing FTA was executed with the following assumptions: 
• The air vehicle is capable of wing-borne flight on any three remaining motors as long 
as air vehicle is in the region of Effective Translational Lift (ETL) or faster. ETL onset 
is assumed around 25 kts based on typical helicopter and tilt-rotor behavior. Any loss 
of a motor or propulsion unit above 25 kts is assumed to be recoverable. Any loss of a 
motor or propulsion unit below 25 kts will require adequate altitude to increase the 
speed of the air vehicle above 25 kts to continue flight. Any failure below 25 kts at low 
altitudes is analogous to a multi-engine helicopter losing an engine in the OEI avoid 
region. For such failures, a hard landing and potential catastrophic outcome is conser-
vatively assumed. 
• While the presence of cross-shafting will mitigate potential directional/roll control def-
icits at critical speeds (not addressed in propulsion FTA), the cross-shaft is assumed to 
provide no mitigation for power deficit below 25 kts. 
• It is assumed that the aircraft will be primarily operated over densely populated urban 
and suburban areas affording potentially few emergency landing possibilities. The mis-
sion length is assumed (ref. 2) as 2 minutes hover (takeoff), 15 minutes cruise (50 nm 
at 200 kts), and 2 minutes hover (landing). It is assumed that the air vehicle will spend 
approximately 78% of time in the short-haul cruise phase. 11% spent in takeoff and 
climb, and 11% during descent and landing. 
• Typical cruising altitudes are assumed to be 5,000 feet or below for the short haul leg. 
If longer cruise legs are specified, 10,000 feet will be assumed. An aggressive high-
rate of descent profile would be necessary for the aircraft to reach the ground and exe-
cute a landing prior to loss of battery and all air vehicle propulsion. This will result in 
approximately a 3.33 mile radius (assuming 200 kts during descent) of potential emer-
gency landing locations. Potential landing spots include golf courses, high school foot-
ball stadiums, etc. These may not be present in dense urban areas. 
• It is assumed that the landing would be executed with the wing tilted vertically to min-
imize landing roll-out. This may need to be balanced against increased power (electric-
ity) requirements once the aircraft has transitioned away from wing-borne flight. 
• Based on the power-limited ability to land vertically; but balanced against the short 
duration of remaining pure electrical battery power and primary suburban/urban use, it 
is qualitatively assessed that the hybrid tilt-wing vehicle would be able to execute a 
successful (minimal damage/injuries) emergency landing 40% of the time. 
• Cooling systems used failure criticality numbers from the FMECA that assumed pilot 
interaction at time of leak detection. A failure of the ESC is assumed to lead to a failure 
of the propulsor to provide thrust. 
4.4.2 Quad-Rotor FTA Assumptions 
The Quad-Rotor FTA was executed with the following assumptions: 
• Due to shorter mission legs and slower speeds than the tilt-wing, the Quad-Rotor is 
assumed to be in the OEI avoid region for 25% of its time as opposed to the tilt-wings 
20%.  
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• The low voltage battery powers the ESC and the FCC is necessary for speed control of 
the propulsor RPM. Loss of either of those components is assumed to result in the loss 
of all propulsors.  
• Loss of a single rotor gearbox (RGB) is assumed to result in the top level hazard due 
to an inability to drive the rotor and create thrust. The fault tree models the intercon-
nection between gearboxes such that a cross shaft failure OR a collector gearbox failure 
AND a loss of any propulsor results in a catastrophic outcome. 
• The fault tree for the Quad-Rotor without interconnection lacks the logical input of the 
cross shafting AND a propulsor fail to prevent the top level occurrence. While the OEI 
avoid region is modeled, the cut set for the fault tree is that any loss of a single propulsor 
will set the top gate event true. 
4.4.3 Lateral-Twin FTA Assumptions 
The Lateral-Twin FTA was executed with the following assumptions: 
• Any contact between the overlapped left and right rotor blades is assumed to be Cata-
strophic. For this reason a failure of any of the following interconnecting shaft compo-
nents will set the top gate true: Right INTX, Left INTX, collector gearbox, Intermediate 
Gearbox, Intermediate Gearbox 2. 
• A failure of the low voltage (LV) battery or the FCC is assumed to set the Propulsor 2 
failure (electric propulsor) to true. It is assumed that the two (2) turboshaft engines have 
their own full authority digital electronic control (FADEC) powered by their own 
sources that are dissimilar to the electric propulsor. 
• It is assumed that the aircraft will be operating at weights that necessitate the burst 
power of the electric propulsor during takeoff, hover, and landing. A loss of any of the 
propulsors in the OEI avoid region will result in a potential Catastrophic outcome. A 
loss of any of the propulsors, turboshaft or electric, is assumed to allow adequate power 
for an adequate amount of time to execute a no-hover or roll-on landing. 
• The HV Battery fail in the fault tree is derived from the FMECA representing complete 
loss of HV battery power. The fault tree does not attempt to address reduced battery 
power or partial battery fails effects on the air vehicle. 
• An engine gearbox fail will serve to disconnect the local turboshaft engine from the 
drivetrain. A failure of the CGB is assumed to disconnect the electric motor from the 
drivetrain. A failure of either of the cross-shafts is assumed to disconnect the power 
output from the electric motor from the rotor on the side of the failed driveshaft. Po-
tential unequal power to each rotor was not addressed in the FHA or air vehicle FHA. 
4.4.4 Lift+Cruise FTA Assumptions 
The Tilt-Wing FTA was executed with the following assumptions: 
• The air-vehicle is capable of hover flight following the loss of a single motor as long 
as a complementary motor on the opposing wing reduces its torque output to maintain 
static equilibrium.  
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• The air-vehicle is dependent upon the aft mounted propulsor for pitch control (ref. 3). 
• Cooling systems used failure criticality numbers from the FMECA that assumed pilot 
interaction at time of leak detection. A failure of the ESC is assumed to lead to a failure 
of the propulsor to provide thrust. 
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5 CONCEPTUAL POWERTRAIN CONFIGURATIONS 
5.1 Tilt-Wing Powertrain Configuration 
5.1.1 Tilt-Wing Rotating System 
The rotating system of the Tilt-Wing is depicted in Figure 12.  The Tilt-Wing rotating system 
contains electric motors remotely located, near each rotor to reduce the power demands on the 
interconnecting shafting.  Each motor spins at 14,999 RPM and provides power into an overrun-
ning, sprag clutch mounted inside an accessory gearbox (AGB).  The AGB contains a parallel axis 
gear train in order to mechanically drive a cooling fan and lubrication pumps.  The cooling fan 
draws air across a heat exchanger which cools the motor, AGB, and RGB.  The lubrication pump 
pressurizes the cooling and lubrication loop for the heat exchanger. 
The motor’s primary power passes through the accessory gearbox and into the RGB (also known 
as Prop-Rotor Gearbox for Tilt-Wing and Tilt-Rotor aircraft) through the noted sprag clutch and 
associated shafting.  The parallel axis gear train in the AGB does not carry primary power.  Power 
enters the RGB and is transferred through a dual stage, simple planetary system with an overall 
reduction ratio of 17.42:1 to achieve a rotor speed of 861 RPM. 
In addition to the primary power path, a secondary power path is included in the rotor gear box for 
OMI conditions and synchronization of the rotors.  A spiral bevel gear mesh with a 1.67:1 ratio is 
mounted between the AGB and the dual stage, simple planetary system.  The spiral bevel gear 
mesh sends power through interconnecting shafts to a RGB.    Limited, if any, sweep of the wing 
and limited, if any, dihedral means that an additional collector gearbox centered in the fuselage is 
not required. 
 
Figure 12:  Tilt-Wing Rotating System Schematic. 
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5.1.2 Tilt-Wing Flight Control System 
The Tilt-Wing FCS arrangement is shown in Figure 13. Each rotor is connected to a rotor gearbox. 
Each of these gearboxes is also connected to an electric motor as well as to a cross-shaft. Each 
motor is controlled by an individual ESC which takes commands from a FCC. The ESC’s accept 
HV power to drive the motors and uses an in-built DC-DC convertor to power itself. The source 
of the HV power is either a battery network or directly from an AC generator through an AC/DC 
convertor. The AC/DC convertor also provides low voltage to power the FCC’s. The AC generator 
is driven via direct connection with a turbo shaft engine.  
 
Figure 13:  Tilt-Wing Powertrain Flight Control System Schematic 
5.2 Quad-Rotor Powertrain Configurations 
The Quad-Rotor design developed by the NASA RVLT team included four (4) remotely located 
rotors, each with collective pitch control for pitch, yaw, and roll stability.  The collective control 
allows for mechanical interconnection of each rotor via cross shafts and gearboxes.  The mechan-
ical interconnection is a secondary load path intended to dampen rotor-to-rotor modes and provide 
power to all rotors in the event of a single motor failure or OMI condition. 
The powertrain configuration for the Quad-Rotor is broken into three (3) primary sub-sections.  As 
defined here, the rotating system includes the motors, gearboxes, and cross-shafting.  The FCS 
includes the ESC, low voltage battery arrays for low power computing and actuation, high voltage 
batteries for high power energy storage necessary to drive the rotors, and associated wiring.  The 
Thermal Management System (TMS) includes systems for managing the temperature of the mo-
tors, gearboxes, and ESC’s. 
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5.2.1 Quad-Rotor Rotating System 
The rotating system of the Quad-Rotor is shown in Figure 14.  The Quad-Rotor rotating system 
contains electric motors remotely located, near each rotor, similar to the Tilt-Wing rotating system.  
Each Motor spins at 11,863 RPM and sends power into an overrunning, sprag clutch mounted 
inside an accessory gearbox.  The accessory gearbox contains a parallel axis gear train in order to 
mechanical drive a cooling fan and lubrication pumps.  The cooling fan draws air across a heat 
exchanger which cools the motor, accessory gearbox, and RGB.  The lubrication pump pressurizes 
the cooling and lubrication loop for the heat exchanger. 
The motor’s primary power passes through the accessory gearbox and into the RGB through the 
noted sprag clutch and associated shafting.  The parallel axis gear train in the AGB does not carry 
primary power.  Power enters the RGB and is transferred through a dual stage, simple planetary 
system with an overall reduction ratio of 17.42:1 to achieve a rotor speed of 681 RPM. 
In addition to the primary power path, a secondary power path is included in the rotor gear box for 
OMI conditions and synchronization of the rotors.  A spiral bevel gear mesh with a 1.16:1 ratio is 
mounted between the AGB and the dual stage, simple planetary system.  The spiral bevel gear 
mesh sends power through cross shafting to a collector gearbox (CGB).  Power from the front, left 
rotor passes through the front, left cross shafting and is transferred into a forward spiral bevel gear 
mesh in the CGB.  Power is split at the forward spiral bevel gear mesh; power is sent to the front, 
right rotor through the complimentary side of the forward spiral bevel gear mesh.  Power is sent 
aft through a short quill shaft and enters an aft spiral bevel gear mesh which splits the power to the 
left and right aft rotors.  The forward and aft sweep of the forward and aft struts, respectively, and 
the dihedral of each require that each, forward and aft, spiral bevel mesh contains two (2) spiral 
bevel gears and one (1) spiral bevel pinion, for a total of six (6) spiral bevel gears. 
An alternate CGB arrangement may be obtained through four (4) spiral bevel or face gears meshing 
with a common ring gear, either spiral bevel or face.  However, this still results in a similar number 
of gears and restricts the configuration of the aircraft, limiting the sweep angles and dihedral of 
each strut. 
5.2.2 Quad-Rotor Flight Control System 
Quad-Rotor FCS assumption schematic is shown in Figure 15. Each rotor shaft is connected to a 
RGB. Collective blade pitch is controlled using a swashplate actuated by a singular electric actu-
ator. The gearbox connected to each rotor is connected to an electric motor through an overrunning 
clutch as well as to a central CGB (for the case with interconnecting shafts). Each electric motor 
is controlled by an individual electronic speed controller which accepts both high voltage (to power 
motor) and low voltage (to power the controller itself) sources. The high voltage power source 
also powers the electric actuators. The low voltage power source provides power to the FCC which 
is sending control signals to the ESC and the electric actuators driving the rotor swashplates as 
well.  
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Figure 14:  Quad-Rotor Rotating System Schematic. 
 
 
Figure 15:  Quad-Rotor Powertrain Flight Control System Schematic. 
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5.3 Alternate Configuration – Quad-Rotor without Interconnecting Shafting 
The Quad-Rotor was also conceptualized without the use of interconnecting shafting as part of the 
reliability and safety assessment.  The overall powertrain configuration remains similar to the 
baseline Quad-Rotor powertrain configuration.  The rotating system architecture is modified from 
the baseline.  The difference being the absence of the interconnecting cross shafting, the CGB, and 
the AGB required to lubricate and cool the CGB.  The FCS and TMS are similar to the baseline, 
as well. 
5.4 Lateral-Twin Powertrain Configuration 
5.4.1 Lateral-Twin Rotating System 
The rotating system of the Lateral-Twin is shown in Figure 16.  The Lateral-Twin rotating system 
contains two (2) turboshaft engines remotely located underneath each rotor and an electric mo-
tor/generator unit (MGU) located above the fuselage.  Each engine spins at 45,000 RPM and sends 
power into an overrunning, sprag clutch mounted inside a left hand (LH) and right hand (RH) 
engine gearbox.  Each LH and RH engine gearbox is similar and contains a spiral bevel gear set in 
order to turn the direction of power into the LH and RH intermediate gearbox.  Each LH and RH 
intermediate gearbox sends power to mechanically driven cooling fans, lubrication pumps, hy-
draulic pumps, and accessory generators.  Each intermediate gearbox sends power into a LH and 
RH RGB where power is sent to each LH and RH rotor system.  Each RGB contains a spiral bevel 
gear mesh that redirects power to the rotor system centerline and a dual-stage, simple planetary 
system.   
In addition to the primary power path, a secondary power path is included in order to mechanically 
synchronize the rotors and to provide a path for power to flow into and out of the electric MGU.  
A spiral bevel gear mesh is mounted above the fuselage and sends power along a synchronization 
shaft set to each LH and RH rotor gearbox, through a pass-through shaft in the intermediate gear-
box.  A friction disc clutch is located between the output of the MGU and the spiral bevel gear 
mesh.  The friction disc clutch is used to couple or decouple the MGU from the primary driveline.  
Detailed mission planning a usage spectrum information is required to determine the schedule for 
clutch engagement and disengagement, but it is likely that the clutch would be disengaged (decou-
pling the MGU from the driveline) during start up and in emergency conditions and engaged (cou-
pling the MGU and driveline) during flight while the MGU powers the rotors or while the MGU 
is being charged by the turboshaft engines. 
5.4.2 Lateral-Twin Flight Control System 
The Lateral-Twin FCS assumption is shown in Figure 17 schematic. The system consists of two 
articulated rotors whose blade pitch is controlled via swashplate through three hydraulic actuators 
each. Each of the rotor shafts are connected to an equivalent RGB which in turn is connected to a 
turboshaft engine via an overrunning clutch. Each of the equivalent RGB is also connected to a 
mid-wing gearbox which in turn is connected to a motor/generator via a controllable clutch. The 
motor/generator is connected to an ESC/AC-DC convertor. This pathway can operate as a mo-
tor/ESC or a generator/AC-DC convertor. The ESC/AC-DC convertor is connected to a HV battery 
from which power is drawn when in the motor/ESC configuration (hover) and vice-versa when in 
the generator/AC-DC convertor configuration (cruise). Each of the RGB drives a hydraulic pump 
and accessory generator. The hydraulic pump in turn drives the swashplate hydraulic actuators of 
the rotors, while the accessory generator power output goes onto the vehicle LV power bus. The 
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LV bus powers the FCC and the hydraulic actuators servos. A LV battery is also on the bus which 
serves as the backup source of LV power. The LV battery can charge itself via the LV bus as well 
as provide power to the bus as required (e.g. when accessory generators are unavailable). Control 
signals from the FCC are routed to the ESC/AC-DC convertor and the hydraulic actuators. 
 
 
Figure 16:  Lateral-Twin Rotating System Schematic. 
 
Figure 17:  Lateral-Twin Powertrain Flight Control Schematic. 
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5.5 Lift+Cruise Powertrain Configuration 
5.5.1 Lift+Cruise Rotating System 
The rotating system of the Lift+Cruise is shown in Figure 18.  The Lift+Cruise rotating system 
contains one (1) turboshaft engine centrally located, inside the fuselage, eight (8) electric motors 
located near each rotor, and an electric motor located near the propulsor.  Each of the drive motors 
spin at 18,169 rpm (rotor motor) or 22,176 rpm (propulsor motor), sending power into an overrun-
ning sprag clutch located inside the respective AGB.  Each AGB is similar and sends power to 
mechanically driven cooling fans, lubrication pumps, hydraulic pumps, and accessory generators 
through a parallel axis gear train.  Each AGB sends power into a RGB where power is sent to each 
rotor or propulsor system.  Each RGB contains a two (2) stage planetary system with a 17.42:1 
total reduction ratio.  The motor spins at 18,169 RPM based on the 17.42:1 planetary system re-
duction ratio.  The planetary systems used to drive the rotors are rated for 88 HP (ref. 3). 
The local propulsor powertrain is assumed to be similar to that of the rotor powertrain in that a 
motor is connected to the propulsor through an AGB and a two (2) stage planetary system.  The 
propulsor spins at 1,273 RPM design speed, requiring a motor output speed of 22,176 RPM (de-
pendent upon the final selected planetary reduction ratio).  The AGB includes a cooler, mechani-
cally driven fan, and lubrication pump necessary to cool the motor, AGB, and RGB. 
The turboshaft engine has an assumed output speed of 20,000 rpm similar to that of the General 
Electric Company’s (GE) CT7 turboshaft engine series (ref. 16).  The output of the turboshaft 
engine enters an AGB, similar to the AGB mounted underneath each rotor.  The AGB includes a 
cooler to cool the AGB and the AC Generator, a mechanically driven fan, starting system inter-
faces, such as a power turbine air starter interface, and lubrication pumps and filters.  The AGB 
mounted to the front of the turboshaft engine does not include an overrunning clutch. 
5.5.2 Lift+Cruise Flight Control System 
The Lift+Cruise FCS schematic is shown in Figure 19.  Nine RPM-controlled rotors (eight lifting, 
one pusher) are each driven by an electric motor controlled by an ESC.  The ESCs route HV power 
to the motors from the HVDC power bus.  They are assumed to be powered by an internal DC-DC 
converter fed by the same HVDC bus.  The HVDC bus is fed by an HVDC battery system, which 
is charged by an AC generator via AC-DC converter.  The ESCs are controlled by the FCC, which 
is powered by a LV accessory generator via another AC-DC converter.  The HV and LV generators 
are driven by the turboshaft engine. 
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Figure 18:  Lift+Cruise Powertrain Rotating System Schematic 
 
Figure 19:  Lift+Cruise Powertrain Flight Control System 
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5.6 Thermal Management Systems 
Electric propulsion systems introduce components which present thermal management challenges. 
These components include high power density electric motors, electric generators, power electron-
ics/speed controllers for driving and controlling motor operation, power converters, and Lithium-
ion (Li-ion) batteries for energy storage. Thermal losses from power distribution cables must also 
be considered as they impact the environment within which they are located. 
A generalized TMS for the vehicles considered in this study is shown in Figure 20. The system 
was configured to address the unique thermal requirements of each of the major propulsion system 
components. System trade studies and detailed system sizing are recommended for future work.  
During detailed design, the heat dissipation for each component is typically determined for each 
phase of the mission profile, similar to the notional power usage profile shown in Figure 21.  The 
ambient temperature profile and component operating temperature limitations would also be es-
tablished.  This information would be used to define cooling system requirements, including op-
portunity for the use of thermal storage materials for peak heat loads. 
 
Figure 20: Thermal Management System (TMS) Schematic 
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Figure 21: Notional Mission Power Usage Profile 
Engine bay cooling requirements and designs can vary from engine to engine, even within the 
same power class, so an engine bay cooling system was not configured.  Generator and motor 
cooling requirements were combined with gearbox lubrication and cooling requirements in order 
to reduce the weight and complexity of the TMS. 
Speed controllers and power converters are cooled with ambient air, consistent with current tech-
nology devices.  High density or future technology components may dictate the need for more 
specialized cooling, which would be determined during system design. The TMS shown in Figure 
20 includes individual electric fans located in proximity to each component to draw air over the 
device to manage temperature.  During cruise flight, it may be possible to turn off the fans and rely 
on external aerodynamics to provide cooling air flow, depending on ambient temperature and ve-
hicle flight speed. 
The Li-ion batteries are the most temperature critical components in each of the concept vehicles 
powertrain system.  Current technology batteries operate most efficiently and reliably between 
15˚C and 45˚C (59˚F and 113˚F), with battery temperatures above 80˚C (176˚F) increasing the risk 
of thermal runaway.  It is also desirable to minimize temperature variation across the battery pack 
for optimal performance.  The battery cooling system defined for the concept vehicles addresses 
each of these concerns. 
The battery cooling system consists of a vapor cycle refrigeration system that provides cooling to 
a liquid loop (water/glycol) used to cool each of the battery packs.  A phase change material (PCM) 
is included in the battery pack design, providing thermal storage to help minimize temperature 
spikes during transient conditions (highest load) or in the event of a cooling system failure. Mate-
rial selection and sizing would be part of a system detailed design. It is anticipated that proper 
PCM selection could reduce the size of the vapor refrigeration system.  Selection of a PCM should 
consider the melting point temperature of the material, the peak heat dissipation of the batteries, 
and the time over which the peak occurs. 
The vapor cycle system operates as a typical vapor compression refrigeration system. Low pres-
sure, low temperature refrigerant gas (R134a) is routed to the compressor, where it first absorbs 
the heat dissipated by the compressor motor. After compression, the high pressure gas is routed to 
the air cooled condenser, where the gas is cooled and condensed into liquid. Under most condi-
tions, the refrigerant is cooled below the saturation temperature, and this sub-cooling provides 
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additional system capacity. The high pressure liquid refrigerant is then routed to the thermal ex-
pansion valves at each evaporator, which provide the pressure drop necessary to produce the cool-
ing effect. As the pressure of the refrigerant is reduced in each valve, the temperature is also re-
duced as a fraction of the liquid flashes into vapor. The low temperature, two phase mixture is then 
routed into the evaporator, where the system heat load is absorbed and the remaining liquid within 
the mixture is evaporated. The refrigerant exits the evaporator as a low temperature, low pressure 
gas, and is routed back to the compressor and the cycle repeats. 
The liquid cooling loop consists of a pump package which is used to circulate the cooling fluid. 
The pump package contains two redundant, independent pumps with each pump having its own 
motor controller and associated level sensor. The two level sensors are installed in a common 
reservoir on the pump package. The two pumps also share a common filter and bypass loop in case 
the filter gets clogged. The liquid cooling system is a closed loop system that interfaces with the 
vapor cycle refrigeration system via the evaporator. The cooled liquid is pumped through the bat-
tery packs where it picks up the heat generated by the batteries. The liquid also helps to maintain 
the batteries at uniform temperature, improving battery performance. The warm liquid flows from 
the battery packs to the evaporator where the heat is transferred to the vapor cycle refrigerant. 
A number of TMS configuration trade studies should be conducted during system design. These 
include the following: 
• Eliminate the liquid cooling system and use conditioned air for battery cooling.  While 
the liquid cooling system can provide increased heat transfer rates and more uniform 
battery temperatures than air cooling, a detailed design study may show that air cooling 
is acceptable. In this case, the vapor cycle system would provide cooling to the air via 
an air to refrigerant evaporator. 
• If the ambient temperature profile is compatible with the battery operating temperature 
range, it may be possible to eliminate the vapor cycle cooling system.  Retaining liquid 
cooling for the batteries may be advantageous as the liquid system provides improved 
heat transfer rates and better temperature distribution within the batteries.  Heat re-
moved from the batteries via the liquid would be shed to ambient air in a liquid to air 
heat exchanger. 
• And finally, it may be possible to provide battery cooling with ambient air only. The 
ambient temperature profile and battery operating temperature limitations would need 
to be evaluated. The air flow rate required to maintain battery temperatures is an im-
portant consideration in this trade. 
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6 FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAMS 
The Functional Block Diagrams are a graphic representation of the functions analyzed.  The 
shaded blocks were analyzed in this study. The FMECA uses the FBD as a basis to postulate failure 
modes and analyze effects.  The corresponding FMECA ID codes are identified in the functional 
blocks to which they reference.  Components not analyzed, such as rotors and flight control com-
ponents, were not considered as part of this FMECA, and are represented with unshaded blocks 
and dashed lines.  The FMECA uses the functional block diagram as a basis to postulate failure 
modes and analyze effects.  Equipment such as low voltage electrical power, flight control system, 
actuators, and rotors are illustrated with dashed lines on the FBD, but not assigned functions as 
they are not considered in the analysis. 
6.1 Tilt-Wing Functional Block Diagram 
The Tilt-Wing propulsion system was assigned 5 functions, which are considered essential 
functions of the propulsion system.   
• Function 1:  Provide High Voltage DC to propulsion system and batteries.  This con-
sists of the turbo-shaft engine, gearbox, AC Generator, and AC/DC converter.  Loss of 
any one of these components would result in loss of the same function.   
• Function 2:  Provide battery storage of electrical energy.  Each electric motor is con-
sidered to have its own battery, such that a battery failure would only affect power 
provided to a single motor.  Internal battery failure could result in thermal runaway and 
aircraft fire, or could have reduced output or no output to the associated electric motor.  
This is delineated by the individual failure modes in the FMECA worksheet. 
• Function 3:  Convert High Voltage DC electrical energy to shaft torque:  This function 
consists of the ESC, electric motor, and associated cooling components.  The functions 
for motor cooling and motor lube were assumed as a single function. 
• Function 4:  Provide shaft torque to prop-rotors.  The clutches and gearboxes transfer 
the motor torque to the prop-rotors. 
• Function 5: Provide system cooling for batteries:  As the electrical power is normally 
provided by the turbo-shaft engine, the battery cooling function would only affect the 
propulsion system in cases where loss of function 1 has already occurred.   
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Figure 22:  Tilt-Wing Functional Block Diagram. 
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6.2 Quad-Rotor Functional Block Diagram: 
The Quad-Rotor with cross shaft propulsion system was divided into three main functions: 
• Function 1: Provide High Voltage DC power to electric motors.  The battery system was 
postulated as a single component with multiple outputs.  Battery failure modes could result 
in loss of a single output to a single motor, [Failure Modes 1A1 through 1D1] or an internal 
failure that could result in reduced output, or possible thermal runaway and aircraft fire 
[Modes 1E1 through 1E4].  
• Function 2: Convert electrical energy to shaft torque.  This function consists of the ESC, 
electric motor, and associated cooling components.  The functions for motor cooling and 
motor lube were assumed as a single function. 
• Function 3: Transfer motor torque to rotors.  The clutches and gearboxes transfer the motor 
torque to the rotors.  In the event of loss of output from a single motor, the collector gearbox 
re-distributes the remaining available torque to keep all 4 rotors operating.   
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Figure 23:  Quad-Rotor Functional Block Diagram. 
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6.3 Alternate Configuration –Quad-Rotor without Interconnecting Shafting Functional 
Block Diagram 
The Quad-Rotor without cross shaft propulsion system differs only in function 3, where there is 
no function to transfer power in the event of a motor failure: 
• Function 1: Provide High Voltage DC power to electric motors.  The battery system was 
postulated as a single component with multiple outputs.  Battery failure modes could result 
in loss of a single output to a single motor, (Failure Modes 1A1 through 1D1)  or an internal 
failure that could result in reduced output, or possible thermal runaway and aircraft fire 
[Modes 1E1 through 1E5  
• Function 2: Convert electrical energy to shaft torque.  This function consists of the ESC, 
electric motor, and associated cooling components.  The functions for motor cooling and 
motor lube were assumed as a single function. 
• Function 3: Transfer motor torque to rotors.  The clutches and gearboxes transfer the motor 
torque to the prop-rotors. 
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Figure 24:  Alternate Configuration –Quad-Rotor without Interconnecting Shafting Func-
tional Block Diagram. 
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6.4 Lateral-Twin Functional Block Diagram  
The lateral twin propulsion system was divided into 3 main functions: 
• Function 1:  Provide main engine torque to intermediate gearboxes.  This consists of main 
engines, engine gearboxes, and overrunning clutch.  
• Function 2:  Transfer shaft torque from engines to rotors and provide rotor synchronization.  
This consists of the gearboxes and interconnecting shafts. 
• Function 3:  Provide electric motor boost power for hover and low speed flight.  This in-
cludes the battery system, ESC, motor-generator, and emergency disconnect.  The electric 
motor is providing boost torque in Functions 3A, and is charging the battery network in 
function 3B.  For the motor-generator and the battery circuits, it is assumed that any failure 
would cause loss of both the boost function and the battery charge function, so loss of 
ability to charge the battery becomes irrelevant if you also lost the ability to use the battery 
power.  For this reason, failure modes for boost mode only were considered.  The ESC was 
considered different, and assumed to have failure modes that would be unique to charge 
only mode, or to boost mode only.  The emergency disconnect system may manifest itself 
as an overrunning clutch, shaft with a shear section, friction disc clutch, or other practical 
means to separate the MGU from the driveline. 
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Figure 25:  Lateral-Twin Functional Block Diagram. 
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6.5 Lift+Cruise Functional Block Diagram 
The Lift+Cruise propulsion system was divided into 4 main functions. 
• Function 1:  Provide High voltage DC power for propulsion and to charge batteries:  This 
includes the turbo-shaft engine, gearbox, AC Generator, and AC/DC converter. 
• Function 2:  Provide High Voltage DC electrical power to motors.  This function consists 
of battery system and associated wiring 
• Function 3: Provide torque to lifting rotors:  Each of the 8 individual lifting rotors is pow-
ered independently by a dedicated ESC, electric motor, and gearbox.   
• Function 4:  Provide torque to thrust propeller:  The thrust function is completely inde-
pendent of the lifting function.  Although the detailed design would be significantly differ-
ent, the functional layout is similar to the lifting rotors.   
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Figure 26:  Lift+Cruise Functional Block Diagram. 
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7 FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS 
The FHA is used to evaluate the functions and corresponding failure conditions and severity 
classifications.  An associated FTA will be used in conjunction with the FHA in order to begin 
defining and allocating safety requirements to sub-systems.  The FHA and the safety assessment 
will typically expand and evolve alongside the airplane development.  The FHA’s for each of the 
NASA RVLT Concept Vehicles may be found in Appendix A. 
The safety analysis process for this study began with a FHA.  The FHA is a structured analysis 
technique which systematically analyzes hazards arising from functional failures of a system.  A 
FHA considers the functions of the system under analysis, and identifies the failure conditions by 
considering the effects of loss of the function, incorrect operation of the function, or inadvertent 
occurrence of the function when not desired.  The FHA typically considers all flight phases of the 
aircraft, as well as different operating environmental conditions, and how they affect functional 
failure severity.  However, do to the conceptual nature of this exercise, only a few phases of flight 
were considered, namely hover, flight within the OEI/OMI avoid region, and flight outside the 
OEI/OMI avoid region. 
The result of the FHA is a list of functional failures with an assigned severity, which depends 
on the possible outcome of the failure.  A severity of catastrophic, severe, major, or minor is as-
signed to each functional failure, in accordance with SAE ARP4761 (ref. 17).  Another result of 
the FHA is a list of Derived Safety Requirements (DSR) needed to help mitigate and control the 
resulting hazard of the functional failure.  The DSRs are provided to the Systems Engineering 
requirements management organization, and flowed down into appropriate design specifications 
in accordance with the requirements management process. 
Following the FHA, the resulting functional failures are consolidated into a more concise list 
of hazards.  Each hazard is assigned a severity, in accordance with the severity of the functional 
failure(s) encompassed by the hazard, and is also assigned a hazard probability.  Different tech-
niques have been employed at the discretion of safety analysts, to determine the hazard probabili-
ties for each hazard. 
The Tilt-Wing was designed to be controlled via collective pitch at each of its rotors for roll 
and yaw control.  Single-axis cyclic control was envisioned for pitch control and interconnecting 
shafting is envisioned between each rotor for emergency conditions.  The FHA associated with the 
Tilt-Wing is shown in Table A- 1. 
The Quad-Rotor was designed to be controlled via collective pitch at each of its rotors.  How-
ever, the rotors do not intermesh so it is conceivable that pitch, roll, and yaw control can be ob-
tained via constant pitch, varying speed propellers.  The baseline system varies collective pitch at 
each rotor for control in all axes.  The hazards associated with Quad-Rotor with cross shafting are 
listed in Table A- 2. 
If future excursions change the configuration of the Quad-Rotor to constant pitch, varying 
speed propellers, then additional hazards are now attributable to the powertrain.  The hazards as-
sociated with Quad-Rotor without cross shafting are listed in Table A- 3.  In the case of the Quad-
Rotor without cross shafting, loss of a single propulsor must be considered a functional hazard in 
all flight modes.  Control and trim of the aircraft should be considered in sub-system or aerody-
namic stability and control simulations to mitigate this hazard. 
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The Lateral-Twin was designed to have lateral and longitudinal cyclic control and collective 
control at each rotor.  The rotors overlapped, which requires that the rotors be mechanically syn-
chronized via interconnecting shafts.  The Lateral-Twin FHA is provided in Table A- 4. 
The Lift+Cruise vehicle was designed to be controlled by a variable speed, fixed pitch rotor 
system.  Based on NASA’s guiding principles behind the Lift+Cruise Concept Vehicle (ref. 3), it 
was assumed that one (1) propulsion unit may be lost without a catastrophic outcome.  The 
Lift+Cruise FHA is provided in Table A- 5. 
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8 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS CRITICALITY ANALYSIS (FMECA) 
The FMECA is a tabular document containing postulated failure modes of the propulsion system.  
The FMECA worksheets contain the following data elements.  Having identified the functions for 
each component, the FMECA worksheets were populated and functional failures were derived.  
From the functional failures and based on reliability data, Table 3, the postulations for failure 
modes and failure effects were developed and added to the worksheet.  Failure effects were ex-
trapolated through the system and to the end item to help identify the severity associated with each 
failure mode.  Failure causes for each mode were then postulated utilizing information from several 
data repositories.  Additional information was added to identify system design related compensat-
ing provisions and failure detection methods. 
The FR prediction for each FMECA component was derived from an industry search for historical 
component failure rates.  Within those numbers, distributions were derived and associated with 
each of the postulated functional failures.  A rate was determined for each functional failure mode 
specific to each sub-system and tabulated in the worksheet, along with the conditional probability 
that the failure effect results in the identified severity code, given that the failure mode occurs 
(Beta) and the mode criticality number.  All Beta values are based on engineering judgment. 
8.1 Definitions of FMECA Worksheet Data Elements:  
• FMECA ID Code: The FMECA identification is an indentured code which assigns a 
unique identifier for each failure mode.  This is a combination of the Failure Mode 
Index (FMI) Function, FMI Mode, and FMI Cause, as defined here: 
o 1st character (1 to 9) identifies the function; 
o 2nd character (A to Z) identifies the failure mode. 
o 3rd character (1 to 9) identifies the cause. 
• Function:  A description of the function under analysis. 
• Failure Rate (λ):  The frequency (or rate) with which an item will be unable to perform 
its intended function in the operational environment for which it was designed. This is 
expressed as failures per flight hour. 
• Failure Mode:  A description of the functional or equipment failure.  Failure modes 
are determined by examination of the functional outputs identified on the applicable 
Functional Block Diagram or based on the system description. 
• Failure Cause:  A description of the unique component or equipment or functional 
loss.   
• Mission Phase:  Describes the flight regime or maneuver that the aircraft is executing 
when the functional failure occurs. The default condition is “ALL”, indicating that the 
failure mode is applicable to all phases of flight and ground maneuvering. 
• Local Failure Effect:  The consequence the failure has on the operation, function, or 
status of the specific item being analyzed. 
• Next Higher Effect:  The consequence the failure has on the operation, functions, 
failed equipment or other system components, including automatic enabling of backup 
and/or redundant systems.   
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• End Effect:  This category defines the worst case end effect the defined failure has on 
the operation, function, or status of the aircraft.  The effect shall be written in such a 
way that the severity determination is substantiated. 
• Detection Method:  The means or mechanism by which the defined failure can be 
discovered. 
• Compensating Provision (CP):  Design provisions or operator actions which circum-
vent or mitigate the effects of a failure. Compensating design provisions are features at 
any indenture level that will nullify the effects of a malfunction or failure, but do not 
prevent its occurrence. 
• Severity Code:  Severity is divided into four categories as defined in MIL-STD-
1629A.  Severity category is assigned to provide a qualitative measure of the worst 
potential consequences resulting from design error or item failure.  The severity clas-
sifications are described in Table 2. 
• Failure Mode Ratio (α):  The fraction of item failures related to the failure mode under 
consideration.  The sum of all failure modes related to a specific equipment or item will 
equal one (1).  When a particular equipment or item has more than one possible failure 
effect, the mode ratio was is distributed evenly.   
• Failure Effect Probability (β):  The conditional probability that the failure end effect 
will result in the identified severity classification given that the failure mode occurs. A 
1.0 value indicates that the failure mode results in an actual loss in all instances. A 
value of less than 1.0 indicates a lower probability of actual loss. 
• Beta Mode Ratio Explanation:  The description of why/how a particular Failure Ef-
fect Probability was selected. 
• Failure Mode Criticality Number:  The probability that a failure for a component 
resulting from a particular failure mode with result in the severity classification identi-
fied. The mission time is, by default, one hour in duration. 
• Incipient Fail Symptoms:  Description of symptoms that can provide early warning 
before the failure event actually occurs, either through health monitoring, observation 
of abnormal condition, or scheduled maintenance inspections.  Incipient failure symp-
toms help avoid worst case end effect, and are considered when determining Beta. 
Appendix B contains the FMECA worksheets for the NASA RVLT Concept Vehicles ana-
lyzed.  Table 4 contains the FMECA summary for Tilt-Wing severity code I failure modes.  Table 
5 contains the FMECA summary for Quad-Rotor severity code I failure modes.  Table 6 contains 
the FMECA summary for Alternate Configuration Quad-Rotor severity code I failure modes, in 
which interconnecting shafting is not utilized to mechanically link each rotor system.  Table 7 
contains the FMECA summary for Lateral-Twin severity code I failure modes.  Table 8 contains 
the FMECA summary for Lift+Cruise severity code I failure modes. 
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Table 4:  Tilt-Wing FMECA Severity Code I Summary 
Function 
No. Function Failure Cause End Effect 
Severity 
Code 
Mode Failure 
Rate 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
1 
Provide HVDC 
power to propul-
sion system and 
batteries 
Engine, gearbox, 
AC Generator, 
AC/DC Converter 
Loss of all propulsion after battery 
power is depleted.  Loss of aircraft if pi-
lot cannot find safe landing area and 
land within 2 minutes.   
I 3.33 X 10-4 1.98 X 10-4 
2 
Provide battery 
storage of electri-
cal energy 
Battery Failure Aircraft fire damages critical systems, causing loss of aircraft I 1.00 X 10
-6 1.00 X 10-9 
3 
Convert HVDC 
Electrical energy 
to shaft torque 
Electronic Speed 
Controllers, Electric 
Motors,  
25% loss of propulsion system power.  
Aircraft handling qualities affected. In-
sufficient power available to control air-
craft in OMI avoid region.  Loss of con-
trol of aircraft if failure occurs while 
aircraft is in OMI region. 
I 1.45 X 10-3 2.90 X 10-4 
4 Provide torque to prop-rotors 
Prop--rotor gear-
boxes, clutches, and 
shafts 
25% loss of propulsion system power.  
Aircraft handling qualities affected. In-
sufficient power available to control air-
craft at airspeeds below 25 knots.  Loss 
of control of aircraft if failure occurs 
while aircraft is in OMI avoid region. 
I 2.00 X 10-5 4.00 X 10-6 
5 
Provide system 
cooling for batter-
ies 
Battery cooling sys-
tem Aircraft fire, loss of controlled flight I 5.22 X 10
-4 1.72 X 10-7 
Severity Code I Summary: 4.92 X 10-4 
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Table 5:  Quad-Rotor FMECA Severity Code I Summary 
Function 
No. Function Failure Cause End Effect 
Severity 
Code 
Mode Failure 
Rate 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
1 
Provide HVDC 
power to electric 
motors 
HV Batteries 
Limited flight envelope.  Reduced max-
imum speed and insufficient power to 
take off or hover at max weight.  Loss 
of air raft Possible hard landing if fail-
ure occurs while in OMI avoid region 
(< 20 kts) 
I 1.00 X 10-6 2.00 X 10-7 
Aircraft descends to ground.  Autorota-
tion employed to provide soft landing II 5.00 X 10
-7 5.00 X 10-9 
2 
Convert HV elec-
trical energy to 
shaft torque 
ESC's, Motors, 
Clutches, ESC cool-
ing, motor cooling 
Limited flight envelope.  Reduced max-
imum speed and insufficient power to 
take off or hover at max weight.  Loss 
of air raft Possible hard landing if fail-
ure occurs while in OMI avoid region 
(< 20 kts) 
I 2.03 X 10-3 3.02 X 10-4 
3 Transfer motor torque to rotors 
Rotor gearboxes, 
collector gearbox 
Aircraft descends to ground with lim-
ited control.   I 2.50 X 10
-5 1.00 X 10-5 
Severity Code I Summary: 2.47 X 10-4 
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Table 6:  Alternate Configuration – Quad-Rotor without Interconnecting Shafts FMECA Severity Code I Summary 
Function 
No. Function Failure Cause End Effect 
Severity 
Code 
Mode Failure 
Rate 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
1 
Provide HVDC 
power to electric 
motors 
HV Batteries 
Aircraft descends to ground with limited 
control. I 1.00 X 10
-6 5.00 X 10-7 
Aircraft descends to ground.  Autorota-
tion employed to provide soft landing. II 5.00 X 10
-7 5.00 X 10-9 
2 
Convert HV elec-
trical energy to 
shaft torque 
ESC's, Motors, 
Clutches, ESC cool-
ing, motor cooling 
Aircraft descends to ground with limited 
control. 
 
I 2.03 X 10-3 1.01 X 10-3 
3 Transfer motor torque to rotors 
Rotor gearboxes, 
collector gearbox 
Aircraft descends to ground with lim-
ited control.   I 2.00 X 10
-5 1.00 X 10-5 
Severity Code I Summary: 1.01 X 10-3 
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Table 7:  Lateral-Twin FMECA Severity Code I Summary 
Function 
No. Function Failure Cause End Effect 
Severity 
Code 
Mode Failure 
Rate 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
1 
Provide main en-
gine torque to  in-
termediate gear-
boxes  
Engine, Gearbox, 
clutch failure 
Loss of aircraft if failure occurs while 
in OEI avoid region of flight.  Reduced 
maximum speed in forward flight.  
Loss of ability to hover below specified 
minimum forward speed.  
I 1.62 X 10-5 3.24 X 10-6 
2 
Transfer shaft 
torque from en-
gines to rotors and 
provide rotor syn-
chronization 
Intermediate gear-
box, rotor gearbox, 
collector gearbox 
Loss of controlled flight.  Loss of air-
craft. I 3.52 X 10
-5 3.52 X 10-5 
3 
Provide electric 
motor boost power 
for hover and low 
speed flight 
Battery, ESC, elec-
tric motor, motor 
cooling  
Loss of ability to hover or fly at low 
speed.  Loss of aircraft if failure occurs 
while in OMI avoid region.   
I 2.90 X 10-4 5.80 X 10-5 
Severity Code I Summary 9.65 X 10-5 
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Table 8:  Lift+Cruise FMECA Severity Code I Summary 
Function 
No. Function Failure Cause End Effect 
Severity 
Code 
Mode Failure 
Rate 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
1 
Provide HVDC for 
propulsion and to 
charge batteries 
Turbo-shaft engine, 
gearbox, AC gener-
ator, AD/DC con-
verter 
Loss of propulsion if pilot cannot land 
safely before batteries are discharged.  
Loss of aircraft. 
I 3.00 X 10-4 1.80 X 10-4 
2 
Provide HVDC 
electrical power to 
motors 
Battery Failure 
Aircraft descends to ground.  Glide 
may be possible depending upon condi-
tions at time of failure.  Loss of control 
of aircraft  
I 5.10 X 10-4 1.04 X 10-4 
3 Provide torque to lifting rotors 
ESC, lift motor,  or 
gearbox failure 
No Cat I or Cat II single point failure in 
lift function NA NA NA 
4 Provide torque to thrust propeller 
Thrust ESC, thrust 
motor, or thrust 
gearbox failure 
Aircraft speed and range significantly 
reduced.   Ability to hover is unaf-
fected.  Loss of aircraft if pilot cannot 
find safe landing area within range 
I 3.67 X 10-4 1.84 X 10-4 
Severity Code I Summary 4.67 X 10-4 
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9 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA) 
Following the FHA, the resulting functional failures are consolidated into a more concise list 
of hazards.  Each hazard is assigned a severity, in accordance with the severity of the functional 
failure(s) encompassed by the hazard, and is also assigned a hazard probability.  Different tech-
niques have been employed at the discretion of safety analysts, to determine the hazard probabili-
ties for each hazard.  For this study, a FTA was performed in order to model the connectivity 
between components, systems, and functions. 
FTA is a top-down analysis meant to capture the propulsion components and to examine their 
interrelationships and allow the definition of cut-sets to show areas where system improvements 
would improve the top-level number. The roll-up of the propulsion FTAs are done so that loss of 
propulsion may also include loss of control, depending on air vehicle configuration. The FTA is 
meant to document a Catastrophic or Severe outcome top level, though lesser severity hazards may 
become evident due to FTA structure and execution. 
Overall, the propulsion specific systems and their failures to provide propulsion function are 
what roll-up to the top-level hazard. The unique DE/HEP aspects of the propulsion system, the 
electronics that control the motor, the motor itself, batteries, thermal management system, and 
charging system were captured in the FTA. Systems that may be shared between propulsion and 
flight controls (e.g., rotor speed and collective pitch) are examined only in their contribution to the 
top level loss of propulsion hazard. Loss of multiple propulsors may cause control problems that 
are considered a part of the loss of propulsion top level hazard. 
The top level hazards defined from the propulsion system FHA were used to inform the top 
level of the fault tree. The FTA was done to a level of detail sufficient to show architectural impacts 
to the top-level hazard. The FTA may capture system effects that roll up to higher losses of func-
tions captured in the FHA. 
The FTA’s performed for this study used a series of “AND” and “OR” gates to build the fault 
tree architecture in Reliability Workbench (RWB) (ref. 18).  The symbols used in the associated 
fault tree diagrams are shown in Figure 27.  RWB calculates the output of the “AND” and “OR” 
gates as shown in Equations (1) and (2), respectively.  Equations (1) and (2) use the three (3) input 
examples shown in Figure 27, but more inputs may be applied by adding terms. 
 
Figure 27:  “AND” and “OR” Gate Symbols 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) (1) 
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𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) + 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) + 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴)− 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴)− 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴)− 
−𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) + 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) 
 
The Tilt-Wing Fault Tree Diagram may be found in Appendix C with a summary provided in 
Table 9 of the top level hazard, Branch ID #1, and the 2nd tier hazards, Branch ID #2-6.  The FTA 
predicts 5.95 X 10-4 failures per flight hour for the Tilt-Wing. 
Table 9:  Tilt-Wing FTA Summary 
Branch ID Description Failure Rate per Flight Hour 
1 
(Top Level) 
Loss of Power Transmission 5.95 X 10-4 
2 Dual Electric Motor Fail 1.03 X 10-5 
3 Dual Gearbox Fail 1.50 X 10-10 
4 OEI Propulsion Loss 5.53 X 10-4 
5 Complete Propulsion Loss 1.32 X 10-4 
6 Dual ESC Fail 1.20 X 10-5 
The Quad-Rotor Fault Tree Diagram may be found in Appendix D with a summary provided 
Table 10 of the top level hazard, Branch ID #1, and the 2nd tier hazards, Branch ID #2-4.  The FTA 
predicts 2.10 X 10-4 failure per flight hour for the Quad-Rotor. 
Table 10:  Quad-Rotor FTA Summary 
Branch ID Description Failure Rate per Flight Hour 
1 
(Top Level) 
Loss of Power Transmission 2.10 X 10-4 
2 Dual Electric Motor Fail 1.06 X 10-5 
3 OEI Propulsion Loss 2.00 X 10-4 
4 Loss of Ability to Drive a Rotor 4.01 X 10-16 
The Alternate Configuration Quad-Rotor, in which the interconnecting shafts are removed 
from the vehicle, Fault Tree Diagram may be found in Appendix E with a summary provided Table 
11 of the top level hazard, Branch ID #1, and the 2nd tier hazards, Branch ID #2-4.  The FTA 
predicts 7.97 X 10-4 failure per flight hour for the Alternate Configuration Quad-Rotor, which is 
roughly four (4) times less safe than the baseline Quad-Rotor. 
(2) 
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Table 11:  Alternate Configuration – Quad-Rotor without Interconnecting Shafts FTA 
Summary 
Branch ID Description Failure Rate per Flight Hour 
1 
(Top Level) 
Loss of Power Transmission 7.97 X 10-4 
2 Dual Electric Motor Fail 1.06 X 10-5 
3 OEI Propulsion Loss 2.00 X 10-4 
4 Loss of Ability to Drive a Rotor 7.97 X 10-4 
The Lateral-Twin Fault Tree Diagram may be found in Appendix F with a summary provided 
Table 12 of the top level hazard, Branch ID #1, and the 2nd tier hazards, Branch ID #2-5.  The FTA 
predicts 1.92 X 10-4 failure per flight hour for the Lateral-Twin. 
Table 12:  Lateral-Twin FTA Summary 
Branch ID Description Failure Rate per Flight Hour 
1 
(Top Level) 
Loss of Power Transmission 1.92 X 10-4 
2 Dual Engine or Motor Fail 1.32 X 10-8 
3 OEI Propulsion Loss 1.66 X 10-4 
4 Loss of Ability to Drive a Rotor 1.00 X 10-5 
5 Either Interconnecting Shaft Fails 6.86 X 10-6 
The Lift+Cruise Fault Tree Diagram may be found in Appendix G with a summary provided 
Table 13 of the top level hazard, Branch ID #1, and the 2nd tier hazards, Branch ID #2-4.  The FTA 
predicts 2.88 X 10-4 failure per flight hour for the Lift+Cruise. 
Table 13:  Lift+Cruise FTA Summary 
Branch ID Description Failure Rate per Flight Hour 
1 
(Top Level) 
Loss of Power Transmission 2.88 X 10-4 
2 Dual Rotor Loss 6.25 X 10-6 
3 Reduced Pitch Force 4.91 X 10-8 
4 Out of Battery Charge 1.80 X 10-4 
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10 DISCUSSION 
10.1 Configuration 
Many assumptions were made during the initial sizing and development of the NASA RVLT 
Concept Vehicles, which is common practice in airplane sizing iteration loops.  As they apply to 
this study, technology factors were applied to all major sub-systems. 
As an example, the installed specific energy of batteries was assumed to be 400 Wh/kg, which, 
with usage and installation effects, means that the battery cell’s specific energy is roughly 650 
Wh/kg (ref. 2).  The NASA RVLT Team has noted that current cell specific energy is 240 Wh/kg 
leading to installed specific energy or 93.3 Wh/kg. 
As can be seen in the battery example, there is a large technology gap between currently avail-
able commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products and some of the assumptions in the sizing of the 
NASA RVLT Concept Vehicles.  COTS equipment and weight/volume information was compiled 
for the powertrain configurations described in Section 5.  The following includes a discussion on 
COTS engines and weight and volume estimates for motors, generators, inverters, and rectifiers 
used in the RVLT Concept Vehicle powertrain configurations.  The impacts that motor, generator, 
inverter, and rectifier designs have on the Thermal Management System are also discussed. 
A variety of COTS engines are capable of providing the design power requirements used in 
the NASA RVLT Concept Vehicle sizing iterations.  NASA used COTS turboshaft engine decks 
from the CTS800, Allison 250-C40B, RR300, and Allison 250/T63-A-5 to scale engine parameters 
during airplane sizing loops.  Additionally, an Advanced Affordable Turbine Engine (AATE) 
model was used.  The GE T901 was named the winner of the competitive Improved Turbine En-
gine Program (ITEP), which succeeded the AATE Program.  The GE T901 has an expected Entry 
into Service (EIS) of 2025.   
The Tilt-Wing included one (1) turboshaft engine to power the generator.  Based on an effi-
ciency of 80.6% (assuming 95% efficiency of each generator, rectifier, inverter, and motor and 
99% electrical power transmission efficiency), the turboshaft engine needed 4,730 HP for takeoff.  
The T55-GA-714A is rated for 4,777 HP takeoff power at an output shaft speed of 15,066 RPM 
(ref. 19). 
The Lateral-Twin included two (2) 187 HP turboshaft engines.  The RR300 engine makes 240-
300 HP but, the forward facing output gearboxes included may make lightweight integration into 
the Lateral-Twin nacelles difficult due to concerns related to spatial integration, aircraft center of 
gravity, and induced loads on the struts supporting each rotor.  It was assumed that a modified 
RR300 could be utilized in which the power turbine output speed was roughly ~40,000 RPM.  The 
RR300 is based on the Allison 250 which has a variety of configurations with different gearboxes 
and power turbine speeds.  The Allison 250-C30G/2 was found to have a takeoff rating of 557 HP, 
gearbox output speed of 9,545 RPM and power turbine output speed of 30,737 RPM (ref. 20).  The 
rotating system schematic may be updated with the appropriate power turbine (or gearbox output 
speed) in the future once an engine selection has been completed. 
The Lift+Cruise included one (1) turboshaft engine to power the generator.  Based on the same 
80.6% efficiency as the 15 passenger Tilt-Wing, the turboshaft engine of the six (6) passenger 
Lift+Cruise required takeoff power of 3,376 HP.  The T55-GA-714A would meet the power re-
quirement, but may be too large for the application.  The GE T901 may be a good candidate engine 
for this application; however, this engine is still under development and is likely not going to be 
available for commercial applications.  The Safran Aneto-1K may also be a good candidate, as it 
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is a commercial engine that began flight testing in 2017 (ref. 21); publically available takeoff 
power could not be found at this time, but takeoff power is expected to be near the 3,000 HP mark. 
A variety of COTS motors, generators, inverters and rectifiers are available, but reliability data 
is not generally available for these COTS components, particularly for rotorcraft applications.  Mo-
tor and generator weight may be estimated using the NDARC parametric motor weight model with 
an application factor of 1.1 applied to generator weight.   
𝑊𝑊 = .5382𝑘𝑘𝑄𝑄.8129 
Where: W = weight (lbs); 
k = application factor (1.0 for motors, 1.1 for generators); 
Q = peak torque (ft-lbs). 
The weight of the inverter and rectifier can be assumed to be directly related to power output. 
COTS inverters and rectifiers may be found for 10 kW/kg, but more advanced inverters and recti-
fiers may be obtained with 15 kW/kg. 
The volume of permanent magnet synchronous motors (PMSM) is proportional to their torque 
output (ref. 22), so a convenient method to estimate the volume of the PMSM is analytically de-
rived.  Output torque, Q (ft-lbs), of a PMSM can be estimated from the following relationship:  
𝑄𝑄 = 288𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝜎𝜎 
Where: σ = estimated shear stress capability of electric machine (psi); 
Vr = volume of the PMSM rotor (ft3);  
𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟 = 𝜋𝜋4𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟2𝐿𝐿 
Dr = outside diameter of rotor (ft); 
L = stack length (ft). 
However, the diameter of the rotor, Dr, is not the outer diameter of the electric machine.  The 
outer diameter of the electric machine is essentially the outer diameter of the stator, Ds.  The outer 
diameter of the stator, Ds, and the diameter of the rotor, Dr, may be related through the number of 
pole pairs, p, as follows in Equation (6) (ref. 22):  
𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠 = 𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟 � 𝜋𝜋5𝑝𝑝 + 1. 7� 
Plugging Equations (5) and (6) into Equation (4), rearranging to solve for Ds, and assuming 
that L = 1.28*Ds, we obtain:  
𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠 = � 4𝑘𝑘𝑄𝑄𝜋𝜋368.64𝜎𝜎 � 𝜋𝜋5𝑝𝑝 + 1. 7�2�1/3
Reasonable estimates for estimated shear stress capability of the electric machine, σ, range 
from 3 psi (20.7 kPa) to 5 psi (34.5 kPa) (ref. 22).  The number of pole pairs will vary between 
designs, but at least three (3) pole pairs are recommended for reliability, so that if one (1) pole pair 
shorts, it may be disconnected and operation of the electric motor may continue at reduced power 
levels.  Designers may find that higher pole pairs are necessary if designing a motor to lose one 
(1) pole pair and continue to operate; as an example, torque ripple may be high for a motor with
only two (2) of its originally designed three (3) pole pairs functioning.
The volume of inverters and rectifiers are not as easy to estimate through analytical means, so 
an industry survey was performed.  27 inverters and rectifiers were used to develop a relationship 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
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between design rated power (kW) and volume (m3).  Figure 28 shows this relationship and Equa-
tion (8) shows the associated equation for Volume, V, as related to electrical power, P.  Note, 
power, P, is in kilowatts, volume, V, is in cubic meters, and the application factor, k, is 1.0 for 
inverters, and 1.1 for rectifiers.  
𝑉𝑉 = 𝑘𝑘 ∗ 3 × 10−5(𝑃𝑃)1.3275 
Figure 28:  Relationship of Power to Volume for Inverters and Rectifiers. 
Table 14 shows the estimated weights and volumes for the motors, generators, inverters, and 
rectifiers for each RVLT Concept Vehicle.  Each motors assumed a 2.5 psi design shear stress, σ, 
and eight (8) pole pairs and the length, L, to be 1.28 times the stator diameter, Ds.  
Wire weight may be estimated easily via calculating ampacity requirements for a given power 
and voltage and selecting the appropriate wire gage.  SAE AS50881 (ref. 23) provides ampacities 
for a given wire material and gage and derating factors for bundling and altitude.  Wire weight 
depends heavily on the length of the wire run. 
The weight of the Thermal Management Systems can depend heavily on the efficiency of the 
motors, generators, inverters, and rectifiers selected.  In the case of the powertrain configurations 
described in Section 5 the motors and generators are cooled by a mechanically driven cooling 
system to reduce vehicle weight.  However, the size of the pumps, heat exchangers, and cooling 
fans will be driven by the efficiency of the motor/generator.  Likewise, the fans used to air-cool 
the inverters and rectifiers will be sized by the efficiency of the inverters/rectifiers.  The weight of 
the Thermal Management System is sensitive to the efficiencies of these components.  An effi-
ciency of 92% as opposed to 96% would result in doubling the size, and therefore weight, of ther-
mal management system components. 
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Table 14:  Weight and Volume Estimates for Motors, Generators, Inverters, and Rectifiers. 
 
Description 
Tilt-
Wing 
Quad-
Rotor 
Lateral-
Twin 
Lift+Cruise 
"Lifters" "Propulsor" 
D
es
ig
n 
Pa
ra
m
et
er
s 
Generator Power (HP) 3,445 - 100 1,355 
Generator Shaft Speed (RPM) 14,999 - 15,002 20,000 
Generator Torque, Q (ft-lbs) 1,206 - 35 356 
Rectifier Power, P (HP [kW]) 3,273 [2,440] - 
112 
[83] 1,287 [960] 
Inverter Power, P (HP [kW]) 777 [580] 
94  
[70] 
106 
[79] 
749 
[558] 
474  
[354] 
Total Motor Power (HP) 2,924 88 100 704 446 
Motor Power (HP) 731 22 100 88 446 
Motor Speed (RPM) 14,999 11,863 15,000 18,160 9,080 
Motor Torque, Q (ft-lbs) 256 10 35 25 258 
W
ei
gh
t  
Es
tim
at
e Electric Generator Weight (lbs) 189.3 - 10.7 70.2 
Rectifier Weight (lbs) 358.7 - 12.3 141.1 
Inverter Weight (lbs) 85.2 10.3 11.7 82.0 52.0 
Electric Motor Weight (lbs) 48.8 3.4 9.7 7.5 49.1 
V
ol
um
e 
Es
tim
at
e Design Shear Stress, σ (psi) 5.0 
Number of Pole Pairs, p 12 
Electric Generator Volume (ft3) 2.021 - 0.059 0.596 
Rectifier Volume (ft3) 36.587 - 0.414 10.600 
Inverter Volume (ft3) 4.933 0.297 0.352 4.693 2.560 
Electric Motor Volume (ft3) 0.390 0.015 0.053 0.039 0.393 
10.2 Reliability/Safety Analysis 
Results from the reliability and safety analysis are summarized in Table 15.  Review of the 
FMECA, predominantly used in reliability analysis, and the FTA, predominantly used in safety 
analysis, shows good correlation between the two methods.  The FMECA could be used in con-
junction with the expertise of an experienced analyst to estimate the safety of a given vehicle 
architecture.  The FTA, however, uses data from supporting reliability analysis and draws the con-
nectivity between systems and functions to perform a top-down safety analysis. 
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Table 15:  FMECA and FTA Summary. 
NASA RVLT 
Concept Vehicle 
Propulsion  
System  
Description 
Flight  
Control  
Description V
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Severity Code I 
Failures per Flight Hour 
Percent Time in 
OEI/OMI  
Avoid Region 
FMECA  
Criticality 
FTA  
Reliability 
Tilt-Wing Series Hybrid Collective and  1-Axis Cyclic X  4.92 X 10
-4 6.95 X 10-4 20% 
Quad-Rotor All Electric Collective Only X  2.47 X 10
-4 2.10 X 10-4 25% 
Quad-Rotor  
(No Shafts) All Electric 
Collective 
Only X  1.01 X 10
-3 7.97 X 10-4 20% 
Lateral-Twin Parallel Hybrid Full Cyclic and Collective X  9.65 X 10
-5 1.91 X 10-4 20% 
Lift+Cruise Series Hybrid RPM  Controlled  X 4.67 X 10
-4 2.88 X 10-4 0% 
EASA Draft 
SC-VTOL-01 Proposed Air-Vehicle Requirement 10
-9 (1) 10-9 (1) – 
Note: 
1) Air-vehicle level requirement.  Propulsion system will likely need to be 10-10 or higher 
to meet proposed SC-VTOL-01 requirements. 
Due to the good correlation of the FMECA and FTA, the concept vehicles analyzed displayed 
similar trends from one analysis method to the other.  The Lateral-Twin resulted in the best (lowest 
failure rate) reliability, due to the architectural decision to have two (2) turboshaft engines me-
chanically connected to the rotor system.  The Quad-Rotor had the next best reliability, followed 
by the Lift+Cruise, then the Tilt-Wing, then, finally, the Quad-Rotor without cross shafting. 
A common theme between all configurations is that sub-system reliability within the propul-
sion system (and thereby vehicle safety) must be improved in order to meet anticipated regulations, 
such as the EASA draft SC-VTOL-01.  Corresponding safety objectives for subsystems and com-
ponents that make up the aircraft would be developed from the application of the processes out-
lined in ARP4761 and ARP4754 (ref. 17, 24), as exemplified by the analysis in this report.  FTAs 
and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs) are developed from aircraft design information 
such as functional block diagrams and system schematics.  FTA results are compared with aircraft 
safety objectives – any discrepancies are addressed with design updates, and so on as the whole 
process iterates until convergence.  In the end, a set of subsystem and component reliability re-
quirements designed to meet aircraft-level specifications is generated.  As alluded to in this report, 
it is a general rule of thumb that the subsystems needs relatively higher reliability than the aircraft 
level objective in order to meet the aircraft-level objective; it is likely that the propulsion system 
would need to have 10-10 failure rates per flight hour, or less, in order to meet the EASA Draft SC-
VTOL-01 air vehicle requirement of 10-9 catastrophic failures per flight hour. 
The reliability of the Tilt-Wing, Quad-Rotor, and Lateral-Twin was closely coupled to the 
assumption that each vehicle spends 1/5 to 1/4 of its mission duration within the OEI or OMI avoid 
region.  The Lift+Cruise was assumed to not have an OEI or OMI avoid region in accordance with 
NASA’s guiding principles behind the Lift+Cruise configuration, “Multicopter-style redundancy 
can be employed to deal with failures in the lifting system.  Any number of rotors greater than 6 
allows a fairly simple and manageable continuation of controlled 6 degree-of-freedom flight,” 
(ref. 3). 
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Avoid regions are developed for all FAA certified airplanes.  Avoid regions may include spatial 
restrictions, such as altitude, airport, or airspace restrictions, time-based restrictions, such as night 
operations, weather restrictions, gross weight restrictions, or power restrictions, among others.  
OEI and OMI avoid regions are restrictions based on power-available, altitude, forward airspeed, 
and vehicle gross weight.  Complex, multivariable analysis is required to define the OEI/OMI 
avoid region for a given air vehicle.  Mission spectrum plays a role in developing the OEI/OMI 
avoid region and it is foreseeable that OMI/OEI power available may be derived from a desired 
OEI/OMI avoid region profile.  Figure 29 shows an example height-velocity chart to illustrate how 
an avoid region may be avoided through airplane design and mission planning. 
Mission planning, in/out of ground effect hover 
(IGE/OGE), and airport, heliport, or vertiport instru-
ment take-off ratings may be incorporated into the 
airplane design mission so that a conventional air-
plane (non-DPFC/DP) does not spend time within an 
OEI/OMI avoid region.  In example, losing power 
IGE provides a manageable situation for a trained, 
certified pilot to land the aircraft in a controlled man-
ner in-which risk to occupant safety is low.  How-
ever, for this study a conservative estimate of time 
spent in the OEI/OMI region was assumed since the 
airplane performance in all flight regimes was not 
yet defined. 
A sensitivity analysis was performed to assess 
the impacts of time spent in OEI/OMI avoid region 
on the safety of the vehicle within its intended mis-
sion.  The Lateral-Twin was used to perform the sen-
sitivity study.  The “In OEI Avoid Region” event 
probability was adjusted from 0.2 to 0.0.  Appendix F includes the baseline FTA for the Lateral-
Twin and Table 16 presents the results.  Note that an event probability of .20 correlates to 20% 
time spent in the OEI/OMI avoid region, .10 to 10%, etc.  The mission duration was calculated to 
be 60.6 minutes, which includes two (2) legs of two (2) minutes hover on takeoff, 26 minutes of 
cruise, and two (2) minutes of hover on landing (ref. 2). 
It was found that nearly an order of magnitude safety improvement was obtained by adjusting 
the time spent in the OEI/OMI avoid region.  A graph of the results, Figure 30, shows a roughly 
linear relationship between failure rate and 0% to 20% time spent in the OEI/OMI Avoid Region.   
It is believed that as the design of these vehicles mature, that the OEI/OMI Avoid Region 
would be reduced from the values shown for the Tilt-Wing, Quad-Rotor, and Lateral-Twin.  Ad-
ditionally, it is believed that the Lift+Cruise air vehicle will have an OMI/OEI avoid region, re-
ducing the inherent safety of the vehicle.  Avoid regions for all of the NASA RVLT Concept 
Vehicles under consideration for future work should be developed in order to more accurately 
assess the safety of the configuration against its intended mission. 
Figure 29:  Example Height Velocity 
Chart Illustrating Takeoff Profile that 
Does Not Enter Avoid Regions. 
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Table 16:  Sensitivity Study Summary – Failures per 
Flight Hour Against Time in OEI/OMI Avoid Region 
for Lateral-Twin Air-Vehicle. 
Percent Time 
in OEI/OMI  
Avoid Region 
Time in 
OEI/OMI 
Avoid Region 
Failures per 
Flight Hour 
FTA Reliability 
20% 12.1 minutes 1.91 X 10-4 
10% 6.1 minutes 1.09 X 10-4 
5% 3.0 minutes 6.80 X 10-5 
3.25% 2.0 minutes 5.16 X 10-5 
2% 1.2 minutes 4.33 X 10-5 
1% 0.6 minutes 3.51 X 10-5 
0% 0.0 minutes 2.69 X 10-5 
 
 
Figure 30:  Sensitivity Study of Failure Rate vs Time 
in OEI/OMI Avoid Region for Lateral-Twin. 
10.3 Reliability Metrics for the UAM Mission 
The UAM operator concepts are looking to operate high frequency, high density routes over and 
around major metropolitan areas and presents routes in the vicinity of 15 minutes in duration cov-
ering distances up to 50 miles as nominal cases for operation (ref. 4). UAM operational concepts 
are also looking to provide this service in high frequency in order to make it economically viable 
(ref. 4).  As mentioned in section 3.1, the UAM community points to the consideration of Part 135 
as the closest FAR specification that applies to the UAM operational model. Furthermore, the 
authors of the document specify a target of no more than 0.3 fatalities per 100 million passenger 
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miles as the design requirement (this equates to a rate of 10-8 catastrophic failures per operational 
hour). This target, the report claims, is four times better than Part 135 fatality rates. For a repre-
sentative UAM aircraft the EASA proposed special condition specifies a rate of 10-9 catastrophic 
failures per operational hour. Furthermore, ARP94910, specifies a Vehicle Management System 
(VMS) reliability metric for a representative sized aircraft to be designed with a catastrophic fail-
ure rate of 10-8 (per operational hour). This equates to approximately a rate of  
10-7 catastrophic failures per operational hour at the aircraft level. As observed there is a significant 
variability in the guidelines presented in various pertinent documents with respect to reliability 
metrics. See Section 3.1 for more supporting evidence related to variability in available specifica-
tions and potential gaps in coverage. 
Recently there has been a flood of activity in industry (ref. 25), academia and government labs 
alike around similar operational concepts as the UAM model. As with the introduction of any 
commercial aircraft there needs to be design guidance available which are reviewed and main-
tained by civil organizations that cover vehicle and sub-system level reliability specifications. The 
UAM community specifically identifies DE/HEP VTOL aircraft types as the choice of configura-
tion to support their operational model. Therefore, it is recommended that there be a significant 
focus on development of regulations and associated design guidelines to cover operations of UAM 
vehicles with DE/HEP configurations operating in/around congested and/or rural areas with no 
more than six on-board passengers or crew. While there is a possibility to use vehicles with capac-
ity for more than 6 passengers to be viable for the UAM type concept, given the current state of 
DE/HEP concepts there is plausibly less urgency to fully address this category.  Furthermore, 
guidance for scheduled transport-category DE/HEP VTOL aircraft carrying more than six passen-
gers could more suitably leverage existing regulations and regulations developed UAM vehicles 
of 6 people of less. 
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11 CONCLUSIONS 
The primary objective of this research effort was to identify failure modes and hazards associated 
with the concept vehicles and to perform FHA and FMECA for each. More specifically, this re-
search was successful in accomplishing the following objectives: 
• To perform a conceptual design of the powertrain configuration for each configuration, 
in as much detail as is necessary to conduct subsequent elements of this research. 
• To create functional block diagrams from each of the conceptual powertrain configu-
rations in order to facilitate the FHA and FMECA. 
• To identify potential hazards and perform a FHA for each configuration. 
• For each configuration, identify and quantify the effects of the identified hazards, the 
severity and probability of their effects, their root cause and the likelihood of each 
cause.  
• To discuss guidelines for development of reliability targets to compare the results con-
tained herein against a benchmark and to enable the certification of similar UAM air-
vehicle concepts.    
As part of a cursory industry search it was determined that available vehicle reliability/safety re-
quirements are not well suited for the UAM mission.  It was also found that currently small Un-
manned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) are grouped with large, passenger carrying vehicles.  However, 
this could unnecessarily prohibit the use of small UAV’s and, therefore, should not be grouped 
with people-carrying, large vehicles.  Momentum based requirements would help distinguish the 
difference between a 50 lbs vehicle a few hundred feet overhead, as compared to a 4,000 lbs vehi-
cle thousands of feet overhead.  Subtle differences, like the variability in size of vehicle, may make 
it difficult to extend an existing FAR for the UAM Mission.  Vehicles for the UAM mission will 
likely require their own FAR. 
Powertrain configurations were developed to support the FHA/FMECA process.  A total of four 
(4) distinct configurations were developed with an alternate configurations for the Quad-Rotor 
Concept Vehicle in which interconnecting shafting was not utilized.  Connectivity between each 
system of components was developed in order to support development of functional block dia-
grams.  Approximate weights and sizes were provided in Table 14. 
Historical data and industry accepted environmental factors were used to generate reliability num-
bers for components in this study.  The electrical components utilized in the various architectures 
were the drivers for the reliability/safety analysis using the noted historical reliability numbers and 
the applied environmental factors.  Reliability improvements may be made by placing inverters 
and rectifiers in parallel, but adjustments to the weight trends must be made in order to account for 
the fail-safe inverter and/or rectifiers.  Reliability improvements are likely able to be made to elec-
tric motors and generators, but it is unlikely that a motor or generator will meet reliability require-
ments for the UAM mission.  Similar to inverters and rectifiers, motors and generators will likely 
need to be placed in fail-safe architectures to increase vehicle safety to acceptable standards.   
The FMECA’s performed on the subject vehicles found that the Tilt-Wing, Quad-Rotor, and Lat-
eral-Twin criticality numbers were all driven by the applied failure rates of the motors and invert-
ers.  In the case of the Tilt-Wing, the turbogeneration function had similar criticality to the electri-
cal energy conversion to shaft torque function.  The criticality of the turbogeneration function was 
driven by the reliability of the generator and rectifier.  The sensitivity study performed on the 
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Quad-Rotor with and without interconnecting shafts yielded an order of magnitude lower reliabil-
ity when interconnecting shafting was not included in the vehicle architecture.  The Lift+Cruise 
Category I Functions all had similar 10-4 criticality numbers to that of the Tilt-Wing, Quad-Rotor, 
and Lateral-Twin concept vehicles. 
The reliability of the Tilt-Wing, Quad-Rotor, and Lateral-Twin was driven by the assumption that 
each concept vehicle spent 20% time in the OEI/OMI avoid region.  In the case of the Alternate 
Configuration Quad-Rotor, the reliability was driven by the motor/inverter reliability.  An addi-
tional finding is that adding more rotors to the Quad-Rotor would not improve the reliability.  
Lift+Cruise reliability was driven by the Category I loss of the turbogeneration unit. 
Overall, the FMECA and FTA agreed with one-another, showing similar criticality and reliability, 
respectively.  The assumption that the Tilt-Wing, Quad-Rotor, and Lateral-Twin spent 20% of 
their time in the OEI/OMI avoid region may be conservative and, conversely, the assumption that 
the Lift+Cruise does not have an OMI avoid region is likely optimistic.   
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12 LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS 
12.1 Lessons Learned 
This study has shed light on many different challenges ahead of the UAM community.  Fol-
lowing the current UAM industry trend, the reliability and safety assessment process was under-
estimated.  Reliability and safety assessment were performed with results that can be used to guide 
architecture changes, but the time and resources allotted to perform the work proved challenging.  
This is a new challenge, though, and processes and tools are being developed to improve the reli-
ability and safety assessment process, particularly early in the conceptual design phase. 
Challenges that most in the UAM community are familiar with relate to range, speed, and 
payload.  Design decisions and technology development associated with 400Wh/kg batteries or 
power-dense electronics plague the UAM configurator as business cases must be closed and novel 
architectures must be developed to create competitive advantages in an over-crowded marketplace. 
However, this study has uncovered an entirely new set of challenges, which the already bur-
dened UAM configurator must attend to.  Safety of UAM vehicles must be improved in order to 
both enter and maintain a UAM industry.  The good news is that the UAM configurator should not 
be traveling this path alone; regulators, government agencies, and even sub-system suppliers 
should be sharing the burden of safety from the regulatory requirements to the sub-system relia-
bility.  However, no amount of component reliability will overcome architecture decisions made 
by the configurator if vehicle configuration that is inherently unsafe. 
This is where the challenge in safety exists today; incorporating robust reliability and safety 
assessments early in a programs infancy, which follows ARP4751 and ARP5754 guidance (ref. 
17, 24), in order to develop inherently safe architectures.  Reliability and safety assessment needs 
to be performed early, at an air-vehicle functional level in order to drive clear requirements into 
the sub-system architecture and into the component. 
Elements of the mission that affect safety should be defined early, so that power demands and 
handling qualities can be designed to meet mission objectives safely.  One large contributor to 
safety as related to the mission profile is the time spent in the OEI/OMI avoid region.  Focusing 
on the macro aircraft functions, as opposed to component configurations early in the program 
would help derive requirements that could be used by the appropriate component design teams. 
Developing safety requirements early will be key in future development of the NASA RVLT 
Concept Vehicles and is likely plaguing the UAM community.  By developing the functional re-
quirements the component designers can then use that information to develop reliable components 
that reside in inherently safe architectures.  As can be seen from the results shown, commercially 
available components required for DE/HEP systems are not readily available with adequate relia-
bilities.  Bespoke, application specific component design efforts are likely required for each appli-
cation considering DE/HEP configurations, and the reliability of those application specific designs 
should be demonstrated through a rigorous design, analysis, and test approach in which reliability 
and safety are intertwined. 
12.2 Recommendations – Operational Requirements 
It is clear that new FAA advisories, as well as standard industry guidance and specifications 
are needed to provide a path for certification of the wide spectrum of DE/HEP aircraft classes and 
reliability guidance dependent on usage (e.g., airspace, passengers on board, weight and/or speed) 
and levels of autonomy (e.g., from automated systems assisting pilots to supervised autonomy).  
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Therefore, careful consideration needs to be established to allow affordable development of future 
avionics and propulsion systems and to guide industry in the design of safe and reliable aircraft 
platforms to operate in National Airspace under FAA and ICAO regulations. 
The operational vehicle momentum is intended to capture the variation of aircraft size and 
operational speed as it can be interpreted from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
data depicted in Figure 31. Boeing recommends a robust characterization approach when devel-
oping design guidelines for these type of aircraft. In particular, the guidelines framework should 
be developed to provide discretization based on operational vehicle momentum, operational alti-
tude, payload type (passenger/freight), operational airspace and operational states.  This variation 
is important as it can provide a metric to ascertain the impact to bystanders due to catastrophic 
failures at the aircraft level. For example consider a relatively heavy freight carrying vehicle op-
erating at a cruise speed of 40 knots, compared to a mid-gross weight passenger carrying vehicle 
operating at 100 knots. These two aircraft look and operate differently but may have similar energy 
and momentum impacts to people and property on the ground in the event of a mishap.  Similarly, 
operational altitude should be used to set safety requirements because aircraft operating at higher 
altitudes have more potential energy that could translate to destructive potential on the ground if 
catastrophic aircraft propulsion failure occurs. Whether an aircraft carries paying-passengers or 
cargo only should have a bearing on safety requirements because, other factors being the same, 
vehicles carrying passengers should be held to higher safety standards than vehicles that only carry 
freight.  Operating airspace should influence DE/HEP aircraft safety requirements by accounting 
for reduced impacts from catastrophic failures in sparsely populated areas, and vice versa.  In 
contrast with general aviation flight patterns with aircraft regulated by FAR Part 23 and hub-and-
spoke route patterns, UAM flight patterns are expected to operate much higher frequency air taxi 
traffic in point-to-point routes.  For congested areas, there will likely be the assumption that 
ground-air transitions occur at prepared zones, i.e. no operation to/from street and road traffic.  
Possible ways to parameterize this dimension include normalizing airspace to the number of ex-
pected passengers flying overhead, or simply using ICAO airspace classes.  Finally, the use of 
operational states discretizes the reliability requirements for a given aircraft class (momentum, 
altitude, payload, operating airspace) as a function of failure consequence or criticality.  For ex-
ample, ARP94910 defines a range of FCS operating states from ‘Normal Operation’ to ‘Loss of 
Control’ and assigns more stringent requirements on failures resulting in more degraded end states. 
The defense industry, government and industry, has already published recommended guidance 
for safety and reliability of flight controls system presented in ARP94910 that include a diverse 
set of usage and operational environments.  However, Boeing suggests that there are gaps in the 
guidance and specifications of sensory and algorithms for unmanned operations.  These gaps can 
be addressed by the development of an Aerospace Recommended Practice and/or a Guidance Doc-
ument to address development of Critical Sensory Systems, as well as Guidance for the Sensory 
Development Life-Cycle similar to, but not replacement of DO-297 and DO-178. 
This can be considered by the FAA for such systems and tailored by means of Advisory Cir-
culars and complementary industry guidance or requirements documents.  Boeing suggests that 
the FAA could use ARP94910 as a starting point for development of Flight Controls for new civil 
unmanned/autonomous aircraft.  Figure 32 depicts a recommended framework of documents that 
can be used as a plan for definition of certification.  In Figure 32, dashed lines represent ties of 
certification requirements and guidance, as well as requirements down flow from 
ARP94910/ARP4754 for development of safety aspects of software and firmware (DO-297, DO-
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254 and DO-178).  In addition, Boeing has been in contact with NAVAIR in Patuxent River, Mar-
yland with the idea to add a document(s) to address a void in safety requirements for sensors that 
will be used to make autonomous decisions, where resolution of time-critical Byzantine Faults 
cannot be achieved with redundancy.  Sensors such as IMUs, LIDARs, RADARs, Electro Optical 
Cameras, and Infrared Cameras are designed with the assumption that a Pilot will detect a sensor 
failure.  However, for UAVs, software will be required to detect time critical failures that cannot 
be identified/detected by a human, or where timing is not sufficient to request resolution from 
operator control stations.  Boeing has also engaged the US Army and Helicopter industry to col-
lectively participate in an endeavor to develop design and certification guidance for such sensors 
and flight-critical algorithms through the SAE-International organization, under the A6 group re-
sponsible for Flight Controls.  Boeing plans to submit a proposal to SAE-International to work on 
such effort to address this underlying guidance, navigation and controls problem. 
 
Figure 31:  Depiction of Loss-of-Function Reliability vs GVW vs Fleet Type. 
In addition, as the propulsion system for some aircraft configurations is all-electric and/or RPM 
controlled, a designer will need to consider the safety effect of a propulsion thruster failure within 
the guidance of the FHA in accordance with ARP4754. Such consideration should include the 
assignment of the motor as part of flight controls or as part of the propulsion system. Such a matter 
needs to be considered when it is determined that the safety-reliability assessment indicates that a 
single (or a set of) thruster require the level of scrutiny that a flight controls design architecture or 
component undertakes.  This detail is brought up as an outcome of several debated conversations 
on this topic during the analysis of the configurations within this program: that is, which technol-
ogy branch should own the motor when one (or a specific combination of) thruster configuration 
failure can cause a catastrophic event.  Boeing encourages the FAA to have participation or mon-
itoring in this activity, since such development/dialog benefits industry and airworthiness agencies 
(Department of Defense (DOD), FAA, EASA, etc.) in the process to align usage within Military 
specifications and Civil Airspace certifications, and therefore safety within airspace usage.  This 
approach is attainable, but will require a rigorous dialog between airworthiness and safety organ-
izations, in order to force comprehensive industry analyses of the different development aspects 
of the vehicle-systems and mission-systems architectures, functions, and sensors, as it relates to 
safety. 
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Figure 32:  Recommendation for Potential Certification Document Suite 
The context of Figure 32 assumes the need for contingency of critical faults resolution (similar 
to the ones pilot or an operator currently have responsibilities for), and therefore advocates that 
sensory systems/components require certification guidance and self-health monitoring to enable 
resolution of establish Byzantine faults.  Examples of such systems are listed below: 
• External sensory systems to assist out-the-window SA (situational awareness) 
o Sensors to assist operations in Degraded Visual Environments 
o Sensors that support un-cooperative surveillance (obstacle avoidance) 
o Landing zone identification, near and on-ground operations, and landing 
o Sensors to enable Terrain Following – Terrain Avoidance operations 
o Altitude above terrain 
o Geo Location (GPS, air or ground based systems) 
• Internal Sensors for diagnosis of identification of critical components and/or systems 
failures 
o Flight Controls and navigation functions 
o Critical Actuation sensors 
o Electrical Systems (as applicable) 
o Hydraulics System (as applicable) 
o Propulsion sensors 
o Fuel System sensors 
o Transmissions and dynamic sensors 
o Sensors for rotor systems and other aerodynamic surfaces 
o Environmental Control Systems (when critical) 
o Sensors for Landing Gear 
o Sensors for fire detection and Fire Extinguishing system 
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• Algorithms 
o Sensor analysis 
o Determinism and Numerical Stability of Decision making Algorithm 
o Measurable Rating of Correctness relative to: Human reaction or Verified 
Mathematical or Physics models 
o Flight Safety Assessment from failure of algorithm 
12.3 Recommendations for Future Work 
Part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Revolutionary Vertical 
Lift (RVLT) Project focus is to work collaboratively with the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) Aircraft Certification Service on research that supports development of certification stand-
ards for Urban Air Mobility (UAM) vehicle propulsion systems.  This includes characterizing fail-
ure modes and mitigation/recovery for common UAM propulsion systems and identifying physical 
and functional reliability and redundancy requirements to meet certification standards.  To enable 
this research, NASA designed four (4) concept vehicles to identify crucial technologies, define 
research requirements, and explore a range of propulsion systems. 
The research performed herein was in support of NASA’s RVLT Project and can be used as a 
measuring stick to guide component technology development, define research requirements for 
future work, and explore the design space for inherently safe propulsion systems for the UAM 
mission.  The primary objective of the research performed herein was to identify failure modes 
and hazards associated with NASA’s RVLT Concept Vehicles and to perform a reliability and 
safety assessment.  Conceptual designs of the powertrain configuration for each concept vehicle 
were developed using the provided architectures.  Hazards related to the powertrain were identified 
and the effects of those hazards were quantified using industry standard reliability and safety anal-
ysis methods.  Gaps between the UAM air vehicles/mission and existing regulations/specifications 
were identified that need to be resolved if Distributed Electric/Hybrid-Electric Propulsion 
(DE/HEP) air vehicles move people and things in the anticipated volumes over metropolitan areas 
(ref. 4).  Future work should further explore leveraging or modifying existing FAR guidance for 
onboard operator case in both conventional or DE/HEP propulsion. 
Boeing recommends extending this research to develop DE/HEP components with improved 
reliability, down-selecting from the four (4) concept vehicles analyzed herein, and exploring 
powertrain architectures and connectivity to provide inherent air-vehicle safety, in order to take 
advantage of higher reliability components.  Selecting one (1) concept vehicle to continue to re-
search will allow greater depths of research activities in specialized technologies, as opposed to 
broader stroke research projects in which many concept vehicles are researched at a higher, sys-
tems level.  Research would follow a similar approach to that of the NASA Civil Heavy Lift Ro-
torcraft Project in which initial vehicle level trade studies were used to down-select to component 
level research using the NASA Large Civil Tilt-Rotor (LCTR) vehicle. 
Boeing recommends selecting a vehicle that is expected to fall within the size and weight re-
strictions of the EASA Draft SC-VTOL-01.  Due to the 4,400 lbs weight limit in the EASA Draft 
SC-VTOL-01, the only two (2) vehicles that fall within this criteria are the Quad-Rotor and the 
Lateral-Twin (ref. 2).  Furthermore, the Quad-Rotor was resized to carry six (6) people on board 
(ref. 3), and it still fell within the 4,400 lbs weight limit, which adds to its applicability to the UAM 
mission and future research areas.  Down-selecting between the Quad-Rotor and the Lateral-Twin 
is more difficult.  The two (2) platforms, similar to the two (2) heavier RVLT Concept Vehicles, 
are both interesting research platforms, as well as good candidate aircraft platforms.  The Tilt-
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Wing or the Lift+Cruise vehicles could be used to conduct trade studies on FCC’s powered by HV 
systems, e.g. from HVDC bus to FCC, using DC-DC converter, examining reliability impacts 
(high power switches, digital components, microcontrollers, heat, etc.) and swap, efficiency. 
The Lateral-Twin is a more efficient aircraft than the Quad-Rotor when considering similar 
payloads (ref. 3) and can be modified to accept conventional powertrains, series-hybrid (turboe-
lectric) powertrains, or all-electric powertrains.  Future work could explore adding a DC-DC con-
verter in addition to the LV battery and accessory generator to improve reliability of the FCS and 
reduce the weight of the LV batteries or accessory generators.  More exploration into engine se-
lection could be performed.  The engines are anticipated to have higher power demands then orig-
inally estimated because they require power to charge HV and LV batteries in cruise, in addition 
to flight power required and accessory loads.  Examining a pilot’s energy management (Fuel vs. 
Battery) displays and strategy may shed light on future cockpit requirements, as well as, optimal 
electrical vs. chemical energy use in future designs.   
However, the Quad-Rotor has similar flexibility in regards to powertrain configurating.  Sim-
ilar exploration into energy management and interplay between HV and LV systems may be ex-
plored, but the Quad-Rotor has the added benefit of being able to flexibly research both variable 
pitch, fixed speed propulsion system architectures as well as fixed pitch, variable speed system 
architectures and further investigate the value of interconnecting shafting, although safety of the 
Quad-Rotor was notably reduced by removing the interconnecting shafts.  Control laws (CLAWS) 
could be developed to assist in autorotation in the alternate configuration in which interconnecting 
shafting is not utilized.  Additionally, multi-rotor research can be performed in interesting man-
ners; adding stacked rotors to make an octo-rotor or removing one (1) rotor to make a tri-rotor are 
both interesting possibilities, as well as adding one (1) rotor to make a penta-rotor.   
Research into adding rotors (i.e. penta or octo-rotor) would help determine if fail safe rotor 
systems will inherently make the vehicle safer.  The study performed herein did not show the 
Lift+Cruise, which is a variable speed octo-rotor with a pusher propeller, to be safer than the Quad-
Rotor; however, additional research considering all aspects of the flight regime that an optimal 
rotor configuration exists for safety.  Three (3) or more rotors could be traded using NASA’s pro-
posed collective only control scheme to determine the optimal rotor configuration for safety. 
Once a vehicle architecture for future study has been down-selected, Boeing recommends trade 
studies related to powertrain architectures necessary to meet the EASA Draft SC-VTOL-01 air-
vehicle requirement of 10-9 failures per flight hour.  As a rule of thumb this would require a pro-
pulsion system architecture that has approximately 10-10 failures per flight hour or less.  The reli-
ability and safety analysis method provided here may be extended to review the critical functions 
that are required within the propulsion system and levy requirements down to the sub-system and 
component level.  Exploration into novel methods to improve safety, such as energy transfer from 
the LV battery to the HV system in emergency conditions could be considered for smaller vehicles, 
like the single-person Quad-Rotor. 
Future work should improve sub-system reliability through component improvements.  Elec-
tric motors, generators, inverters, and rectifiers require more reliable designs in order to be used 
for primary propulsion in commercial applications.  Detailed design and analysis efforts should be 
undertaken to develop reliability models that can be used to assess the reliability of a design prior 
to extensive test programs.  SAE ARP4761 and ARP4754 include guidance necessary to perform 
detailed reliability analysis and should be used to improve motor and generator reliability through 
a data-driven approach.  Although testing and fielding will inevitably determine the reliability of 
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a component, being able to analytically predict the reliability will aid in regulatory and industry 
specification development. 
Boeing recommends down-selecting a single vehicle configuration and then performing a more 
pointed functional reliability and safety assessment to develop an architecture and architectural 
requirements necessary to attain a propulsion system with no more than 10-10 failures per flight 
hour.  Once the detailed reliability and safety assessment is performed, derived requirements may 
be driven into component level research with motor or inverter suppliers to improve the state-of-
the-art technology for the aerospace industry.  NASA will need to work closely with the sub-
contractor to explore the complex flight dynamics in ground effect, out of ground effect, maneu-
vers, and environmental factors that may impact the reliability requirements necessary to meet the 
10-10 failures per flight hour threshold.  Deliverables of the study could include the functional 
reliability and safety assessment in all phases of flight, a model of the propulsion system integrated 
into the down-selected air-vehicle including sensor and software packages that may be required, a 
mass balance record of all airplane sub-systems to assess cg location, and initial component level 
reliability assessments to develop more focused areas for technology improvement. 
 
 
NASA/CR—2019-220217 78
 
 
 
 
 
13 REFERENCES 
1 Johnson, W., Yamauchi, G., and Watts, 
M.: Designs and Technology Require-
ments for Civil Heavy Lift Rotorcraft.  
AVS Vertical Lift Aircraft Design Con-
ference, San Francisco, CA, January, 
2006. 
2 Johnson, W., Silva, C. and Solis, E.: 
Concept Vehicles for Air Taxi Opera-
tions.  AHS Aeromechanics Design for 
Transformative Vertical Flight, San 
Francisco, CA, January 2018. 
3 Silva, C., Johnson, W., Solis, E., Patter-
son, M., and Antcliff, K.: VTOL Urban 
Air Mobility Concept Vehicles for 
Technology Development.  2018 Avia-
tion Technology, Integration, and Oper-
ations Conference, AIAA Aviation Fo-
rum, 2018. 
4 Goel, N. and Holden, J.: Fast-Forward-
ing to a Future of On-Demand Urban 
Air Transportation. Uber Elevate, Octo-
ber 27, 2016. 
5 Johnson, W. “NDARC.  NASA Design 
and Analysis of Rotorcraft.”  NASA TP 
2015-218751, April 2015. 
6 Darmstadt, P. and Robuck, M.:  Compo-
sites for Advanced Drive Systems, a 
Systems Analysis – Revolutionary Ver-
tical Lift Technology (RVLT).  AHS In-
ternational 74th Annual Forum & Tech-
nology Display, Phoenix, AZ, May, 
2018. 
7 SAE ARP5580 – Aerospace Recom-
mended Practice:  Recommended Fail-
ure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) Practices for Non-Automobile 
Applications, 2012-05. 
8 MIL-STD-1629A – Military Standard:  
Procedures for Performing a Failure 
Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis, 
24 November 1980. 
9 MIL-HDBK-217F – Military Handbook: 
Reliability Prediction of Electronic 
Equipment, 2 December, 1991. 
10 Piancastelli, L.: Powerplant Reliability 
Issues and Wear Monitoring in Aircraft 
Piston Engines. Part II: Engine Diagnos-
tic. Drones. 2. 10. 
10.3390/drones2010010, 2018. 
11 Rossi, M.J.:  Nonelectronic Parts Relia-
bility Data. NPRD-3, Griffiss A.F.B, 
NY, 1985. 
12 Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data. 
NPRD-16, Quanterion Solutions Incor-
porated, Utica, NY, 2016. 
13 Rome Laboratory Reliability Engineer’s 
Toolkit.  Systems Reliability Division, 
Rome Laboratory, Air Force Material 
Command (AFMC), Griffiss AFB, NY, 
April, 1993. 
14 Song, Y. and Wang, B.: Quantitative 
Evaluation for Reliability of Hybrid 
Electric Vehicle Powertrain.  4th Interna-
tional Conference on Power Engineer-
ing, Energy, and Electrical Drives, Is-
tanbul, Turkey, May, 2013. 
15 System Reliability Toolkit. Quanterion 
Solutions Incorporated, Utica, NY, 
2000. 
16 EASA Type-Certificate Data Sheet – 
General Electric Company CT7-series 
engines, 07.02.2018. 
17 SAE ARP4761 - Aerospace Recom-
mended Practice: Guidelines and Meth-
ods for Conducting The Safety Assess-
ment Process on Civil Airborne Systems 
and Equipment, 1996-12. 
18 Reliability Workbench. (2015). Isop-
graph Ltd. 
19 Aerospace.honeywell.com. (2019). T55 
Turboshaft Engine. [online] Available 
NASA/CR—2019-220217 79
 
 
 
 
 
at: https://aerospace.honey-
well.com/en/products/engines/t55-tur-
boshaft-engine. 
20 Forecastinternational.com. (2019). The 
Market for Aviation Turboshaft En-
gines, Product Code #F642. [online] 
Available at: https://www.forecastinter-
national.com/samples/F642_Com-
pleteSample.pdf. 
21 Safran Helicopter Engines. (2019). 
Aneto. [online] Available at: 
https://www.safran-helicopter-en-
gines.com/helicopter-engines/over-
2000-shp/aneto. 
22 Soong, W. (2008). Power Engineering 
Briefing Note Series, Sizing of Electri-
cal Machines, PEBN #9. [online] Ele-
ceng.adelaide.edu.au. Available at: 
http://www.eleceng.adelaide.edu.au/re-
search/power/pebn/pebn009%20siz-
ing%20of%20electrical%20ma-
chines.pdf. 
23 SAE AS50881 - Aerospace Standard: 
(R) Wiring Aerospace Vehicle, 2015-05. 
24 SAE ARP4754 – Aerospace Recom-
mended Practice:  (R) Guidelines for 
Development of Civil Aircraft and Sys-
tems, 2010-12. 
25 Electric VTOL News™. [online] Electric 
VTOL News™. Available at: http://ev-
tol.news/ [April, 2019]. 
 
NASA/CR—2019-220217 80
APPENDIX A FUNCTIONAL HAZARD ANALYSIS (FHA) TABLES 
Table A- 1:  Tilt-Wing FHA 
Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
Tr
an
sm
it 
A
de
qu
at
e 
Po
w
er
 to
 R
ot
or
s 
Any loss of 
single pro-
pulsor fail 
Away from 
OEI region 
Aircrew detects failure and compensates 
with remaining thrust to continue flight Minor 
In OEI re-
gion 
Failure is detected. Power Required is 
greater than Power available (Pr>Pa). Hard 
landing with potential loss of aircraft/crew. 
Catastrophic 
Any com-
bination of 
Dual pro-
pulsor Fail 
All 
Failures are detected. Cross shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Control-
lability still present. Reduced power avail-
able. Insufficient power to maintain level 
fight. Gliding approach to airplane mode or 
Run-On Landing (ROL). If adequate room 
exists for flare and roll-out, no damage or 
loss of occupants. Worst case feasible out-
come is loss of air-vehicle/occupant 
Catastrophic 
Complete 
Propulsion 
loss 
Within 2 
minutes of 
suitable 
landing 
area 
Loss of ability to maintain battery charge. 
Electric motors running off battery power 
alone. Batteries are adequate to provide 
power for a normal hover or (ROL). 
Severe 
More than 
2 minutes 
from a suit-
able land-
ing area 
Loss of ability to maintain battery charge. 
Electric motors running off battery power 
alone. Batteries are NOT adequate to pro-
vide power for a normal hover or (ROL). 
Gliding approach without suitable landing 
area. Loss of air vehicle and occupants 
Catastrophic 
Tr
an
sm
it 
A
de
qu
at
e 
Po
w
er
 
to
 R
ot
or
s 
Dual esc 
fail 
Dual ESC 
failed high: 
all phases 
Failures are detected. Cross shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Control-
lability still present. Pilots will need to re-
duce engine power to land.  If hover power 
can be managed than land normally. If ad-
equate room exists for flare and roll-out as 
required, no damage or loss of occupants. 
Worst case feasible outcome is air-vehicle 
damage and occupant injury 
Severe 
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Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
Dual ESC 
Failed 
Low: All 
phases 
Failures are detected. Cross shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Control-
lability still present. Reduced power avail-
able. Insufficient power to maintain level 
fight. Gliding approach to airplane mode or 
Run-On Landing (ROL). If adequate room 
exists for flare and roll-out, no damage or 
loss of occupants. Worst case feasible out-
come is loss of air-vehicle/occupant. Haz-
ard classification is the same whether OEI 
or out of OEI avoid region. 
Catastrophic 
Single esc 
fail 
Esc failed 
hi: all 
phases 
Failures are detected. Cross shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Control-
lability still present. Pilots will need to 
manually modulate engine power Gliding 
approach to airplane mode or Run-On 
Landing (ROL).If adequate room exists for 
flare and roll-out as required, no damage or 
loss of occupants. Hover landings should 
still be possible with careful modulation of 
thrust via aircrew action 
Major 
ESC Failed 
Low: Not 
OEI Avoid 
region 
Effective loss of torque output from one 
motor. Pilot detects failure and compen-
sates. ROL required. 
Minor 
ESC Failed 
Low: OEI 
Avoid re-
gion 
Failure is detected. Power Required is 
greater than Power available (Pr>Pa). Hard 
landing with potential loss of aircraft/crew. 
Catastrophic 
Tr
an
sm
it 
A
de
qu
at
e 
Po
w
er
 to
 R
ot
or
s 
Single 
gearbox 
fail 
All 
Failures detected and annunciated to air-
crew (chip light, temp/ pressure indica-
tions). Loss of ability to spin rotor associ-
ated with that gearbox. Pilot compensation 
possible via directional control. Safe flight 
to ROL possible. Air-crew workload im-
pact. Must be within range of suitable land-
ing area. 
Major 
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Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
Dual gear-
box fail 
Opposite 
wings 
Failures detected and annunciated to air-
crew (chip light, temp/ pressure indica-
tions. Loss of ability to spin rotor associ-
ated with any two gearbox will result in 
loss of sufficient power for airplane mode 
level flight. Pilot compensation possible 
via directional control. Safe flight to ROL 
possible, but will require adequate Air-
crew workload impact. Possible loss of air 
vehicle and occupants. 
Catastrophic 
Same 
Wings 
Failures detected and annunciated to air-
crew (chip light, temp/ pressure indica-
tions. Loss of ability to spin rotor associ-
ated with two gearbox on the same wing 
will result in loss of sufficient power for 
airplane mode level flight. If is also as-
sumed to result in loss of flight path control 
due to excessive yaw. Pilot compensation 
not possible via directional control. Loss of 
air vehicle and occupants. 
Catastrophic 
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Table A- 2:  Quad-Rotor FHA 
Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
Tr
an
sm
it 
A
de
qu
at
e 
Po
w
er
  t
o 
R
ot
or
s 
Any loss of 
single pro-
pulsor fail 
Away 
from OEI 
region 
Aircrew detects failure and compensates 
with remaining thrust to continue flight. 
Cross-shafting results in all rotors continu-
ing to spin. 
Minor 
In OEI re-
gion 
Failure is detected. Power Required is 
greater than Power available (Pr>Pa). Hard 
landing with potential loss of aircraft/occu-
pants. 
Catastrophic 
Any com-
bination of 
dual pro-
pulsor Fail 
All 
Failures are detected. Cross-shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Controlla-
bility still present. Reduced power availa-
ble. Insufficient power to maintain level 
fight. Autorotative approach requires suita-
ble landing area. Worst case feasible out-
come is loss of air-vehicle/occupant. 
Catastrophic 
FCC fail All 
ECS loses RPM loop closure commands 
from FCC. Additionally, collective control 
of rotor is lost. Catastrophic outcome due 
to loss of flight path control 
Catastrophic 
Dual ESC 
fail 
Dual ESC 
failed 
high: all 
phases 
Failures are detected. Cross shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Controlla-
bility still present. Pilots will need to re-
duce engine power to land.  If hover power 
can be properly managed than land nor-
mally. Worst case feasible outcome is air-
vehicle damage and occupant injury 
Severe 
Dual ESC 
Failed 
Low: All 
phases 
Failures are detected. Cross shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Controlla-
bility still present. Reduced power availa-
ble. Insufficient power to maintain level 
fight. Autorotative landing required. Worst 
case feasible outcome is loss of air-vehi-
cle/occupant. Hazard classification is the 
same whether OEI or out of OEI avoid re-
gion. 
Catastrophic 
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Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
Tr
an
sm
it 
A
de
qu
at
e 
Po
w
er
  t
o 
R
ot
or
s 
Single ESC 
fail 
Esc failed 
hi: all 
phases 
Failures are detected. Cross shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Controlla-
bility still present. Pilots will need to man-
ually modulate engine power to a hover 
landing or a no hover landing with some 
forward speed to maximize Effective 
Translational Lift (ETL). Pilot workload is-
sue. 
Minor 
ESC 
Failed 
Low: Not 
OEI Avoid 
region 
Failures are detected. Cross shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Controlla-
bility still present. Pilots will need to exe-
cute a no hover landing with some forward 
speed to maximize Effective Translational 
Lift (ETL). Pilot workload issue. 
Minor 
ESC 
Failed 
Low: OEI 
Avoid re-
gion 
Failure is detected. Cross shafting ensures 
controllability. Power Required is greater 
than Power available (Pr>Pa). Hard landing 
with potential loss of aircraft/crew. 
Catastrophic 
Single 
gearbox 
fail 
All 
Failures detected and annunciated to air-
crew (chip light, temp/ pressure indica-
tions). Loss of ability to spin rotor associ-
ated with that gearbox.  Loss of flight-path 
control and subsequent catastrophic loss of 
air vehicle/occupants 
Catastrophic 
Dual gear-
box fail All 
Failures detected and annunciated to air-
crew (chip light, temp/ pressure indica-
tions). Loss of ability to spin rotors associ-
ated with those gearbox.  Loss of flight-
path control and subsequent catastrophic 
loss of air vehicle/occupants 
Catastrophic 
Complete 
HV Battery 
fail 
All 
Complete loss of all High Voltage Power to 
motors. Complete loss of propulsion. Auto-
rotative landing required. Worst case feasi-
ble outcome is loss of air-vehicle/occupant. 
Catastrophic 
Individual 
portions of 
HV Battery 
Fail 
OEI Avoid 
Region 
Failure is detected. Power Required is 
greater than Power available (Pr>Pa). Hard 
landing with potential loss of aircraft/occu-
pants 
Catastrophic 
Other than 
OEI Avoid 
Region 
Aircrew detects failure and compensates 
with remaining thrust to continue flight Minor 
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Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
Tr
an
sm
it 
A
de
qu
at
e 
Po
w
er
 
to
 R
ot
or
s 
LV battery 
fail All 
Loss of power to all 4 ESC and FCC. Col-
lective control of rotor lost. Loss of flight 
Path Control and air vehicle 
Catastrophic 
Combiner 
gear-
box/cross 
shaft fail 
All 
Annunciated to pilot. Need proper anti-flail 
in place on driveshaft. Possible minor han-
dling qualities impact, lack of redundancy 
available for follow-on propulsion single or 
dual failures. This fail is and of itself is not 
Catastrophic. 
Minor 
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Table A- 3:  Alternate Configuration – Quad-Rotor without Interconnecting Shafts FHA 
Note:  Red text denotes changes to “Classification of Failure Condition” from the baseline Quad-
Rotor, with interconnecting shafts, and orange text denotes added or removed “Failure Condi-
tions” to be when comparing the baseline and alternate Quad-Rotor configurations. 
Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
Tr
an
sm
it 
A
de
qu
at
e 
Po
w
er
  t
o 
R
ot
or
s 
Any loss of 
single pro-
pulsor fail 
Away from 
OEI region 
Aircrew detects failure and compensates 
with remaining thrust to continue flight. 
Lack of cross-shafting will require imme-
diate cut of power to diagonal side rotor to 
continue controlled flight. Lack of power 
will require autorotative or dual engine fail 
descent profile. ROL required due to lack 
of ability to flare during autorotative land-
ing. Potential catastrophic outcome with 
loss of air vehicle /occupants. 
Catastrophic 
In OEI re-
gion 
Failure is detected. Power Required is 
greater than Power available (Pr>Pa). Po-
tential for diminished controllability due to 
one rotor no longer producing thrust/lift. 
Hard landing with potential loss of air-
craft/occupants. 
Catastrophic 
Any com-
bination of 
Dual pro-
pulsor Fail 
Both on 
one side 
(fore/aft, or 
Left/Right) 
Failures are detected. Either fore/aft or 
left/right propulsors fail. All remaining 
thrust causes uncontrolled pitch/yaw mo-
ments. Loss of control w/o immediate 
thrush reduction from remaining rotors. 
Insufficient power to maintain level fight. 
Autorotative approach requires suitable 
landing area. Limited ability for a collec-
tive flare. Likely outcome is loss of air ve-
hicle/occupant. 
Catastrophic 
Diagonal 
from each 
other 
Failures are detected. Diagonal thrust may 
be able to be modulated to drive a degree 
of pitch, roll, and yaw control.  Insufficient 
lift for continued flight. Will require an au-
torotative descent. Possibility of limited 
use of power to flare the air vehicle for 
landing. Worse case realistic outcome is 
catastrophic loss of air vehicle and occu-
pants. 
Catastrophic 
FCC Fail All 
ECS loses RPM loop closure commands 
from FCC. Additionally, collective control 
of rotor is lost. Catastrophic outcome due 
to loss of flight path control 
Catastrophic 
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Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
Tr
an
sm
it 
A
de
qu
at
e 
Po
w
er
  t
o 
R
ot
or
s 
Dual ESC 
Fail 
Dual ESC 
Failed 
High: All 
phases 
Failures are detected. Rotors will continue 
to spin. Controllability heavily degraded in 
combination of pitch/roll/yaw axis. Ability 
to descend to landing under control in 
doubt. Worse case realistic outcome is cat-
astrophic loss of air vehicle and occupants. 
Catastrophic 
Dual ESC 
Failed 
Low: All 
phases 
Failures are detected. Insufficient thrust re-
main for level flight. Remaining thrust 
causes uncontrolled pitch/yaw moments. 
Loss of control w/o immediate thrush re-
duction from remaining rotors to balance 
out forces.  Autorotative approach requires 
suitable landing area. Limited ability for a 
collective flare. Likely outcome is loss of 
air-vehicle/occupant. 
Catastrophic 
Single ESC 
Fail 
ESC Failed 
Hi: All 
phases 
Failures are detected. All rotors are still 
spinning.  System will need to modulate 
engine power on other rotors to allow de-
graded controllability to a hover landing or 
a no hover landing with some forward 
speed to maximize Effective Translational 
Lift (ETL). Pilot workload issue. 
Severe 
ESC Failed 
Low: Not 
OEI Avoid 
region 
Failures are detected. Rotor associated 
with failed ECS will not produce adequate 
thrust to allow for controllability unless 
other rotors allow for degraded control 
modes. Pilots will need to execute a no 
hover landing with some forward speed to 
maximize Effective Translational Lift 
(ETL) and potential controllability. If de-
graded control modes are present, then Se-
vere outcome for pilot workload. Other-
wise, Catastrophic outcome due to loss of 
flight path control. 
Catastrophic 
ESC Failed 
Low: OEI 
Avoid re-
gion 
Failure is detected. Degraded/loss of con-
trol due to degraded thrust. Power Re-
quired is greater than Power available 
(Pr>Pa). Hard landing with potential loss 
of aircraft/crew. 
Catastrophic 
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Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
Tr
an
sm
it 
A
de
qu
at
e 
Po
w
er
  t
o 
R
ot
or
s 
Single 
Gearbox 
Fail 
All 
Failures detected and annunciated to air-
crew (chip light, temp/ pressure indica-
tions). Loss of ability to spin rotor associ-
ated with that gearbox.  Loss of flight-path 
control and subsequent catastrophic loss of 
air vehicle/occupants 
Catastrophic 
Dual Gear-
box Fail All 
Failures detected and annunciated to air-
crew (chip light, temp/ pressure indica-
tions). Loss of ability to spin rotors associ-
ated with those gearbox.  Loss of flight-
path control and subsequent catastrophic 
loss of air vehicle/occupants 
Catastrophic 
Complete 
HV Battery 
Fail 
All 
Complete loss of all High Voltage Power 
to motors. Complete loss of propulsion. 
Autorotative landing required. Worst case 
feasible outcome is loss of air-vehicle/oc-
cupant. 
Catastrophic 
Individual 
portions of 
HV Battery 
Fail 
OEI Avoid 
Region 
Failure is detected. Degradation in thrust 
from that rotor could result in degraded 
controllability. Power Required is greater 
than Power available (Pr>Pa). Hard land-
ing with potential loss of aircraft/occu-
pants 
Catastrophic 
Other than 
OEI Avoid 
Region 
Aircrew detects failure. Degraded thrust 
from associated rotor. Depending on na-
ture of battery fail, controllability could be 
severely degraded or lost. Severe outcome 
if a partial battery failure. Catastrophic 
outcome for complete loss of that portion 
of the batteries function. 
Catastrophic 
LV Battery 
Fail All 
Loss of power to all 4 ESC and FCC. Col-
lective control of rotor lost. Loss of flight 
Path Control results in Catastrophic out-
come. 
Catastrophic 
Note: NOT 
PRESENT 
due to lack 
of intercon-
necting 
shafts 
Combiner 
gear-
box/Cross 
shaft fail 
All 
Annunciated to pilot. Need proper anti-
flail in place on driveshaft. Possible minor 
handling qualities impact, lack of redun-
dancy available for follow-on propulsion 
single or dual failures. This fail is and of 
itself is not Catastrophic. 
Minor 
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Table A- 4:  Lateral-Twin FHA 
Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
Tr
an
sm
it 
A
de
qu
at
e 
Po
w
er
  t
o 
R
ot
or
s 
Any loss of 
single pro-
pulsor fail 
Away from 
OEI region 
Aircrew detects failure and compensates 
with remaining thrust to continue flight. 
Controllability not degraded due to cross 
shafting. 
Minor 
In OEI re-
gion 
Failure is detected. Power Required is 
greater than Power available (Pr>Pa). Hard 
landing with potential loss of aircraft/crew. 
Catastrophic 
Any com-
bination of 
Dual pro-
pulsor Fail 
All 
Failures are detected. Cross shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Control-
lability still present. Reduced power avail-
able. Insufficient power to maintain level 
fight. Autorotative approach and landing. 
Worst case feasible outcome is loss of air-
vehicle/occupant 
Catastrophic 
Dual Tur-
boshaft 
Failure 
All 
Failures are detected. Cross shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Control-
lability still present. Reduced power avail-
able. Insufficient power to maintain level 
fight. Autorotative approach and landing. 
Worst case feasible outcome is loss of air-
vehicle/occupant 
Catastrophic 
Single Tur-
boshaft and 
Electric 
Propulsion 
fail 
All 
Failures are detected. Cross shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Control-
lability still present. Reduced power avail-
able. Insufficient power to maintain level 
fight. Autorotative approach and landing. 
Worst case feasible outcome is loss of air-
vehicle/occupant 
Catastrophic 
ESC Fail 
ESC Failed 
Hi: All 
phases 
Failures are detected. Cross shafting en-
sures all rotors are still spinning. Control-
lability still present. Pilots’ control of tur-
boshaft output will allow for sufficient 
power decrement to allow a normal de-
scent to landing. Hover landing is possible 
with careful modulation of thrust via air-
crew action 
Major 
ESC Failed 
Low: Not 
OEI Avoid 
region 
Effective loss of torque output from elec-
tric motor. Pilot detects failure and com-
pensates. ROL required due to lack of 
hover power. 
Minor 
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Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
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ESC Failed 
Low: OEI 
Avoid re-
gion 
Failure is detected. Power Required is 
greater than Power available (Pr>Pa). Hard 
landing with potential loss of aircraft/crew. 
Catastrophic 
Single Ro-
tor Gear-
box Fail 
All 
Failures detected and annunciated to air-
crew (chip light, temp/ pressure indica-
tions). Loss of ability to spin rotor associ-
ated with that gearbox. Assuming rotor 
tops spinning due to GB fail, control will 
be lost with a Catastrophic loss of air vehi-
cle and occupants. 
Catastrophic 
Cross 
shafting 
fail (in-
cludes 
junction 
gear box) 
While in 
OEI 
Failures detected and annunciated to air-
crew (chip light, temp/ pressure indica-
tions. Loss of ability to apply torque to the 
rotor associated with the failed engine. 
System will need to immediately drop col-
lective on the rotor still producing thrust. 
Must enter autorotative descent to a land-
ing. If pilot reaction or system reaction is 
delayed, loss of flight path control and cat-
astrophic outcome may occur. Possibility 
or rotor to rotor contact (see entry below). 
Catastrophic 
Combiner 
Gearbox 
Fail or 
cross shaft 
failure 
All 
Failures detected and annunciated to air-
crew (chip light, temp/ pressure) indica-
tions. All motors continue to operate. Elec-
tric motor is unable to provide power to 
one or more main rotors. Reduced power 
will necessitate ROL. Failure mode con-
sidered catastrophic due to rotor overlap. 
Gearboxes utilized in cross-shafting will 
serve to balance out delta-Qm between ro-
tors and keep the rotor phased. Any failure 
of any gearbox utilized in cross-shafting 
will also result in loss of Qm equalization. 
Once the cross-shafting is gone, differ-
ences in Qm will result in changes to rotor 
phasing. Rotor contact is considered Cata-
strophic and will result in loss of flight path 
control and possible loss of vehicle struc-
tural integrity. Loss of air vehicle and oc-
cupants. 
Catastrophic 
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Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
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LV Battery 
Fail All 
Loss of power to ESC and FCC. Loss of 
ECS result in loss of electric propulsor. See 
single propulsor fail above for failure ef-
fects given flight modes and conditions. 
Catastrophic 
FCC Fail All 
Potential loss of electric motor. Severity 
tied to flight condition and failure mode. If 
power command fails to low in OEI avoid 
region, potentially catastrophic. If the fails 
command to current value or to high 
power, then Major outcome due to pilot 
workload. 
Catastrophic; 
Major (see ef-
fect of failure) 
Complete 
HV Battery 
Fail 
Other than 
OEI avoid 
region 
Complete loss of all High Voltage Power 
to electric propulsor. Complete loss of 
electric propulsion. Turboshaft engine 
proves sufficient power for level flight 
away from OEI avoid region. Run on/ no 
hover landing is required. 
Major 
OEI avoid 
region 
Failure is detected. Power Required is 
greater than Power available (Pr>Pa) due 
to loss of electrical motor resulting in 
hover power deficit. Potential hard landing 
with potential loss of aircraft/crew. 
Catastrophic 
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Table A- 5:  Lift+Cruise FHA 
Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
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Any loss of 
single pro-
pulsor fail 
All 
Aircrew and air vehicle detects failure. Air 
vehicle throttles back one additional en-
gine and adds power to others to compen-
sate with additional thrust to continue 
flight 
Minor 
Any com-
bination of 
Dual pro-
pulsor Fail 
All 
Failure detected and annunciated to Flight 
Crew. Four propulsors now at reduced 
power (two failed and corresponding two 
at reduced power) Air vehicle unable to 
hover. Airplane mode landing required. 
Major 
Complete 
turboshaft 
Propulsion 
loss or as-
sociated 
battery 
charging 
hardware. 
Within 2 
minutes of 
suitable 
landing 
area 
Loss of ability to maintain battery charge. 
Electric motors running off battery power 
alone. Batteries are adequate to provide 
power for a normal hover or (ROL). 
Severe 
More than 
2 minutes 
from a suit-
able land-
ing area 
Loss of ability to maintain battery charge. 
Electric motors running off battery power 
alone. Batteries are NOT adequate to pro-
vide power for a normal hover or (ROL). 
Gliding approach without suitable landing 
area. Loss of air vehicle and occupants 
Catastrophic 
Single 
Gearbox 
Fail 
All 
Fail to spin rotor captured under single 
propulsor fail. This is for a failure to align 
rotor with relative wind when transitioning 
to wingborne flight. For fail during hover 
flight, see loss of single propulsor fail. An-
nunciation to pilots would require sensor 
to measure alignment. Extra drag on one 
wing due to propeller not being aligned 
with the relative wind. 
Minor 
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Failure 
Conditions 
Phase of 
Operation 
Effect of the Failure condition of air-
craft/crew 
Classification 
of Failure 
Condition 
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Dual Gear-
box Fail Same wing 
Fail to spin 2 rotors captured under dual 
propulsor fail. This is for a failure to align 
rotor with relative wind when transitioning 
to wingborne flight. For fail during hover 
flight, see loss of dual propulsor fail. An-
nunciation to pilots would require sensor 
to measure alignment. Extra drag on one 
wing due to two propellers not being 
aligned with the relative wind. Adequate 
roll control, yaw control will be degraded. 
Major 
Opposite 
Wings 
Fail to spin 2 rotors captured under dual 
propulsor fail. This is for a failure to align 
rotor with relative wind when transitioning 
to wingborne flight. For fail during hover 
flight, see loss of dual propulsor fail. An-
nunciation to pilots would require sensor 
to measure alignment. Extra drag on both 
wings due to two propellers not being 
aligned with the relative wind. Adequate 
roll control. Adequate degraded yaw con-
trol should be assured via design. 
Major 
Rear pro-
pulsor fail All 
Air vehicle will lose forward thrust. Air 
vehicle will have to slow and land as soon 
as practicable. Per "VTOL Urban" a reduc-
tion in pitch authority will take place. Any 
additional single loss of any of the 8 pro-
pulsors on the wing will result in a Severe 
outcome with heavily degraded pitch au-
thority. 
Major/Severe 
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APPENDIX B FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS CRITICALITY (FMECA) WORKSHEETS 
Table B- 1:  Tilt-Wing FMECA Worksheet 
FMECA 
ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure Ef-
fect 
Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
1A1 Provide 
HVDC 
power to 
propulsion 
system and 
batteries 
2.67E-06 Turboshaft en-
gine fails to 
provide  output 
shaft power to 
gearbox 
Turboshaft en-
gine failure (no 
output) 
All Loss of Engine 
power output to 
gearbox, AC 
generator and 
accessory loads  
Loss of electrical 
power to drive mo-
tors and accessory 
loads.  Batteries 
provide electric 
power for 2 
minutes.    
Loss of all propulsion 
after battery power is 
depleted.  Loss of air-
craft if pilot cannot 
find safe landing area 
and land within 2 
minutes.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot.  Pilot 
detects ab-
normal en-
gine noise 
Emergency procedures 
defined in flight manual 
I 1.00 1.200E-01 80% chance 
that engine 
performance 
degradation 
is detected 
with ample 
time to land 
safely before 
complete en-
gine failure.  
3.20E-07 
1B1 Provide 
HVDC 
power to 
propulsion 
system and 
batteries 
5.00E-07 Engine gear-
box assembly 
failure 
Internal gear-
box assembly 
failure 
All Failure prevents 
input torque from 
being transferred 
to AC generator 
Loss of electrical 
power to drive mo-
tors. Batteries pro-
vide electric power 
for 2 minutes.    
Loss of all propulsion 
after battery power is 
depleted.  Loss of air-
craft if pilot cannot 
find safe landing area 
and land within 2 
minutes.   
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Emergency procedures 
defined in flight manual 
I 1.00 1.200E-01 Estimated 
that 80% of 
failures can 
be detected 
before loss of 
function and 
40% chance 
that the pilot 
will be able to 
land safely 
within 2 
minutes of 
the failure. 
6.00E-08 
1C1 Provide 
HVDC 
power to 
propulsion 
system and 
batteries 
1.30E-04 AC Generator 
failure 
Complete fail-
ure of AC gen-
erator output 
(generator unit 
or GCU) 
All Loss of electrical 
power input to 
AC-DC con-
verter.   
Loss of HVDC out-
put from AC-DC 
converter.  Batter-
ies provide electric 
power for 2 
minutes.    
Loss of all propulsion 
after battery power is 
depleted.  Loss of air-
craft if pilot cannot 
find safe landing area 
and land within 2 
minutes.   
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Emergency procedures 
defined in flight manual 
I 1.00 6.000E-01 Estimated 
40% chance 
that the pilot 
will be able to 
land safely 
within 2 
minutes of 
the failure. 
7.80E-05 
1D1 Provide 
HVDC 
power to 
propulsion 
system and 
batteries 
2.00E-04 No HVDC out-
put from AC-
DC converter  
AC-DC con-
verter failure 
All Loss of power 
output to drive 
motors and 
charge batteries. 
Batteries provide 
electric power for 2 
minutes.    
Loss of all propulsion 
after battery power is 
depleted.  Loss of air-
craft if pilot cannot 
find safe landing area 
and land within 2 
minutes. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Emergency procedures 
defined in flight manual 
I 1.00 6.000E-01 Estimated 
40% chance 
that the pilot 
will be able to 
land safely 
within 2 
minutes after 
the failure. 
1.20E-04 
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FMECA 
ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure Ef-
fect 
Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
2A1 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 1 fail-
ure 
Failure of sin-
gle branch of 
battery array (1 
of N) (open cir-
cuit or high im-
pedance) 
All Reduced battery 
capacity,  
2 minute reserve 
power slightly com-
promised 
None Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
None IV 0.25 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
2.50E-07 
2A2 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 1 fail-
ure 
Failure of sin-
gle battery cell 
in array (1 of 
N) (internal 
short circuit ) 
All Rapid release of 
heat and gas at 
shorted battery 
cell; heat trans-
fers to adjacent 
cells 
Adjacent cells 
overheat and also 
short, causing ther-
mal runaway. In-
tense heat causes 
fire  
Aircraft fire damages 
critical systems, caus-
ing loss of aircraft 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
battery cooling system 
and fire protection sys-
tem contain the heat/fire 
I 0.25 1.000E-03 Assume that 
Battery cool-
ing and fire 
protection 
systems will 
be 99.9% ef-
fective to 
control bat-
tery fire 
2.50E-10 
2A3 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 1 fail-
ure 
Failure of sin-
gle branch of 
battery array (1 
of N) (internal 
short  
circuit ) 
All Internal tempera-
ture increases 
rapidly 
Battery protection 
device contains 
failed battery cell 
Reduced battery ca-
pacity, reserve power 
slightly reduced 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to  
pilot  
None III 0.25 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
2.50E-07 
2A4 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 1 fail-
ure 
Main battery 
terminal loose 
or broken. 
All No battery out-
put. System 
health monitoring 
detects battery 
#1 fault.   
Loss of ability to 
operate Motor #1in 
case of engine, 
generator, or 
AC/DC converter 
failure 
Loss of redundancy.  
Loss of ability to oper-
ate motor #1 in event 
of loss of main AC 
power source 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
None III 0.25 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
2.50E-07 
2B1 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 2 fail-
ure 
Failure of sin-
gle branch of 
battery array (1 
of N) (open cir-
cuit or high im-
pedance) 
All Reduced battery 
capacity,  
2 minute reserve 
power slightly com-
promised 
None Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
None IV 0.25 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
2.50E-07 
2B2 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 2 fail-
ure 
Failure of sin-
gle battery cell 
in array (1 of 
N) (internal 
short circuit ) 
All Rapid release of 
heat and gas at 
shorted battery 
cell; heat trans-
fers to adjacent 
cells 
Adjacent cells 
overheat and also 
short, causing ther-
mal runaway. In-
tense heat causes 
fire  
Aircraft fire damages 
critical systems, caus-
ing loss of aircraft 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
battery cooling system 
and fire protection sys-
tem contain the heat/fire 
I 0.25 1.000E-03 Assume that 
Battery cool-
ing and fire 
protection 
systems will 
be 99.9% ef-
fective to 
control bat-
tery fire 
2.50E-10 
2B3 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 2 fail-
ure 
Failure of sin-
gle branch of 
battery array (1 
of N) (internal 
short  
circuit ) 
All Internal tempera-
ture increases 
rapidly 
Battery protection 
device contains 
failed battery cell 
Reduced battery ca-
pacity, reserve power 
slightly reduced 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to  
pilot  
None III 0.25 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
2.50E-07 
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ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure Ef-
fect 
Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
2B4 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 2 fail-
ure 
Main battery 
terminal loose 
or broken. 
All No battery out-
put. System 
health monitoring 
detects battery 
#2 fault.   
Loss of ability to 
operate Motor #2in 
case of engine, 
generator, or 
AC/DC converter 
failure 
Loss of redundancy.  
Loss of ability to oper-
ate motor #2 in event 
of loss of main AC 
power source 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
None III 0.25 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
2.50E-07 
2C1 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 3 fail-
ure 
Failure of sin-
gle branch of 
battery array (1 
of N) (open cir-
cuit or high im-
pedance) 
All Reduced battery 
capacity,  
2 minute reserve 
power slightly com-
promised 
None Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
None IV 0.25 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
2.50E-07 
2C2 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 3 fail-
ure 
Failure of sin-
gle battery cell 
in array (1 of 
N) (internal 
short circuit ) 
All Rapid release of 
heat and gas at 
shorted battery 
cell; heat trans-
fers to adjacent 
cells 
Adjacent cells 
overheat and also 
short, causing ther-
mal runaway. In-
tense heat causes 
fire  
Aircraft fire damages 
critical systems, caus-
ing loss of aircraft 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
battery cooling system 
and fire protection sys-
tem contain the heat/fire 
I 0.25 1.000E-03 Assume that 
Battery cool-
ing and fire 
protection 
systems will 
be 99.9% ef-
fective to 
control bat-
tery fire 
2.50E-10 
2C3 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 3 fail-
ure 
Failure of sin-
gle branch of 
battery array (1 
of N) (internal 
short  
circuit ) 
All Internal tempera-
ture increases 
rapidly 
Battery protection 
device contains 
failed battery cell 
Reduced battery ca-
pacity, reserve power 
slightly reduced 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to  
pilot  
None III 0.25 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
2.50E-07 
2C4 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 3 fail-
ure 
Main battery 
terminal loose 
or broken. 
All No battery out-
put. System 
health monitoring 
detects battery 
#3 fault.   
Loss of ability to 
operate Motor #3 
in case of engine, 
generator, or 
AC/DC converter 
failure 
Loss of redundancy.  
Loss of ability to oper-
ate motor #3 in event 
of loss of main AC 
power source 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
None III 0.25 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
2.50E-07 
2D1 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 4 fail-
ure 
Failure of sin-
gle branch of 
battery array (1 
of N) (open cir-
cuit or high im-
pedance) 
All Reduced battery 
capacity,  
2 minute reserve 
power slightly com-
promised 
None Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
None IV 0.25 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
2.50E-07 
2D2 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 4 fail-
ure 
Failure of sin-
gle battery cell 
in array (1 of 
N) (internal 
short circuit ) 
All Rapid release of 
heat and gas at 
shorted battery 
cell; heat trans-
fers to adjacent 
cells 
Adjacent cells 
overheat and also 
short, causing ther-
mal runaway. In-
tense heat causes 
fire  
Aircraft fire damages 
critical systems, caus-
ing loss of aircraft 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
battery cooling system 
and fire protection sys-
tem contain the heat/fire 
I 0.25 1.000E-03 Assume that 
Battery cool-
ing and fire 
protection 
systems will 
be 99.9% ef-
fective to 
control bat-
tery fire 
2.50E-10 
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ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure Ef-
fect 
Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
2D3 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 4 fail-
ure 
Failure of sin-
gle branch of 
battery array (1 
of N) (internal 
short  
circuit ) 
All Internal tempera-
ture increases 
rapidly 
Battery protection 
device contains 
failed battery cell 
Reduced battery ca-
pacity, reserve power 
slightly reduced 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to  
pilot  
None III 0.25 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
2.50E-07 
2D4 Provide 
battery 
storage of 
electrical 
energy 
1.00E-06 Battery 4 fail-
ure 
Main battery 
terminal loose 
or broken. 
All No battery out-
put. System 
health monitoring 
detects battery 
#4 fault.   
Loss of ability to 
operate Motor #4 
in case of engine, 
generator, or 
AC/DC converter 
failure 
Loss of redundancy.  
Loss of ability to oper-
ate motor #4 in event 
of loss of main AC 
power source 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
None III 0.25 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
2.50E-07 
                               
3A1 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
2.70E-04 Motor #1 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
Electronic 
Speed Control-
ler #1 Failure 
All No ESC output 
to motor #1 
Motor #1 cannot 
provide output 
torque, intercon-
necting shaft trans-
fers torque from 
other motors to 
prop-rotor #1 
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft in 
OMI avoid region.  
Loss of control of air-
craft if failure occurs 
while aircraft is in OMI 
region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing location and ex-
ecutes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 1.00 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
5.40E-05 
3A2 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
9.24E-05 Motor #1 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
Motor #1 
Failure 
All Motor #1 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Interconnecting 
shaft transfers 
torque from other 
motors to prop-ro-
tor #1.   
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft in 
OMI avoid region.  
Loss of control of air-
craft if failure occurs 
while aircraft is in OMI 
region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing location and ex-
ecutes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 1.00 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
1.85E-05 
3A3 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
5.17E-05 Motor #1 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
ESC #1 cool-
ing fan failure 
All Loss of cooling 
for ESC #1.  Lim-
ited performance 
envelope for Mo-
tor #1.   
Interconnecting 
shaft transfers 
torque from other 
motors to prop-ro-
tor #1.   
Some loss of propul-
sion system power 
depending on condi-
tions.   Reduced abil-
ity to operate in hover 
for extended period of 
time. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Ram air will be sufficient 
to cool ESC while in for-
ward flight.  Pilot can 
minimize time in hover 
to avoid overheating 
ESC.  Pilot can avoid 
operating conditions 
that will cause ESC to 
overheat. 
III 1.00 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
5.17E-05 
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ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure Ef-
fect 
Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
3A4 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
5.17E-05 Motor #1 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
Motor #1 Cool-
ing  & Lube 
Failure 
All Loss of Lube and 
cooling for Motor 
#1.  Damage to 
Motor #1 possi-
ble. 
Health manage-
ment system auto-
matically shuts 
down Motor #1 if 
not in OMI avoid 
region.  Intercon-
necting shaft trans-
fers torque from 
other motors to 
prop-rotor #1.   
Some loss of propul-
sion system power 
depending on condi-
tions.   Reduced abil-
ity to operate in hover 
for extended period of 
time. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Motor #1 may be oper-
ated for short time to 
land safely if.  Pilot can 
avoid operating condi-
tions that require Motor 
#1.  
III 1.00 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
5.17E-05 
3B1 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
2.70E-04 Motor #2 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
Electronic 
Speed Control-
ler #2 Failure 
All No ESC output 
to motor #2 
Motor #2 cannot 
provide output 
torque, intercon-
necting shaft trans-
fers torque from 
other motors to 
prop-rotor #2 
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft in 
OMI avoid region.  
Loss of control of air-
craft if failure occurs 
while aircraft is in OMI 
region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing location and ex-
ecutes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 1.00 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
5.40E-05 
3B2 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
9.24E-05 Motor #2 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
Motor #2 
Failure 
All Motor #2 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Interconnecting 
shaft transfers 
torque from other 
motors to prop-ro-
tor #2.   
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft in 
OMI avoid region.  
Loss of control of air-
craft if failure occurs 
while aircraft is in OMI 
region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing location and ex-
ecutes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 1.00 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
1.85E-05 
3B3 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
5.17E-05 Motor #2 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
ESC #2 cool-
ing fan failure 
All Loss of cooling 
for ESC #2.  Lim-
ited performance 
envelope for Mo-
tor #2.   
Interconnecting 
shaft transfers 
torque from other 
motors to prop-ro-
tor #2.   
Some loss of propul-
sion system power 
depending on condi-
tions.   Reduced abil-
ity to operate in hover 
for extended period of 
time. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Ram air will be sufficient 
to cool ESC while in for-
ward flight.  Pilot can 
minimize time in hover 
to avoid overheating 
ESC.  Pilot can avoid 
operating conditions 
that will cause ESC to 
overheat. 
III 1.00 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
5.17E-05 
N
A
SA
/C
R
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ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure Ef-
fect 
Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
3B4 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
5.17E-05 Motor #2 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
Motor #2 Cool-
ing  & Lube 
Failure 
All Loss of Lube and 
cooling for Motor 
#2.  Damage to 
Motor #2 possi-
ble. 
Health manage-
ment system auto-
matically shuts 
down Motor #2 if 
not in OMI avoid 
region.  Intercon-
necting shaft trans-
fers torque from 
other motors to 
prop-rotor #2.   
Some loss of propul-
sion system power 
depending on condi-
tions.   Reduced abil-
ity to operate in hover 
for extended period of 
time. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Motor #2 may be oper-
ated for short time to 
land safely if.  Pilot can 
avoid operating condi-
tions that require Motor 
#2.  
III 1.00 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
5.17E-05 
3C1 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
2.70E-04 Motor #3 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
Electronic 
Speed Control-
ler #3 Failure 
All No ESC output 
to motor #3 
Motor #3 cannot 
provide output 
torque, intercon-
necting shaft trans-
fers torque from 
other motors to 
prop-rotor #3 
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft in 
OMI avoid region.  
Loss of control of air-
craft if failure occurs 
while aircraft is in OMI 
region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing location and ex-
ecutes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 1.00 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
5.40E-05 
3C2 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
9.24E-05 Motor #3 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
Motor #3 
Failure 
All Motor #3 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Interconnecting 
shaft transfers 
torque from other 
motors to prop-ro-
tor #3.   
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft in 
OMI avoid region.  
Loss of control of air-
craft if failure occurs 
while aircraft is in OMI 
region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing location and ex-
ecutes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 1.00 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
1.85E-05 
3C3 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
5.17E-05 Motor #3 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
ESC #3 cool-
ing fan failure 
All Loss of cooling 
for ESC #3.  Lim-
ited performance 
envelope for Mo-
tor #3.   
Interconnecting 
shaft transfers 
torque from other 
motors to prop-ro-
tor #3.   
Some loss of propul-
sion system power 
depending on condi-
tions.   Reduced abil-
ity to operate in hover 
for extended period of 
time. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Ram air will be sufficient 
to cool ESC while in for-
ward flight.  Pilot can 
minimize time in hover 
to avoid overheating 
ESC.  Pilot can avoid 
operating conditions 
that will cause ESC to 
overheat. 
III 1.00 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
5.17E-05 
N
A
SA
/C
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ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure Ef-
fect 
Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
3C4 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
5.17E-05 Motor #3 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
Motor #3 Cool-
ing  & Lube 
Failure 
All Loss of Lube and 
cooling for Motor 
#3.  Damage to 
Motor #3 possi-
ble. 
Health manage-
ment system auto-
matically shuts 
down Motor #3 if 
not in OMI avoid 
region.  Intercon-
necting shaft trans-
fers torque from 
other motors to 
prop-rotor #3.   
Some loss of propul-
sion system power 
depending on condi-
tions.   Reduced abil-
ity to operate in hover 
for extended period of 
time. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Motor #3 may be oper-
ated for short time to 
land safely if.  Pilot can 
avoid operating condi-
tions that require Motor 
#3.  
III 1.00 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
5.17E-05 
3D1 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
2.70E-04 Motor #4 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
Electronic 
Speed Control-
ler #4 Failure 
All No ESC output 
to motor #4 
Motor #4 cannot 
provide output 
torque, intercon-
necting shaft trans-
fers torque from 
other motors to 
prop-rotor #4 
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft in 
OMI avoid region.  
Loss of control of air-
craft if failure occurs 
while aircraft is in OMI 
region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing location and ex-
ecutes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 1.00 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
5.40E-05 
3D2 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
9.24E-05 Motor #4 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
Motor #4 
Failure 
All Motor #4 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Interconnecting 
shaft transfers 
torque from other 
motors to prop-ro-
tor #4.   
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft in 
OMI avoid region.  
Loss of control of air-
craft if failure occurs 
while aircraft is in OMI 
region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing location and ex-
ecutes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 1.00 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
1.85E-05 
3D3 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
5.17E-05 Motor #4 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
ESC #4 cool-
ing fan failure 
All Loss of cooling 
for ESC #4.  Lim-
ited performance 
envelope for Mo-
tor #4.   
Interconnecting 
shaft transfers 
torque from other 
motors to prop--ro-
tor #4.   
Some loss of propul-
sion system power 
depending on condi-
tions.   Reduced abil-
ity to operate in hover 
for extended period of 
time. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Ram air will be sufficient 
to cool ESC while in for-
ward flight.  Pilot can 
minimize time in hover 
to avoid overheating 
ESC.  Pilot can avoid 
operating conditions 
that will cause ESC to 
overheat. 
III 1.00 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
5.17E-05 
N
A
SA
/C
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ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure Ef-
fect 
Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
3D4 Convert 
HVDC 
Electrical 
energy to 
shaft 
torque 
5.17E-05 Motor #4 fails 
to provide out-
put torque 
Motor #4 Cool-
ing  & Lube 
Failure 
All Loss of Lube and 
cooling for Motor 
#4.  Damage to 
Motor #4 possi-
ble. 
Health manage-
ment system auto-
matically shuts 
down Motor #4 if 
not in OMI avoid 
region.  Intercon-
necting shaft trans-
fers torque from 
other motors to 
prop-rotor #4.   
Some loss of propul-
sion system power 
depending on condi-
tions.   Reduced abil-
ity to operate in hover 
for extended period of 
time. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Motor #4 may be oper-
ated for short time to 
land safely if.  Pilot can 
avoid operating condi-
tions that require Motor 
#4.  
III 1.00 1.000E+00 Beta = 1 for 
severity III 
and IV 
5.17E-05 
                               
4A1 Provide 
torque to 
prop-rotors 
5.00E-06 Prop-rotor 
Gearbox #1 
failure 
Input shaft of 
gearbox fails 
(or clutch), 
causing loss of 
torque from 
motor #1.  
All loss of torque 
from motor #1 
Torque from other 
3 motors trans-
ferred to prop-rotor 
#1 via intercon-
necting shaft 
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft at 
airspeeds below 25 
knots.  Loss of control 
of aircraft if failure oc-
curs while aircraft is in 
OMI  
avoid region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing location and ex-
ecutes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 0.50 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
5.00E-07 
4A2 Provide 
torque to 
prop-rotors 
5.00E-06 Prop-rotor 
Gearbox #1 
failure 
Complete 
gearbox failure 
All loss of torque 
from motor #1 
and loss of 
torque output to 
prop-rotor #1 
No output to prop-
rotor #1; unable to 
transfer motor #1 
torque to other 
prop-rotors. 25% 
loss of propulsion 
system power. 
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft at 
airspeeds below 25 
knots.  Loss of control 
of aircraft if failure oc-
curs while aircraft is in 
OMI  
avoid region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
possible loss of ability to 
hover depending on air-
craft weight.  Pilot di-
verts to alternate land-
ing location and 
executes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 0.50 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
5.00E-07 
4B1 Provide 
torque to 
prop-rotors 
5.00E-06 Prop-rotor 
Gearbox #2 
failure 
Input shaft of 
gearbox fails 
(or clutch), 
causing loss of 
torque from 
motor #2.  
All loss of torque 
from motor #2 
Torque from other 
3 motors trans-
ferred to prop-rotor 
#2 via intercon-
necting shaft 
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft at 
airspeeds below 25 
knots.  Loss of control 
of aircraft if failure oc-
curs while aircraft is in 
OMI  
avoid region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing location and ex-
ecutes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 0.50 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
5.00E-07 
N
A
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ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure Ef-
fect 
Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
4B2 Provide 
torque to 
prop-rotors 
5.00E-06 Prop-rotor 
Gearbox #2 
failure 
Complete 
gearbox failure 
All loss of torque 
from motor #2 
and loss of 
torque output to 
prop-rotor #2 
No output to prop-
rotor #2; unable to 
transfer motor #2 
torque to other 
prop-rotors. 25% 
loss of propulsion 
system power. 
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft at 
airspeeds below 25 
knots.  Loss of control 
of aircraft if failure oc-
curs while aircraft is in 
OMI  
avoid region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
possible loss of ability to 
hover depending on air-
craft weight.  Pilot di-
verts to alternate land-
ing location and 
executes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 0.50 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
5.00E-07 
4C1 Provide 
torque to 
prop-rotors 
5.00E-06 Prop-rotor 
Gearbox #3 
failure 
Input shaft of 
gearbox fails 
(or clutch), 
causing loss of 
torque from 
motor #3.  
All loss of torque 
from motor #3 
Torque from other 
3 motors trans-
ferred to prop-rotor 
#3 via intercon-
necting shaft 
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft at 
airspeeds below 25 
knots.  Loss of control 
of aircraft if failure oc-
curs while aircraft is in 
OMI  
avoid region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing location and ex-
ecutes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 0.50 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
5.00E-07 
4C2 Provide 
torque to 
prop-rotors 
5.00E-06 Prop-rotor 
Gearbox #3 
failure 
Complete 
gearbox failure 
All loss of torque 
from motor #3 
and loss of 
torque output to 
prop-rotor #3 
No output to prop-
rotor #3; unable to 
transfer motor #3 
torque to other 
prop-rotors. 25% 
loss of propulsion 
system power. 
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft at 
airspeeds below 25 
knots.  Loss of control 
of aircraft if failure oc-
curs while aircraft is in 
OMI  
avoid region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
possible loss of ability to 
hover depending on air-
craft weight.  Pilot di-
verts to alternate land-
ing location and 
executes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 0.50 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
5.00E-07 
4D1 Provide 
torque to 
prop-rotors 
5.00E-06 Prop-rotor 
Gearbox #4 
failure 
Input shaft of 
gearbox fails 
(or clutch), 
causing loss of 
torque from 
motor #4.  
All loss of torque 
from motor #4 
Torque from other 
3 motors trans-
ferred to prop-rotor 
#4 via intercon-
necting shaft 
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft at 
airspeeds below 25 
knots.  Loss of control 
of aircraft if failure oc-
curs while aircraft is in 
OMI  
avoid region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing location and ex-
ecutes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 0.50 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
5.00E-07 
N
A
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ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure Ef-
fect 
Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
4D2 Provide 
torque to 
prop-rotors 
5.00E-06 Prop-rotor 
Gearbox #4 
failure 
Complete 
gearbox failure 
All loss of torque 
from motor #4 
and loss of 
torque output to 
prop-rotor #4 
No output to prop-
rotor #4; unable to 
transfer motor #4 
torque to other 
prop-rotors. 25% 
loss of propulsion 
system power. 
25% loss of propul-
sion system power.  
Aircraft handling qual-
ities affected. Insuffi-
cient power available 
to control aircraft at 
airspeeds below 25 
knots.  Loss of control 
of aircraft if failure oc-
curs while aircraft is in 
OMI  
avoid region. 
Visual & 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot  
Limited flight envelope, 
possible loss of ability to 
hover depending on air-
craft weight.  Pilot di-
verts to alternate land-
ing location and 
executes roll-on landing 
above 25 kts.   
I 0.50 2.000E-01 Assumed to 
be in 
hover/OMI 
avoid region 
20% of the 
time 
5.00E-07 
             
5A1 Provide 
system 
cooling for 
batteries 
1.00E-05 Failure to pro-
vide chilled 
water to bat-
teries 
coolant leak All Coolant leaks 
until reservoir is 
empty and pump 
runs dry.  No 
coolant provided 
to batteries; bat-
teries quickly  
overheat 
Battery cell failure, 
battery goes into 
thermal runaway.  
Battery catches 
fire, Reduced 
power available to 
1 or more  
electric motors. 
Aircraft fire, loss of 
controlled flight 
System 
Health 
monitoring 
provides 
alert to pi-
lot  
(1) Automatic discon-
nect of batteries when 
they become hot. 
(2)  Battery fire 
protection system con-
tains battery failure to 
mitigate fire. 
I 1.00 3.300E-04 Batteries only 
used in case 
of Primary 
HVDC  
source fail-
ure.   
3.30E-09 
                    
 
         
5A2 Provide 
system 
cooling for 
batteries 
1.90E-09 Failure to pro-
vide chilled 
water to bat-
teries 
Dual electri-
cally driven 
pump failure.  
(both pumps 
failed) 
All No coolant flow 
from failed 
pumps.   
Battery cell failure, 
battery goes into 
thermal runaway.  
Battery catches 
fire, Reduced 
power available to 
1 or more  
electric motors. 
Aircraft fire, loss of 
controlled flight 
System 
Health 
monitoring 
provides 
alert to pi-
lot  
((1) Automatic discon-
nect of batteries when 
they become hot. 
(2)  Battery fire 
protection system con-
tains battery failure to 
mitigate fire. 
I 1.00E+00 3.300E-04 Batteries only 
used in case 
of Primary 
HVDC  
source fail-
ure.   
6.27E-13 
                    
 
         
5A3 Provide 
system 
cooling for 
batteries 
0.000508 Failure to pro-
vide chilled 
water to bat-
teries 
Vapor-cycle 
system failure, 
compressor, 
condenser, 
electric fan, 
etc. 
All Coolant temper-
ature rises while 
circulating 
through all bat-
teries. All batter-
ies become 
equally hot. 
Batteries overheat, 
causing battery cell 
failure, battery 
goes into thermal 
runaway.  Battery 
catches fire. Re-
duced power avail-
able to 1 or more 
electric motors. 
Aircraft fire, loss of 
controlled flight 
System 
Health 
monitoring 
provides 
alert to pi-
lot  
(1) Automatic discon-
nect of batteries when 
they become hot. 
(2)  Battery fire protec-
tion system contains 
battery failure to miti-
gate fire. 
I 1.00 3.300E-04 Batteries only 
used in case 
of Primary 
HVDC  
source fail-
ure.   
1.68E-07 
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ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure Ef-
fect 
Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
5B1 Provide 
system 
cooling for 
batteries 
1.00E-06 Battery 1 cool-
ing failure 
clogged or  
kinked coolant 
line, clogged 
battery heat 
exchanger, de-
fective bypass 
valve, or  
thermostat 
All Restricted cool-
ant flow through 
battery. Battery 
temperature 
rises to critical 
temperature 
Causing battery  
failure. 
Loss of ability to 
operate motor #1 
from battery power 
in case of loss of 
main HVDC power 
source.  Possible 
battery fire   
Loss of motor #1 out-
put.  Battery fire 
causes loss of aircraft 
  (1) Automatic discon-
nect of batteries when 
they become hot. 
(2)  Battery fire 
protection system con-
tains battery failure to 
mitigate fire.  
I 1.00 3.300E-04 Batteries only 
used in case 
of Primary 
HVDC  
source fail-
ure.   
3.30E-10 
                  
 
         
5C1 Provide 
system 
cooling for 
batteries 
1.00E-06 Battery 2 cool-
ing failure 
clogged or  
kinked coolant 
line, clogged 
battery heat 
exchanger, de-
fective bypass 
valve, or  
thermostat 
All Restricted cool-
ant flow through 
battery. Battery 
temperature 
rises to critical 
temperature 
Causing battery  
failure. 
Loss of ability to 
operate motor #1 
from battery power 
in case of loss of 
main HVDC power 
source.  Possible 
battery fire   
Loss of motor #2 out-
put.  Battery fire 
causes loss of aircraft 
  (1) Automatic discon-
nect of batteries when 
they become hot. 
(2)  Battery fire 
protection system con-
tains battery failure to 
mitigate fire. 
I 1.00 3.300E-04 Batteries only 
used in case 
of Primary 
HVDC  
source fail-
ure.   
3.30E-10 
                  
 
         
5D1 Provide 
system 
cooling for 
batteries 
1.00E-06 Battery 3 cool-
ing failure 
clogged or  
kinked coolant 
line, clogged 
battery heat 
exchanger, de-
fective bypass 
valve, or  
thermostat 
All Restricted cool-
ant flow through 
battery. Battery 
temperature 
rises to critical 
temperature 
Causing battery  
failure. 
Loss of ability to 
operate motor #1 
from battery power 
in case of loss of 
main HVDC power 
source.  Possible 
battery fire   
Loss of motor #3 out-
put.  Battery fire 
causes loss of aircraft 
  (1) Automatic discon-
nect of batteries when 
they become hot. 
(2)  Battery fire 
protection system con-
tains battery failure to 
mitigate fire. 
I 1.00 3.300E-04 Batteries only 
used in case 
of Primary 
HVDC  
source fail-
ure.   
3.30E-10 
                  
 
         
5E+1 Provide 
system 
cooling for 
batteries 
1.00E-06 Battery 4 cool-
ing failure 
clogged or  
kinked coolant 
line, clogged 
battery heat 
exchanger, de-
fective bypass 
valve, or  
thermostat 
All Restricted cool-
ant flow through 
battery. Battery 
temperature 
rises to critical 
temperature 
Causing battery  
failure. 
Loss of ability to 
operate motor #1 
from battery power 
in case of loss of 
main HVDC power 
source.  Possible 
battery fire   
Loss of motor #4 out-
put.  Battery fire 
causes loss of aircraft 
  (1) Automatic discon-
nect of batteries when 
they become hot. 
(2)  Battery fire 
protection system con-
tains battery failure to 
mitigate fire. 
I 1.00 3.300E-04 Batteries only 
used in case 
of Primary 
HVDC  
source fail-
ure.   
3.30E-10 
                  
 
         
Criticality Summary I      4.92E-04 
                      II      0.00E+00 
                      III      4.16E-04 
                      IV      1.00E-06 
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Table B- 2:  Quad-Rotor FMECA Worksheet 
FMECA ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mission 
Phase 
Local Failure Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provisions Severity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
1A1 Provide 
HVDC power 
to electric 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to provide 
HVDC electrical 
energy to  ESC 
#1 
HV Battery output 
failure or associ-
ated wiring. Loss 
of output to ESC 
#1 only. 
All No power to ESC 
#1; Motor #1 fails to 
provide output 
torque 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #1 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 2.50E-01 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
5.00E-08 
1B1 Provide 
HVDC power 
to electric 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to provide 
HVDC electrical 
energy to  ESC 
#2 
HV Battery output 
failure or associ-
ated wiring. Loss 
of output to ESC 
#2 only. 
All No power to ESC 
#2; Motor #2 fails to 
provide output 
torque 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #2 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 2.50E-01 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
5.00E-08 
1C1 Provide 
HVDC power 
to electric 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to provide 
HVDC electrical 
energy to  ESC 
#3 
HV Battery output 
failure or associ-
ated wiring. Loss 
of output to ESC 
#3 only. 
All No power to ESC 
#3; Motor #3 fails to 
provide output 
torque 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #3 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 2.50E-01 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
5.00E-08 
1D1 Provide 
HVDC power 
to electric 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to provide 
HVDC electrical 
energy to  ESC 
#4 
HV Battery output 
failure or associ-
ated wiring. Loss 
of output to ESC 
#4 only. 
All No power to ESC 
#4; Motor #4 fails to 
provide output 
torque 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #4 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 2.50E-01 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
5.00E-08 
1E1 Provide 
HVDC power 
to electric 
motors 
1.00E-06 Internal battery 
failure 
Battery cell failure 
- No runaway. 
All Loss of output from 
single branch within 
battery network. 
Battery output volt-
age slightly reduced. 
Increased current 
draw from remaining 
battery cells 
Output voltage slightly 
reduced to one or 
more motors. 
Reduced range and/or 
slight degradation of mo-
tor performance. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Battery monitoring system 
must detect and isolate the 
fault. Continued operation 
with failed cell may put ad-
ditional stress on other bat-
tery cells which must be 
managed to prevent cata-
strophic failure 
IV 2.50E-01 1.00E+00 Beta = 1 for 
Cat III & Cat 4 
FM's 
2.50E-07 
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FMECA ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mission 
Phase 
Local Failure Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provisions Severity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
1E2 Provide 
HVDC power 
to electric 
motors 
1.00E-06 Internal battery 
failure 
Battery cell failure 
- Thermal runa-
way. - contained 
All Battery cell temper-
ature rises rapidly, 
causing thermal 
runaway. Battery 
monitoring system 
detects failure, dis-
connects and iso-
lates the defective 
battery cell. 
Reduced battery sys-
tem capacity, slight 
degradation of battery 
output voltage pro-
vided to one or more 
electric motors. Bat-
tery may catch fire. 
Excess heat gener-
ated may affect adja-
cent battery cells. 
Reduced range and/or 
degradation electric mo-
tor performance. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Battery cooling and fire 
protection system must 
contain battery tempera-
ture to prevent loss of air-
craft 
III 2.50E-01 1.00E+00 Beta = 1 for 
Cat III & Cat 4 
FM's 
2.50E-07 
1E3 Provide 
HVDC power 
to electric 
motors 
1.00E-06 Internal battery 
failure 
Battery cell failure 
internal short - 
thermal runaway - 
uncontained 
All Battery cell temper-
ature rises rapidly, 
causing thermal run-
away. Battery 
catches fire. Loss of 
all HVDC output. 
No power provided to 
electric motors. Loss 
of torque output to ro-
tors 
Aircraft descends to 
ground. Autorotation em-
ployed to provide soft 
landing 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. Pilot 
detects loss 
of power 
Flight control system and 
rotor pitch control actuators 
are powered by a low volt-
age battery which is still 
operational. 
Controlled landing possible 
through autorotation 
II 2.50E-01 1.00E-02 It is assumed 
that in most 
cases, battery 
failure will oc-
cur gradually 
giving the pilot 
time to land 
safely. 
2.50E-09 
1E4 Provide 
HVDC power 
to electric 
motors 
1.00E-06 Internal battery 
failure 
Complete HV 
battery failure; 
low voltage or no 
voltage output. 
(Battery dis-
charged) 
All Loss of all HVDC 
output 
No power provided to 
electric motors. Loss 
of torque output to ro-
tors 
Aircraft descends to 
ground. Autorotation em-
ployed to provide soft 
landing 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. Pilot 
detects loss 
of power 
Flight control system and 
rotor pitch control actuators 
are powered by a low volt-
age battery which is still 
operational. 
Controlled landing possible 
through autorotation 
II 2.50E-01 1.00E-02 It is assumed 
that in most 
cases, battery 
voltage would 
decrease grad-
ually, giving the 
pilot time to 
land safely. 
2.50E-09 
                
2A1 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
2.70E-04 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #1 to 
Gearbox #1 
ESC #1 failure All No output from 
ESC #1 to Motor 
#1. Motor #1 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #1 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
5.40E-05 
2A2 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
9.24E-05 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #1 to 
Gearbox #1 
Motor #1 failure All No output from 
ESC #1 to Motor 
#1. Motor #1 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #1 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
1.85E-05 
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FMECA ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mission 
Phase 
Local Failure Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provisions Severity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
2A3 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
4.20E-07 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #1 to 
Gearbox #1 
Clutch #1 failure - 
failure to engage 
All No output from 
ESC #1 to Motor 
#1. Motor #1 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #1 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 5.00E-01 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
4.20E-08 
2A4 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
4.20E-07 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #1 to 
Gearbox #1 
Clutch #1 failure - 
failure to disen-
gage 
All No effect on normal 
operation. In the 
event of motor fail-
ure, clutch failure 
will transfer torque 
from other motors. 
Torque from other 3 
motors forces motor 
#1 to continue to spin. 
In case of motor- sta-
tor contact, friction 
causes excessive 
heat to be generated, 
causing motor to 
catch fire. 
Aircraft fire. Substantial 
damage to aircraft, Possi-
ble loss of aircraft. 
None Fire detection and suppres-
sion system must contain 
fire. 
I 5.00E-01 4.62E-05 Probability of 
motor bearing 
failure or motor- 
stator contact 
assumed to be 
half of motor 
failure rate. 
9.70E-12 
2A5 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
9.24E-05 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #1 to 
Gearbox #1 
ESC #1 cooling 
fan failure 
All ESC temperature 
rises rapidly. 
ESC #1 fails, loss of 
Motor #1 output. 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
ESC cooling 
fan failure in-
dication pro-
vided to pilot. 
ESC Hot indi-
cation pro-
vided if ESC 
overheats 
System health monitoring 
detects cooling failure, Mo-
tor #1 output can be re-
duced or turned off either 
manually or automatically 
to prevent overheating of 
ESC. Full power may still 
be available for short peri-
ods. 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-02 Assume pilot 
will be able to 
prevent over-
heat and avoid 
ESC failure 
90% of the 
time. 
1.85E-06 
2A6 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
5.17E-05 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #1 to 
Gearbox #1 
Motor cooling oil 
pump failure or oil 
leak 
All Loss of cooling/lube 
oil pressure or oil 
flow, Motor #1 over-
heats. 
Motor #1 fails, loss of 
Motor #1 output. 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Motor oil tem-
perature 
and/or pres-
sure indica-
tion provided 
to pilot. 
System health monitoring 
detects cooling failure, 
Motor #1 output can be 
reduced or turned off ei-
ther manually or automati-
cally to prevent overheat-
ing. Full power may still 
be available for short peri-
ods. 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-02 Assume pilot 
will be able to 
prevent over-
heat and avoid 
ESC failure 
90% of the 
time. 
1.03E-06 
2B1 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
2.70E-04 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #2 to 
Gearbox #2 
ESC #2 failure All No output from 
ESC #2 to Motor 
#2. Motor #2 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #2 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
5.40E-05 
  
N
A
SA
/C
R
—
2019-220217
B
-14
FMECA ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mission 
Phase 
Local Failure Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provisions Severity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
2B2 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
9.24E-05 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #2 to 
Gearbox #2 
Motor #2 failure All No output from 
ESC #2 to Motor 
#2. Motor #2 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #2 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
1.85E-05 
2B3 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
4.20E-07 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #2 to 
Gearbox #2 
Clutch #2 failure - 
failure to engage 
All No output from 
ESC #2 to Motor 
#2. Motor #2 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #2 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 5.00E-01 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
4.20E-08 
2B4 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
4.20E-07 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #2 to 
Gearbox #2 
Clutch #2 failure - 
failure to disen-
gage 
All No effect on normal 
operation. In the 
event of motor fail-
ure, clutch failure 
will transfer torque 
from other motors. 
Torque from other 3 
motors forces motor 
#2 to continue to spin. 
In case of motor- sta-
tor contact, friction 
causes excessive 
heat to be generated, 
causing motor to 
catch fire. 
Aircraft fire. Substantial 
damage to aircraft, Possi-
ble loss of aircraft. 
None Fire detection and suppres-
sion system must contain 
fire. 
I 5.00E-01 4.62E-05 Probability of 
motor bearing 
failure or motor- 
stator contact 
assumed to be 
half of motor 
failure rate. 
9.70E-12 
2B5 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
9.24E-05 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #2 to 
Gearbox #2 
ESC #2 cooling 
fan failure 
All ESC temperature 
rises rapidly. 
ESC #2 fails, loss of 
Motor #2 output. 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
ESC cooling 
fan failure in-
dication pro-
vided to pilot. 
ESC Hot indi-
cation pro-
vided if ESC 
overheats 
System health monitoring 
detects cooling failure, Mo-
tor output can be reduced 
or turned off either manu-
ally or automatically to pre-
vent overheating of ESC. 
Full power may still be 
available for short periods. 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-02 Assume pilot 
will be able to 
prevent over-
heat and avoid 
ESC failure 
90% of the 
time. 
1.85E-06 
2B6 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
5.17E-05 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #2 to 
Gearbox #2 
Motor cooling oil 
pump failure or oil 
leak 
All Loss of cooling/lube 
oil pressure or oil 
flow, Motor #2 over-
heats. 
Motor #2 fails, loss of 
Motor #2 output. 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Motor oil tem-
perature 
and/or pres-
sure indica-
tion provided 
to pilot. 
System health monitoring 
detects cooling failure, 
Motor output can be re-
duced or turned off either 
manually or automatically 
to prevent overheating. 
Full power may still be 
available for short peri-
ods. 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-02 Assume pilot 
will be able to 
prevent over-
heat and avoid 
ESC failure 
90% of the 
time. 
1.03E-06 
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FMECA ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mission 
Phase 
Local Failure Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provisions Severity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
2C1 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
2.70E-04 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #3 to 
Gearbox #3 
ESC #3 failure All No output from 
ESC #3 to Motor 
#3. Motor #3 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #3 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
5.40E-05 
2C2 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
9.24E-05 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #3 to 
Gearbox #3 
Motor #3 failure All No output from 
ESC #3 to Motor 
#3. Motor #3 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #3 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
1.85E-05 
2C3 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
4.20E-07 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #3 to 
Gearbox #3 
Clutch #3 failure - 
failure to engage 
All No output from 
ESC #3 to Motor 
#3. Motor #3 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #3 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 5.00E-01 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
4.20E-08 
2C4 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
4.20E-07 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #3 to 
Gearbox #3 
Clutch #3 failure - 
failure to disen-
gage 
All No effect on normal 
operation. In the 
event of motor fail-
ure, clutch failure 
will transfer torque 
from other motors. 
Torque from other 3 
motors forces motor 
#3 to continue to spin. 
In case of motor- sta-
tor contact, friction 
causes excessive 
heat to be generated, 
causing motor to 
catch fire. 
Aircraft fire. Substantial 
damage to aircraft, Possi-
ble loss of aircraft. 
None Fire detection and suppres-
sion system must contain 
fire. 
I 5.00E-01 4.62E-05 Probability of 
motor bearing 
failure or motor- 
stator contact 
assumed to be 
half of motor 
failure rate. 
9.70E-12 
2C5 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
9.24E-05 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #3 to 
Gearbox #3 
ESC #3 cooling 
fan failure 
All ESC temperature 
rises rapidly. 
ESC #3 fails, loss of 
Motor #3 output. 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
ESC cooling 
fan failure in-
dication pro-
vided to pilot. 
ESC Hot indi-
cation pro-
vided if ESC 
overheats 
System health monitoring 
detects cooling failure, Mo-
tor output can be reduced 
or turned off either manu-
ally or automatically to pre-
vent overheating of ESC. 
Full power may still be 
available for short periods. 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-02 Assume pilot 
will be able to 
prevent over-
heat and avoid 
ESC failure 
90% of the 
time. 
1.85E-06 
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FMECA ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mission 
Phase 
Local Failure Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provisions Severity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
2C6 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
5.17E-05 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #3 to 
Gearbox #3 
Motor cooling oil 
pump failure or oil 
leak 
All Loss of cooling/lube 
oil pressure or oil 
flow, Motor #3 over-
heats. 
Motor #3 fails, loss of 
Motor #3 output. 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Motor oil tem-
perature 
and/or pres-
sure indica-
tion provided 
to pilot. 
System health monitoring 
detects cooling failure, 
Motor output can be re-
duced or turned off either 
manually or automatically 
to prevent overheating. 
Full power may still be 
available for short peri-
ods. 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-02 Assume pilot 
will be able to 
prevent over-
heat and avoid 
ESC failure 
90% of the 
time. 
1.03E-06 
2D1 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
2.70E-04 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #4 to 
Gearbox #4 
ESC #4 failure All No output from 
ESC #4 to Motor 
#4. Motor #4 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #4 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
5.40E-05 
2D2 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
9.24E-05 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #4 to 
Gearbox #4 
Motor #4 failure All No output from 
ESC #4 to Motor 
#4. Motor #4 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #4 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
1.85E-05 
2D3 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
4.20E-07 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #4 to 
Gearbox #4 
Clutch #4 failure - 
failure to engage 
All No output from 
ESC #4 to Motor 
#4. Motor #4 fails to 
provide output 
torque. 
Torque from other 3 
motors is transferred 
to gearbox #4 through 
collector gearbox. 
Available power re-
duced 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot can avoid flight con-
ditions which require 
maximum torque. Pilot 
can use energy stored in 
rotors to provide soft 
landing (autorotate) 
I 5.00E-01 2.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with limited 
power 
4.20E-08 
2D4 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
4.20E-07 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #4 to 
Gearbox #4 
Clutch #4 failure - 
failure to disen-
gage 
All No effect on normal 
operation. In the 
event of motor fail-
ure, clutch failure 
will transfer torque 
from other motors. 
Torque from other 3 
motors forces motor 
#4 to continue to spin. 
In case of motor- sta-
tor contact, friction 
causes excessive 
heat to be generated, 
causing motor to 
catch fire. 
Aircraft fire. Substantial 
damage to aircraft, Possi-
ble loss of aircraft. 
None Fire detection and suppres-
sion system must contain 
fire. 
I 5.00E-01 4.62E-05 Probability of 
motor bearing 
failure or motor- 
stator contact 
assumed to be 
half of motor 
failure rate. 
9.70E-12 
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FMECA ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mission 
Phase 
Local Failure Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provisions Severity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
2D5 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
9.24E-05 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #4 to 
Gearbox #4 
ESC #4 cooling 
fan failure 
All ESC temperature 
rises rapidly. 
ESC #4 fails, loss of 
Motor #4 output. 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
ESC cooling 
fan failure in-
dication pro-
vided to pilot. 
ESC Hot indi-
cation pro-
vided if ESC 
overheats 
System health monitoring 
detects cooling failure, Mo-
tor output can be reduced 
or turned off either manu-
ally or automatically to pre-
vent overheating of ESC. 
Full power may still be 
available for short periods. 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-02 Assume pilot 
will be able to 
prevent over-
heat and avoid 
ESC failure 
90% of the 
time. 
1.85E-06 
2D6 Convert HV 
electrical en-
ergy to shaft 
torque 
5.17E-05 Failure to provide 
output torque 
from Motor #4 to 
Gearbox #4 
Motor cooling oil 
pump failure or oil 
leak 
All Loss of cooling/lube 
oil pressure or oil 
flow, Motor #4 over-
heats. 
Motor #4 fails, loss of 
Motor #4 output. 
Limited flight envelope. 
Reduced maximum 
speed and insufficient 
power to take off or 
hover at max weight. 
Loss of air raft Possible 
hard landing if failure oc-
curs while in OMI avoid 
region (< 20 kts) 
Motor oil tem-
perature 
and/or pres-
sure indica-
tion provided 
to pilot. 
System health monitoring 
detects cooling failure, 
Motor output can be re-
duced or turned off either 
manually or automatically 
to prevent overheating. 
Full power may still be 
available for short peri-
ods. 
I 1.00E+00 2.00E-02 Assume pilot 
will be able to 
prevent over-
heat and avoid 
ESC failure 
90% of the 
time. 
1.03E-06 
                
3A1 Transfer mo-
tor torque to 
rotors 
5.00E-06 Failure to transfer 
torque  from Mo-
tor #1 to Rotor #1 
and transfer 
torque to/from 
collector gearbox 
Gearbox #1 Fail-
ure, failure to 
transfer torque 
from motor #1 or 
collector gearbox 
to Rotor #1 
All Unable to transfer 
torque to Rotor #1. 
No lift available to Ro-
tor #1. Torque 
From Motor #1 unusa-
ble. Unable to main-
tain level flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited con-
trol. 
Visual and au-
dible alert pro-
vided to pilot 
Flight control system ad-
justs controls to other 3 ro-
tors to maintain limited 
control and soft landing 
I 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with 
limited power 
1.25E-06 
3A2 Transfer mo-
tor torque to 
rotors 
5.00E-06 Failure to transfer 
torque  from Mo-
tor #1 to Rotor #1 
and transfer 
torque to/from 
collector gearbox 
Gearbox #1 
seized; 
Flight Unable to transfer 
torque Rotor #1. 
Potential damage to 
interconnecting 
drive shaft and col-
lector gearbox. 
Excess drag on collec-
tor gearbox consumes 
power from remaining 
3 motors. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited con-
trol. 
Visual and au-
dible alert pro-
vided to pilot 
Flight control system ad-
justs controls to other 3 ro-
tors to maintain limited 
control and soft landing 
I 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with 
limited power 
1.25E-06 
3B1 Transfer mo-
tor torque to 
rotors 
5.00E-06 Failure to transfer 
torque  from Mo-
tor #2 to Rotor #2 
and transfer 
torque to/from 
collector gearbox 
Gearbox #2 Fail-
ure, failure to 
transfer torque 
from motor #2 or 
collector gearbox 
to Rotor #2 
All Unable to transfer 
torque to Rotor #2. 
No lift available to Ro-
tor #2. Torque 
From Motor #2 unusa-
ble. Unable to main-
tain level flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited con-
trol. 
Visual and au-
dible alert pro-
vided to pilot 
Flight control system ad-
justs controls to other 3 ro-
tors to maintain limited 
control and soft landing 
I 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with 
limited power 
1.25E-06 
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FMECA ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mission 
Phase 
Local Failure Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provisions Severity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
3B2 Transfer mo-
tor torque to 
rotors 
5.00E-06 Failure to transfer 
torque  from Mo-
tor #2 to Rotor #2 
and transfer 
torque to/from 
collector gearbox 
Gearbox #2 
seized; 
Flight Unable to transfer 
torque Rotor #2. 
Potential damage to 
interconnecting 
drive shaft and col-
lector gearbox. 
Excess drag on collec-
tor gearbox consumes 
power from remaining 
3 motors. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited con-
trol. 
Visual and au-
dible alert pro-
vided to pilot 
Flight control system ad-
justs controls to other 3 ro-
tors to maintain limited 
control and soft landing 
I 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with 
limited power 
1.25E-06 
3C1 Transfer mo-
tor torque to 
rotors 
5.00E-06 Failure to transfer 
torque  from Mo-
tor #3 to Rotor #3 
and transfer 
torque to/from 
collector gearbox 
Gearbox #3 Fail-
ure, failure to 
transfer torque 
from motor #3 or 
collector gearbox 
to Rotor #3 
All Unable to transfer 
torque to Rotor #3. 
No lift available to Ro-
tor #3. Torque 
From Motor #3 unusa-
ble. Unable to main-
tain level flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited con-
trol. 
Visual and au-
dible alert pro-
vided to pilot 
Flight control system ad-
justs controls to other 3 ro-
tors to maintain limited 
control and soft landing 
I 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with 
limited power 
1.25E-06 
3C2 Transfer mo-
tor torque to 
rotors 
5.00E-06 Failure to transfer 
torque  from Mo-
tor #3 to Rotor #3 
and transfer 
torque to/from 
collector gearbox 
Gearbox #3 
seized; 
Flight Unable to transfer 
torque Rotor #3. 
Potential damage to 
interconnecting 
drive shaft and col-
lector gearbox. 
Excess drag on collec-
tor gearbox consumes 
power from remaining 
3 motors. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited con-
trol. 
Visual and au-
dible alert pro-
vided to pilot 
Flight control system ad-
justs controls to other 3 ro-
tors to maintain limited 
control and soft landing 
I 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with 
limited power 
1.25E-06 
3D1 Transfer mo-
tor torque to 
rotors 
5.00E-06 Failure to transfer 
torque  from Mo-
tor #4 to Rotor #4 
and transfer 
torque to/from 
collector gearbox 
Gearbox #4 Fail-
ure, failure to 
transfer torque 
from motor #4 or 
collector gearbox 
to Rotor #4 
All Unable to transfer 
torque to Rotor #4. 
No lift available to Ro-
tor #4. Torque 
From Motor #4 unusa-
ble. Unable to main-
tain level flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited con-
trol. 
Visual and au-
dible alert pro-
vided to pilot 
Flight control system ad-
justs controls to other 3 ro-
tors to maintain limited 
control and soft landing 
I 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with 
limited power 
1.25E-06 
3D2 Transfer mo-
tor torque to 
rotors 
5.00E-06 Failure to transfer 
torque  from Mo-
tor #4 to Rotor #4 
and transfer 
torque to/from 
collector gearbox 
Gearbox #4 
seized; 
Flight Unable to transfer 
torque Rotor #4. 
Potential damage to 
interconnecting 
drive shaft and col-
lector gearbox. 
Excess drag on collec-
tor gearbox consumes 
power from remaining 
3 motors. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited con-
trol. 
Visual and au-
dible alert pro-
vided to pilot 
Flight control system ad-
justs controls to other 3 ro-
tors to maintain limited 
control and soft landing 
I 5.00E-01 5.00E-01 Beta will be 
highly depend-
ent upon de-
tailed design 
and controlla-
bility of aircraft 
with 
limited power 
1.25E-06 
3E1 Transfer mo-
tor torque to 
rotors 
5.00E-06 Failure to trans-
fer torque be-
tween motors 
and rotors 
Combiner Gear-
box Failure, una-
ble to transfer 
torque 
All Loss of ability to 
transfer torque be-
tween rotor gear-
boxes. 
Loss of ability to 
cross-shaft power in 
the event of a motor 
failure 
None Visual and au-
dible alert pro-
vided to pilot 
None I 5.00E-01 3.64E-04 probability of 
loss of single 
motor output 
9.10E-10 
3E2 Transfer mo-
tor torque to 
rotors 
5.00E-06 Failure to trans-
fer torque be-
tween motors 
and rotors 
Combiner gear-
box seized 
All collector gearbox 
stops turning and 
causes sudden 
stop of intercon-
necting 
Drive shafts. 
Potential damage to 
interconnecting drive 
shafts and rotor gear-
boxes. 
Loss of power to all 4 ro-
tors. Loss of control of 
aircraft. Loss of aircraft 
and crew 
Visual and au-
dible alert pro-
vided to pilot 
None I 5.00E-01 3.64E-04 probability of 
loss of single 
motor output 
9.10E-10 
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Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mission 
Phase 
Local Failure Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Detection 
Method 
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Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure Mode 
Criticality No. 
Criticality Summary: I    3.08E-04 
0.00E+00 
2.50E-07 
2.50E-07 
           II    
           III    
           IV    
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Table B- 3:  Alternate Configuration –Quad-Rotor without Interconnecting Shafting FMECA Worksheet 
FMECA 
ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode 
Critical-
ity No. 
1A1 Provide 
HVDC 
power to 
electric mo-
tors 
1.00E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy to ESC 
#1 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
#1 only. 
All Unable to trans-
fer torque to Ro-
tor #1. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #1.  Torque 
from Motor #1 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Flight control system 
adjusts controls to 
other 3 rotors to main-
tain limited control as 
aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 2.50E‐01 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.25E‐07 
1B1 Provide 
HVDC 
power to 
electric mo-
tors 
1.00E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy to ESC 
#2 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
#2 only. 
All No power to 
ESC #2; Motor 
#2 fails to pro-
vide output 
torque 
No lift available to 
Rotor #2.  Torque 
from Motor #2 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts controls to 
other 3 rotors to main-
tain limited control as 
aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 2.50E‐01 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.25E‐07 
1C1 Provide 
HVDC 
power to 
electric mo-
tors 
1.00E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy to ESC 
#3 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
#3 only. 
All No power to 
ESC #3; Motor 
#3 fails to pro-
vide output 
torque 
No lift available to 
Rotor #3.  Torque 
from Motor #3 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts controls to 
other 3 rotors to main-
tain limited control as 
aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 2.50E‐01 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.25E‐07 
1D1 Provide 
HVDC 
power to 
electric mo-
tors 
1.00E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy to ESC 
#4 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
#4 only. 
All No power to 
ESC #4; Motor 
#4 fails to pro-
vide output 
torque 
No lift available to 
Rotor #4.  Torque 
from Motor #4 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts controls to 
other 3 rotors to main-
tain limited control as 
aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 2.50E‐01 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.25E‐07 
1E+1 Provide 
HVDC 
power to 
electric mo-
tors 
1.00E-
06 
Internal bat-
tery failure 
Battery cell fail-
ure 
- no runaway. 
All Loss of output 
from single 
branch within 
battery network. 
Battery output 
voltage slightly 
reduced.  In-
creased current 
draw from re-
maining battery 
cells 
Output voltage 
slightly reduced to 
one or more mo-
tors. 
Reduced range 
and/or slight degra-
dation of motor per-
formance. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Battery monitoring sys-
tem must detect and 
isolate the fault.  Con-
tinued operation with 
failed cell may put addi-
tional stress on other 
battery cells which 
must be managed to 
prevent catastrophic 
failure 
IV 2.50E‐01 1.00E+00 Beta = 1 for 
Cat III & Cat 
4 FM's 
2.50E‐07 
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ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode 
Critical-
ity No. 
1E+2 Provide 
HVDC 
power to 
electric mo-
tors 
1.00E-
06 
Internal bat-
tery failure 
Battery cell fail-
ure 
- Thermal runa-
way. - con-
tained 
All Battery cell tem-
perature rises 
rapidly, causing 
thermal runa-
way. Battery 
monitoring sys-
tem detects fail-
ure, disconnects 
and isolates the 
defective battery 
cell. 
Reduced battery 
system capacity, 
slight degradation 
of battery output 
voltage provided 
to one or more 
electric motors. 
Battery may catch 
fire.  Excess heat 
generated may af-
fect adjacent bat-
tery cells. 
Reduced range 
and/or degradation 
electric motor perfor-
mance. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Battery cooling and fire 
protection system must 
contain battery temper-
ature to prevent loss of 
aircraft 
III 2.50E‐01 1.00E+00 Beta = 1 for 
Cat III & Cat 
4 FM's 
2.50E‐07 
1E+3 Provide 
HVDC 
power to 
electric mo-
tors 
1.00E-
06 
Internal bat-
tery failure 
Battery cell fail-
ure internal 
short - thermal 
runaway - un-
contained 
All Battery cell tem-
perature rises 
rapidly, causing 
thermal runa-
way. Battery 
catches fire. 
Loss of all 
HVDC output. 
No power provided 
to electric motors.  
Loss of torque out-
put to rotors 
Aircraft descends to 
ground.  Autorotation 
employed to provide 
soft landing 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. Pilot 
detects 
loss of 
power 
Flight control system 
and rotor pitch control 
actuators are powered 
by a low voltage battery 
which is still opera-
tional. 
Controlled landing pos-
sible through autorota-
tion 
II 2.50E‐01 1.00E‐02 It is as-
sumed that 
in most 
cases, bat-
tery failure 
will occur 
gradually 
giving the pi-
lot time to 
land safely. 
2.50E‐09 
1E+4 Provide 
HVDC 
power to 
electric mo-
tors 
1.00E-
06 
Internal bat-
tery failure 
Complete HV 
battery failure; 
low voltage or 
no voltage out-
put. (Battery 
discharged) 
All Loss of all 
HVDC output 
No power provided 
to electric motors.  
Loss of torque out-
put to rotors 
Aircraft descends to 
ground.  Autorotation 
employed to provide 
soft landing 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. Pilot 
detects 
loss of 
power 
Flight control system 
and rotor pitch control 
actuators are powered 
by a low voltage battery 
which is still opera-
tional. 
Controlled landing pos-
sible through autorota-
tion 
II 2.50E‐01 1.00E‐02 It is as-
sumed that 
in most 
cases, bat-
tery voltage 
would de-
crease grad-
ually, giving 
the pilot time 
to land 
safely. 
2.50E‐09 
                                
2A1 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
2.70E-
04 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #1 to 
Gearbox #1 
ESC #1 failure All No output from 
ESC #1 to Motor 
#1. Motor #1 
fails to provide 
output torque. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #1.  Torque 
from Motor #1 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.35E‐04 
2A2 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
9.24E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #1 to 
Gearbox #1 
Motor #1 failure All No output from 
ESC #1 to Motor 
#1. Motor #1 
fails to provide 
output torque. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #1.  Torque 
from Motor #1 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
4.62E‐05 
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ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode 
Critical-
ity No. 
2A3 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
4.20E-
07 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #1 to 
Gearbox #1 
Clutch #1 fail-
ure - failure to 
engage 
All No output from 
ESC #1 to Motor 
#1. Motor #1 
fails to provide 
output torque. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #1.  Torque 
from Motor #1 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 5.00E‐01 5.00E‐01 Clutch must 
be engaged 
for normal 
operation 
1.05E‐07 
2A4 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
4.20E-
07 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #1 to 
Gearbox #1 
Clutch #1 fail-
ure - failure to 
disengage 
All No effect on nor-
mal operation. 
None None None   IV 5.00E‐01 1.00E+00   2.10E‐07 
2A5 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
9.24E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #1 to 
Gearbox #1 
ESC #1 cooling 
fan failure 
All ESC tempera-
ture rises rap-
idly. 
ESC #1 fails, loss 
of Motor #1 output. 
Aircraft fire. Substan-
tial damage to air-
craft, Possible loss of 
aircraft. 
ESC cool-
ing fan fail-
ure indica-
tion 
provided to 
pilot. ESC 
Hot indica-
tion pro-
vided if 
ESC over-
heats 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Assume pilot 
will be able 
to prevent 
overheat 
and avoid 
ESC failure 
50% of the 
time. 
4.62E‐05 
2A6 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
5.17E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #1 to 
Gearbox #1 
Motor cooling 
oil pump failure 
or oil leak 
All Loss of cool-
ing/lube oil pres-
sure or oil flow, 
Motor #1 over-
heats. 
Motor #1 fails, loss 
of Motor #1 output. 
Aircraft fire. Substan-
tial damage to air-
craft, Possible loss of 
aircraft. 
Motor oil 
tempera-
ture and/or 
pressure 
indication 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Assume pilot 
will be able 
to prevent 
overheat 
and avoid 
Motor failure 
50% of the 
time. 
2.59E‐05 
2B1 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
2.70E-
04 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #2 to 
Gearbox #2 
ESC #2 failure All No output from 
ESC #2 to Motor 
#2. Motor #2 
fails to provide 
output torque. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #2.  Torque 
from Motor #2 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.35E‐04 
2B2 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
9.24E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #2 to 
Gearbox #2 
Motor #2 failure All No output from 
ESC #2 to Motor 
#2. Motor #2 
fails to provide 
output torque. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #2.  Torque 
from Motor #2 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
4.62E‐05 
N
A
SA
/C
R
—
2019-220217
B
-23
FMECA 
ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode 
Critical-
ity No. 
2B3 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
4.20E-
07 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #2 to 
Gearbox #2 
Clutch #2 fail-
ure - failure to 
engage 
All No output from 
ESC #2 to Motor 
#2. Motor #2 
fails to provide 
output torque. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #2.  Torque 
from Motor #2 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 5.00E‐01 5.00E‐01 Clutch must 
be engaged 
for normal 
operation 
1.05E‐07 
2B4 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
4.20E-
07 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #2 to 
Gearbox #2 
Clutch #2 fail-
ure - failure to 
disengage 
All No effect on nor-
mal operation. 
None None None   IV 5.00E‐01 1.00E+00   2.10E‐07 
2B5 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
9.24E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #2 to 
Gearbox #2 
ESC #2 cooling 
fan failure 
All ESC tempera-
ture rises rap-
idly. 
ESC #2 fails, loss 
of Motor #2 output. 
Aircraft fire. Substan-
tial damage to air-
craft, Possible loss of 
aircraft. 
ESC cool-
ing fan fail-
ure indica-
tion 
provided to 
pilot. ESC 
Hot indica-
tion pro-
vided if 
ESC over-
heats 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Assume pilot 
will be able 
to prevent 
overheat 
and avoid 
ESC failure 
50% of the 
time. 
4.62E‐05 
2B6 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
5.17E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #2 to 
Gearbox #2 
Motor cooling 
oil pump failure 
or oil leak 
All Loss of cool-
ing/lube oil pres-
sure or oil flow, 
Motor #2 over-
heats. 
Motor #2 fails, loss 
of Motor #2 output. 
Aircraft fire. Substan-
tial damage to air-
craft, Possible loss of 
aircraft. 
Motor oil 
tempera-
ture and/or 
pressure 
indication 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Assume pilot 
will be able 
to prevent 
overheat 
and avoid 
Motor failure 
50% of the 
time. 
2.59E‐05 
2C1 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
2.70E-
04 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #3 to 
Gearbox #3 
ESC #3 failure All No output from 
ESC #3 to Motor 
#3. Motor #3 
fails to provide 
output torque. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #3.  Torque 
from Motor #3 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.35E‐04 
2C2 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
9.24E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #3 to 
Gearbox #3 
Motor #3 failure All No output from 
ESC #3 to Motor 
#3. Motor #3 
fails to provide 
output torque. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #3.  Torque 
from Motor #3 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
4.62E‐05 
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Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
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Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode 
Critical-
ity No. 
2C3 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
4.20E-
07 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #3 to 
Gearbox #3 
Clutch #3 fail-
ure - failure to 
engage 
All No output from 
ESC #3 to Motor 
#3. Motor #3 
fails to provide 
output torque. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #3.  Torque 
from Motor #3 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 5.00E‐01 5.00E‐01 Clutch must 
be engaged 
for normal 
operation 
1.05E‐07 
2C4 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
4.20E-
07 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #3 to 
Gearbox #3 
Clutch #3 fail-
ure - failure to 
disengage 
All No effect on nor-
mal operation. 
None None None   IV 5.00E‐01 1.00E+00   2.10E‐07 
2C5 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
9.24E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #3 to 
Gearbox #3 
ESC #3 cooling 
fan failure 
All ESC tempera-
ture rises rap-
idly. 
ESC #3 fails, loss 
of Motor #3 output. 
Aircraft fire. Substan-
tial damage to air-
craft, Possible loss of 
aircraft. 
ESC cool-
ing fan fail-
ure indica-
tion 
provided to 
pilot. ESC 
Hot indica-
tion pro-
vided if 
ESC over-
heats 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Assume pilot 
will be able 
to prevent 
overheat 
and avoid 
ESC failure 
50% of the 
time. 
4.62E‐05 
2C6 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
5.17E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #3 to 
Gearbox #3 
Motor cooling 
oil pump failure 
or oil leak 
All Loss of cool-
ing/lube oil pres-
sure or oil flow, 
Motor #3 over-
heats. 
Motor #3 fails, loss 
of Motor #3 output. 
Aircraft fire. Substan-
tial damage to air-
craft, Possible loss of 
aircraft. 
Motor oil 
tempera-
ture and/or 
pressure 
indication 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Assume pilot 
will be able 
to prevent 
overheat 
and avoid 
Motor failure 
50% of the 
time. 
2.59E‐05 
2D1 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
2.70E-
04 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #4 to 
Gearbox #4 
ESC #4 failure All No output from 
ESC #4 to Motor 
#4. Motor #4 
fails to provide 
output torque. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #4.  Torque 
from Motor #4 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.35E‐04 
2D2 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
9.24E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #4 to 
Gearbox #4 
Motor #4 failure All No output from 
ESC #4 to Motor 
#4. Motor #4 
fails to provide 
output torque. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #4.  Torque 
from Motor #4 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
4.62E‐05 
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Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode 
Critical-
ity No. 
2D3 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
4.20E-
07 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #4 to 
Gearbox #4 
Clutch #4 fail-
ure - failure to 
engage 
All No output from 
ESC #4 to Motor 
#4. Motor #4 
fails to provide 
output torque. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #4.  Torque 
from Motor #4 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 5.00E‐01 5.00E‐01 Clutch must 
be engaged 
for normal 
operation 
1.05E‐07 
2D4 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
4.20E-
07 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #4 to 
Gearbox #4 
Clutch #4 fail-
ure - failure to 
disengage 
All No effect on nor-
mal operation. 
None None None   IV 5.00E‐01 1.00E+00   2.10E‐07 
2D5 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
9.24E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #4 to 
Gearbox #4 
ESC #4 cooling 
fan failure 
All ESC tempera-
ture rises rap-
idly. 
ESC #4 fails, loss 
of Motor #4 output. 
Aircraft fire. Substan-
tial damage to air-
craft, Possible loss of 
aircraft. 
ESC cool-
ing fan fail-
ure indica-
tion 
provided to 
pilot. ESC 
Hot indica-
tion pro-
vided if 
ESC over-
heats 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Assume pilot 
will be able 
to prevent 
overheat 
and avoid 
ESC failure 
50% of the 
time. 
4.62E‐05 
2D6 Convert HV 
electrical 
energy to 
shaft torque 
5.17E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide output 
torque from 
Motor #4 to 
Gearbox #4 
Motor cooling 
oil pump failure 
or oil leak 
All Loss of cool-
ing/lube oil pres-
sure or oil flow, 
Motor #4 over-
heats. 
Motor #4 fails, loss 
of Motor #4 output. 
Aircraft fire. Substan-
tial damage to air-
craft, Possible loss of 
aircraft. 
Motor oil 
tempera-
ture and/or 
pressure 
indication 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 1.00E+00 5.00E‐01 Assume pilot 
will be able 
to prevent 
overheat 
and avoid 
Motor failure 
50% of the 
time. 
2.59E‐05 
                                
3A1 Transfer 
motor 
torque to ro-
tors 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
torque from 
Motor #1 to 
Rotor #1 
Gearbox #1 
Failure, failure 
to transfer 
torque from 
motor #1 to Ro-
tor #1 
All Unable to trans-
fer torque to Ro-
tor #1. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #1.  Torque 
from Motor #1 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 5.00E‐01 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.25E‐06 
3A2 Transfer 
motor 
torque to ro-
tors 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
torque from 
Motor #1 to 
Rotor #1 
Gearbox #1 
seized; Motor 
and rotor stop 
rotation 
Flight Unable to trans-
fer torque Rotor 
#1. Potential 
damage to mo-
tor #1 and rotor. 
  Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 5.00E‐01 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.25E‐06 
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FMECA 
ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode 
Critical-
ity No. 
3B1 Transfer 
motor 
torque to ro-
tors 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
torque from 
Motor #2 to 
Rotor #2 
Gearbox #2 
Failure, failure 
to transfer 
torque from 
motor #2 or 
collector gear-
box to Rotor #2 
All Unable to trans-
fer torque to Ro-
tor #2. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #2.  Torque 
from Motor #2 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 5.00E‐01 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.25E‐06 
3B2 Transfer 
motor 
torque to ro-
tors 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
torque from 
Motor #2 to 
Rotor #2 
Gearbox #2 
seized; 
Flight Unable to trans-
fer torque Rotor 
#2. potential 
damage to mo-
tor and 
  Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 5.00E‐01 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.25E‐06 
3C1 Transfer 
motor 
torque to ro-
tors 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
torque from 
Motor #3 to 
Rotor #3 
Gearbox #3 
Failure, failure 
to transfer 
torque from 
motor #3 or 
collector gear-
box to Rotor #3 
All Unable to trans-
fer torque to Ro-
tor #3. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #3.  Torque 
from Motor #3 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 5.00E‐01 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.25E‐06 
3C2 Transfer 
motor 
torque to ro-
tors 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
torque from 
Motor #3 to 
Rotor #3 
Gearbox #3 
seized; 
Flight Unable to trans-
fer torque Rotor 
#3. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #3.  Torque 
from Motor #3 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 5.00E‐01 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.25E‐06 
3D1 Transfer 
motor 
torque to ro-
tors 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
torque from 
Motor #4 to 
Rotor #4 
Gearbox #4 
Failure, failure 
to transfer 
torque from 
motor #4 or 
collector gear-
box to Rotor #4 
All Unable to trans-
fer torque to Ro-
tor #4. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #4.  Torque 
from Motor #4 un-
usable.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 5.00E‐01 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.25E‐06 
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FMECA 
ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode 
Critical-
ity No. 
3D2 Transfer 
motor 
torque to ro-
tors 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
torque from 
Motor #4 to 
Rotor #4 
Gearbox #4 
seized; 
Flight Unable to trans-
fer torque Rotor 
#4. 
Potential damage 
to motor and rotor 
assembly. No lift 
available to Rotor 
#4. Torque from 
Motor #4 unusa-
ble.  Unable to 
maintain level 
flight. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground with limited 
control. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Flight control system 
adjusts speed and pitch 
to other 3 rotors to 
maintain limited control 
as aircraft descends to 
ground 
I 5.00E‐01 5.00E‐01 Beta will be 
highly de-
pendent 
upon de-
tailed design 
and control-
lability of air-
craft with 
limited 
power 
1.25E‐06 
                                
Criticality Summary I 1.02E‐03               
II 0.00E+00               
III 2.50E‐07               
IV 1.09E‐06 
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Table B- 4:  Side-by-Side (Lateral-Twin) FMECA Worksheet 
FMECA 
ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phas
e 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
1A1 Provide 
main en-
gine torque 
to interme-
diate gear-
boxes 
2.67E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide engine 
torque to the 
Intermediate 
gearbox #1 
Engine #1 Fail-
ure 
All Loss of primary 
power output to 
Intermediate 
gearbox #1. 
Intermediate gear-
box #1 draws 
power from engine 
#2 and electric 
motor through col-
lector gearbox. In-
sufficient power to 
maintain flight in 
hover OEI avoid 
region.   Reduced 
or no power avail-
able to charge bat-
teries 
Loss of aircraft if fail-
ure occurs while in 
OEI avoid region of 
flight. Reduced maxi-
mum speed in for-
ward flight. Loss of 
ability to hover below 
specified minimum 
forward speed. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing area where 
landing in forward flight 
is possible. Pilot must 
manage cruise speed 
to preserve battery 
power which will be 
needed for landing. 
I 1.00E+
00 
2.00E‐
01 
Assumed 
that the air-
craft is in 
hover/ OEI 
avoid region 
20% of flight 
time 
5.34E‐07 
1A2 Provide 
main en-
gine torque 
to interme-
diate gear-
boxes 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide engine 
torque to the 
Intermediate 
gearbox #1 
Engine #1 
gearbox failure, 
All Loss of primary 
power output to 
Intermediate 
gearbox #1. 
Intermediate gear-
box #1 draws 
power from engine 
#2 and electric 
motor through col-
lector gearbox. In-
sufficient power to 
maintain flight in 
hover OEI avoid 
region.   Reduced 
or no power avail-
able to charge bat-
teries 
Loss of aircraft if fail-
ure occurs while in 
OEI avoid region of 
flight. Reduced maxi-
mum speed in for-
ward flight. Loss of 
ability to hover below 
specified minimum 
forward speed. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing area where 
landing in forward flight 
is possible. Pilot must 
manage cruise speed 
to preserve battery 
power which will be 
needed for landing. 
I 1.00E+
00 
2.00E‐
01 
Assumed 
that the air-
craft is in 
hover/ OEI 
avoid region 
20% of flight 
time 
1.00E‐06 
1A3 Provide 
main en-
gine torque 
to interme-
diate gear-
boxes 
4.20E-
07 
Failure to pro-
vide engine 
torque to the 
Intermediate 
gearbox #1 
Engine #1 over-
running clutch 
fails to engage 
All Loss of primary 
power output to 
Intermediate 
gearbox #1. 
Intermediate gear-
box #1 draws 
power from engine 
#2 and electric 
motor through col-
lector gearbox. In-
sufficient power to 
maintain flight in 
hover OEI avoid 
region.   Reduced 
or no power avail-
able to charge bat-
teries 
Loss of aircraft if fail-
ure occurs while in 
OEI avoid region of 
flight. Reduced maxi-
mum speed in for-
ward flight. Loss of 
ability to hover below 
specified minimum 
forward speed. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing area where 
landing in forward flight 
is possible. Pilot must 
manage cruise speed 
to preserve battery 
power which will be 
needed for landing. 
I 1.00E+
00 
2.00E‐
01 
Assumed 
that the air-
craft is in 
hover/ OEI 
avoid region 
20% of flight 
time 
8.40E‐08 
1B1 Provide 
main en-
gine torque 
to interme-
diate gear-
boxes 
2.67E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide engine 
torque to the 
Intermediate 
gearbox #2 
Engine #2 Fail-
ure 
All Loss of primary 
power output to 
Intermediate 
gearbox #2. 
Intermediate gear-
box #2 draws 
power from engine 
#1 and electric 
motor through col-
lector gearbox. In-
sufficient power to 
maintain flight in 
hover OEI avoid 
region.   Reduced 
or no power avail-
able to charge bat-
teries 
Loss of aircraft if fail-
ure occurs while in 
OEI avoid region of 
flight. Reduced maxi-
mum speed in for-
ward flight. Loss of 
ability to hover below 
specified minimum 
forward speed. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing area where 
landing in forward flight 
is possible. Pilot must 
manage cruise speed 
to preserve battery 
power which will be 
needed for landing. 
I 1.00E+
00 
2.00E‐
01 
Assumed 
that the air-
craft is in 
hover/ OEI 
avoid region 
20% of flight 
time 
5.34E‐07 
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FMECA 
ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phas
e 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
1B2 Provide 
main en-
gine torque 
to interme-
diate gear-
boxes 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide engine 
torque to the 
Intermediate 
gearbox #2 
Engine #2 
gearbox failure, 
All Loss of primary 
power output to 
Intermediate 
gearbox #2. 
Intermediate gear-
box #2 draws 
power from engine 
#1 and electric 
motor through col-
lector gearbox. In-
sufficient power to 
maintain flight in 
hover OEI avoid 
region.   Reduced 
or no power avail-
able to charge bat-
teries 
Loss of aircraft if fail-
ure occurs while in 
OEI avoid region of 
flight. Reduced maxi-
mum speed in for-
ward flight. Loss of 
ability to hover below 
specified minimum 
forward speed. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing area where 
landing in forward flight 
is possible. Pilot must 
manage cruise speed 
to preserve battery 
power which will be 
needed for landing. 
I 1.00E+
00 
2.00E‐
01 
Assumed 
that the air-
craft is in 
hover/ OEI 
avoid region 
20% of flight 
time 
1.00E‐06 
1B3 Provide 
main en-
gine torque 
to interme-
diate gear-
boxes 
4.20E-
07 
Failure to pro-
vide engine 
torque to the 
Intermediate 
gearbox #2 
Engine #2 over-
running clutch 
fails to engage 
All Loss of primary 
power output to 
Intermediate 
gearbox #2. 
Intermediate gear-
box #2 draws 
power from engine 
#1 and electric 
motor through col-
lector gearbox. In-
sufficient power to 
maintain flight in 
hover OEI avoid 
region.   Reduced 
or no power avail-
able to charge bat-
teries 
Loss of aircraft if fail-
ure occurs while in 
OEI avoid region of 
flight. Reduced maxi-
mum speed in for-
ward flight. Loss of 
ability to hover below 
specified minimum 
forward speed. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing area where 
landing in forward flight 
is possible. Pilot must 
manage cruise speed 
to preserve battery 
power which will be 
needed for landing. 
I 1.00E+
00 
2.00E‐
01 
Assumed 
that the air-
craft is in 
hover/ OEI 
avoid region 
20% of flight 
time 
8.40E‐08 
                                
2A1 Transfer 
shaft torque 
from en-
gines to ro-
tors and 
provide ro-
tor synchro-
nization 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
torque to ro-
tor #1 
Intermediate 
gearbox #1 fail-
ure; failure to 
receive transfer 
torque input. To 
output. 
All Loss of output 
torque to rotor 
gearbox #1. 
Loss of control of 
output to rotor #1.  
No control over ro-
tor speed and po-
sition. Rotor-rotor 
contact possible 
Loss of controlled 
flight. Loss of aircraft. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
None. I 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Assume that 
gearbox fail-
ure in flight 
will always 
result in loss 
of aircraft 
5.00E‐06 
2A2 Transfer 
shaft torque 
from en-
gines to ro-
tors and 
provide ro-
tor synchro-
nization 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
torque to ro-
tor #1 
Rotor gearbox 
#1 failure 
All Loss of output 
torque to rotor 
gearbox #1. 
Loss of control of 
output to rotor #1.  
No control over ro-
tor speed and po-
sition. Rotor-rotor 
contact possible 
Loss of controlled 
flight. Loss of aircraft. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
None. I 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Assume that 
gearbox fail-
ure in flight 
will always 
result in loss 
of aircraft 
5.00E‐06 
2B1 Transfer 
shaft torque 
from en-
gines to ro-
tors and 
provide ro-
tor synchro-
nization 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
torque to ro-
tor #2 
Intermediate 
gearbox #2 fail-
ure; failure to 
receive transfer 
torque input. To 
output. 
All Loss of output 
torque to rotor 
gearbox #2. 
Loss of control of 
output to rotor #2.  
No control over ro-
tor speed and po-
sition. Rotor-rotor 
contact possible 
Loss of controlled 
flight. Loss of aircraft. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
None. I 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Assume that 
gearbox fail-
ure in flight 
will always 
result in loss 
of aircraft 
5.00E‐06 
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FMECA 
ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phas
e 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
2B2 Transfer 
shaft torque 
from en-
gines to ro-
tors and 
provide ro-
tor synchro-
nization 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
torque to ro-
tor #2 
Rotor gearbox 
#2 failure 
All Loss of output 
torque to rotor 
gearbox #2. 
Loss of control of 
output to rotor #2.  
No control over ro-
tor speed and po-
sition. Rotor-rotor 
contact possible 
Loss of controlled 
flight. Loss of aircraft. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
None. I 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Assume that 
gearbox fail-
ure in flight 
will always 
result in loss 
of aircraft 
5.00E‐06 
2C1 Transfer 
shaft torque 
from en-
gines to ro-
tors and 
provide ro-
tor synchro-
nization 
5.00E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
power and 
provide syn-
chronization 
between rotor 
#1 
and rotor #2 
Collector gear-
box failure 
All Loss of ability to 
synchronize ro-
tors. Power from 
electric motor is 
unusable 
Rotor to rotor con-
tact causes dam-
age to rotors. Re-
duced net power 
available to 
hover/land. 
Unable to hover.  
Loss of controlled 
flight if damage 
causes rotor failure.  
Loss of aircraft. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot diverts to alternate 
landing site and lands 
as soon as possible in 
forward flight. 
I 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Assume that 
loss of synch 
will always 
result in loss 
of aircraft 
5.00E‐06 
2C2 Transfer 
shaft torque 
from en-
gines to ro-
tors and 
provide ro-
tor synchro-
nization 
9.30E-
07 
Failure to 
transfer 
power and 
provide syn-
chronization 
between rotor 
#1 
and rotor #2 
Interconnect 
shaft #1 failure 
All Loss of ability to 
synchronize ro-
tors. Power from 
electric motor 
cannot be trans-
ferred to rotor #1 
Rotor to rotor con-
tact causes dam-
age to rotors. Net 
power available to 
hover/land slightly 
reduced. 
Limited ability to 
hover. Loss of con-
trolled flight if dam-
age causes rotor fail-
ure.  Loss of aircraft. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot lands as soon as 
possible. (assume that 
vertical landing is still 
possible) 
I 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Assume that 
loss of synch 
will always 
result in loss 
of aircraft 
9.30E‐07 
2C3 Transfer 
shaft torque 
from en-
gines to ro-
tors and 
provide ro-
tor synchro-
nization 
9.30E-
06 
Failure to 
transfer 
power and 
provide syn-
chronization 
between rotor 
#1 
and rotor #2 
Interconnect 
shaft #2 failure 
All Loss of ability to 
synchronize ro-
tors. Power from 
electric motor 
cannot be trans-
ferred to rotor #2 
Rotor to rotor con-
tact causes dam-
age to rotors. Net 
power available to 
hover/land slightly 
reduced. 
Limited ability to 
hover. Loss of con-
trolled flight if dam-
age causes rotor fail-
ure.  Loss of aircraft. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot lands as soon as 
possible. (assume that 
vertical landing is still 
possible) 
I 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Assume that 
loss of synch 
will always 
result in loss 
of aircraft 
9.30E‐06 
                                
3A1 Provide 
electric mo-
tor boost 
power for 
hover and 
low speed 
flight 
1.00E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power from 
electric motor 
Battery cell fail-
ure, no runa-
way 
All Loss of output 
from single 
branch within 
battery network.  
Battery output 
voltage slightly 
reduced.  In-
creased current 
draw from re-
maining battery 
cells 
slight reduction in 
battery power 
available to elec-
tric motor 
Slight reduction in 
available power dur-
ing hover, maximum 
time in hover slightly 
reduced. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Pilot must compensate 
for slight reduction in 
hover capability 
III 3.33E‐
01 
1.00E+
00 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
3.33E‐07 
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FMECA 
ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phas
e 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
3A2 Provide 
electric mo-
tor boost 
power for 
hover and 
low speed 
flight 
1.00E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power from 
electric motor 
Battery cell fail-
ure, thermal 
runaway con-
tained 
All Battery cell tem-
perature rises 
rapidly, causing 
thermal runa-
way. 
Battery monitor-
ing system de-
tects failure, dis-
connects and 
isolates the de-
fective battery 
cell. 
Reduced battery 
system capacity, 
slight degradation 
of battery output 
voltage provided 
to one or more 
electric motors.  
Battery may catch 
fire.  Excess heat 
generated may af-
fect adjacent bat-
tery cells. 
Slight reduction in 
available power dur-
ing hover, maximum 
time in hover slightly 
reduced. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
None III 3.33E‐
01 
1.00E+
00 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
3.33E‐07 
3A3 Provide 
electric mo-
tor boost 
power for 
hover and 
low speed 
flight 
1.00E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power from 
electric motor 
Battery cell fail-
ure, thermal 
runaway un-
contained 
All Battery cell tem-
perature rises 
rapidly, causing 
thermal runa-
way. Battery 
catches fire. 
Loss of all 
HVDC output. 
No HVDC power 
available to power 
motor. No electric 
motor power avail-
able. 
Loss of motor power 
necessary for hover 
and low speed flight.  
Loss of aircraft if fail-
ure occurs while in 
OMI avoid region of 
flight. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Pilot must exit OMI 
avoid region ASAP.  Pi-
lot diverts to alternate 
landing site and lands 
in forward flight. 
I 3.34E‐
01 
2.00E‐
01 
  6.68E‐08 
3A4 Provide 
electric mo-
tor boost 
power for 
hover and 
low speed 
flight 
5.08E-
04 
Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power from 
electric motor 
Battery cooling 
system failure 
All Battery tempera-
ture rises rap-
idly, battery fail-
ure occurs if not 
Battery availability 
limited, availability 
of electric motor 
significantly re-
duced. 
Unable to continue to 
hover or maintain low 
speed flight. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Pilot must exit OMI 
avoid region ASAP.  Pi-
lot diverts to alternate 
landing site and lands 
in forward flight. 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
5.08E‐04 
3A5 Provide 
electric mo-
tor boost 
power for 
hover and 
low speed 
flight 
2.70E-
04 
Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power from 
electric motor 
ESC failure All No electrical out-
put to drive mo-
tor.  Motor fails 
to provide output 
power 
No boost power 
available from 
electric motor.  In-
sufficient power to 
maintain flight 
while in hover or 
low speed flight 
Loss of ability to 
hover or fly at low 
speed.  Loss of air-
craft if failure occurs 
while in OMI avoid re-
gion. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Pilot must divert to al-
ternate landing site and 
land in forward flight. 
I 1.00E+
00 
2.00E‐
01 
assume that 
aircraft is in 
hover or low 
speed flight 
20% of the 
flight time 
5.40E‐05 
3A6 Provide 
electric mo-
tor boost 
power for 
hover and 
low speed 
flight 
9.24E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power from 
electric motor 
ESC cooling 
fan failure 
All ESC tempera-
ture increases 
ESC shuts down 
or limits output 
due to over tem-
perature. 
Reduced or no 
boost power avail-
able from electric 
motor. 
Insufficient power 
to maintain flight 
while in hover or 
low speed flight. 
Unable to continue to 
hover or maintain low 
speed flight. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Pilot must exit OMI 
avoid region ASAP.  
Hover for short periods 
might be possible de-
pending on conditions.  
Pilot may divert to alter-
nate landing site and 
lands in forward flight. 
II 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
  9.24E‐06 
3A7 Provide 
electric mo-
tor boost 
power for 
hover and 
low speed 
flight 
1.97E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power from 
electric motor 
Electric mo-
tor/generator 
failure 
All No boost power 
available from 
electric motor. 
Insufficient power 
to maintain flight 
while in hover or 
low speed flight 
Loss of ability to 
hover or fly at low 
speed.  Loss of air-
craft if failure occurs 
while in OMI avoid re-
gion. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Pilot must exit OMI 
avoid region ASAP.  Pi-
lot diverts to alternate 
landing site and lands 
in forward flight. 
I 1.00E+
00 
2.00E‐
01 
assume that 
aircraft is in 
hover or low 
speed flight 
20% of the 
flight time 
3.94E‐06 
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ID 
Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phas
e 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
3A8 Provide 
electric mo-
tor boost 
power for 
hover and 
low speed 
flight 
5.17E-
05 
Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power from 
electric motor 
Electric motor 
cooling and 
lube failure 
All Increased fric-
tion and temper-
ature in motor. 
Motor temperature 
rises, eventually 
causing motor fail-
ure. 
Loss of ability to 
hover or fly at low 
speed.  If failure oc-
curs while in OMI 
avoid region pilot 
must exit OMI avoid 
region immediately. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Pilot must exit OMI 
avoid region ASAP.  Pi-
lot diverts to alternate 
landing site and lands 
in forward flight. 
II 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
  5.17E‐05 
3A9 Provide 
electric mo-
tor boost 
power for 
hover and 
low speed 
flight 
5.01E-
06 
Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power from 
electric motor 
Clutch (emer-
gency discon-
nect) failure 
All Loss of ability to 
disconnect mo-
tor/generator in 
case of mo-
tor/generator 
failure 
None during nor-
mal operation; po-
tential damage/ 
aircraft fire in case 
of motor generator 
failure. 
Aircraft fire, Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Fire suppression sys-
tem contains fire. 
I 9.75E‐
06 
2.00E‐
01 
assume that 
loss of func-
tion does not 
impact flying 
qualities and 
pilot is al-
ready oper-
ating in 
emergency 
procedures 
because of 
electric mo-
tor failure 
9.77E‐12 
3B1 Provide 
electric mo-
tor boost 
power for 
hover and 
low speed 
flight 
2.70E-
02 
Failure to pro-
vide electrical 
power to 
charge bat-
tery 
ESC failure. 
Loss of charge 
capability 
All Loss of HVDC 
output to charge 
batteries, 
Unable to charge 
battery during 
cruise. 
Hover capability is 
limited to remaining 
charge in battery. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Pilot must manage 
available battery 
charge to complete 
flight and land safely 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
  2.70E‐02 
                                
Criticality Summary: I 9.65E‐05 
              
II 6.10E‐05 
              
III 2.75E‐02 
              
IV 0.00E+00 
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Table B- 5:  Lift+Cruise FMECA Worksheet 
FMECA  
ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
1A1 Provide 
HVDC for 
propulsion 
and to 
charge 
batteries 
2.67E-06 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to 
gearbox 
Turbo-shaft en-
gine failure 
All Loss of HVDC 
electrical power 
to drive lift and 
thrust motors 
and to charge 
batteries  
Electric motors op-
erate from battery 
power only.  In-
creased power de-
mand from batter-
ies.  Batteries 
rapidly discharge. 
Loss of propulsion if 
pilot cannot land 
safely before batter-
ies are discharged.  
Loss of aircraft. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Pilot follows emergency 
procedures to find safe 
landing area and land 
immediately 
I 1.00E+
00 
6.00E-
01 
Assume that 
pilot will be 
able to find a 
safe landing 
area within 
before bat-
teries dis-
charge 40% 
of the time. 
1.60E-06 
1B1 Provide 
HVDC for 
propulsion 
and to 
charge 
batteries 
5.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to AC 
generator 
Gearbox failure All Loss of HVDC 
electrical power 
to drive lift and 
thrust motors 
and to charge 
batteries  
Electric motors op-
erate from battery 
power only.  In-
creased power de-
mand from batter-
ies.  Batteries 
rapidly discharge. 
Loss of propulsion if 
pilot cannot land 
safely before batter-
ies are discharged.  
Loss of aircraft. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot.  
Pilot follows emergency 
procedures to find safe 
landing area and land 
immediately  
I 1.00E+
00 
6.00E-
01 
Assume that 
pilot will be 
able to find a 
safe landing 
area within 
before bat-
teries dis-
charge 40% 
of the time. 
3.00E-06 
1C1 Provide 
HVDC for 
propulsion 
and to 
charge 
batteries 
9.24E-05 Failure to 
convert shaft 
power to AC 
electrical 
power 
AC Generator 
failure 
All Loss of HVDC 
electrical power 
to drive lift and 
thrust motors 
and to charge 
batteries  
Electric motors op-
erate from battery 
power only.  In-
creased power de-
mand from batter-
ies.  Batteries 
rapidly discharge. 
Loss of propulsion if 
pilot cannot land 
safely before batter-
ies are discharged.  
Loss of aircraft. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot follows emergency 
procedures to find safe 
landing area and land 
immediately 
I 1.00E+
00 
6.00E-
01 
Assume that 
pilot will be 
able to find a 
safe landing 
area within 
before bat-
teries dis-
charge 40% 
of the time. 
5.54E-05 
1D1 Provide 
HVDC for 
propulsion 
and to 
charge 
batteries 
2.00E-04 Failure to 
convert AC 
electrical 
power to 
HVDC electri-
cal power 
AC/DC con-
verter failure 
All Loss of HVDC 
electrical power 
to drive lift and 
thrust motors 
and to charge 
batteries  
Electric motors op-
erate from battery 
power only.  In-
creased power de-
mand from batter-
ies.  Batteries 
rapidly discharge. 
Loss of propulsion if 
pilot cannot land 
safely before batter-
ies are discharged.  
Loss of aircraft. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Pilot follows emergency 
procedures to find safe 
landing area and land 
immediately  
I 1.00E+
00 
6.00E-
01 
Assume that 
pilot will be 
able to find a 
safe landing 
area within 
before bat-
teries dis-
charge 40% 
of the time. 
1.20E-04 
                                
2A1 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy single 
ESC (all other 
ESC's still 
have power) 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
#1 only.   
All No power to 
ESC #1 Motor 
#1 fails to pro-
vide output 
torque to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #1.  Flight 
handling qualities 
affected. 
Reduced maneuvera-
bility in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot.  
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
1.00E-06 
2A2 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy single 
ESC (all other 
ESC's still 
have power) 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
#2 only.   
All No power to 
ESC #2 Motor 
#2 fails to pro-
vide output 
torque to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #2.  Flight 
handling qualities 
affected. 
Reduced maneuvera-
bility in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot.  
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
1.00E-06 
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FMECA 
ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
2A3 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy single 
ESC (all other 
ESC's still 
have power) 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
#3 only.   
All No power to 
ESC #3 Motor 
#3 fails to pro-
vide output 
torque to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #3.  Flight 
handling qualities 
affected. 
Reduced maneuvera-
bility in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
1.00E-06 
2A4 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy single 
ESC (all other 
ESC's still 
have power) 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
#4 only.   
All No power to 
ESC #4 Motor 
#4 fails to pro-
vide output 
torque to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #4.  Flight 
handling qualities 
affected. 
Reduced maneuvera-
bility in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
1.00E-06 
2A5 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy single 
ESC (all other 
ESC's still 
have power) 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
#5 only.   
All No power to 
ESC #5 Motor 
#5 fails to pro-
vide output 
torque to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #5.  Flight 
handling qualities 
affected. 
Reduced maneuvera-
bility in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
1.00E-06 
2A6 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy single 
ESC (all other 
ESC's still 
have power) 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
#6 only.   
All No power to 
ESC #6 Motor 
#6 fails to pro-
vide output 
torque to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #6.  Flight 
handling qualities 
affected. 
Reduced maneuvera-
bility in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
1.00E-06 
2A7 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy single 
ESC (all other 
ESC's still 
have power) 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
#7 only.   
All No power to 
ESC #7 Motor 
#7 fails to pro-
vide output 
torque to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #7.  Flight 
handling qualities 
affected. 
Reduced maneuvera-
bility in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
1.00E-06 
2A8 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy single 
ESC (all other 
ESC's still 
have power) 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
#8 only.   
All No power to 
ESC #8 Motor 
#8 fails to pro-
vide output 
torque to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #8.  Flight 
handling qualities 
affected. 
Reduced maneuvera-
bility in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
1.00E-06 
2A9 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide HVDC 
electrical en-
ergy single 
ESC (all other 
ESC's still 
have power) 
HV Battery out-
put failure or 
associated wir-
ing. Loss of 
output to ESC 
(thrust motor) 
only.   
All No power to 
thrust ESC.  
Thrust motor 
fails to provide 
output torque to 
propeller. 
No forward thrust 
available for for-
ward flight.  Air-
craft reverts to 
hover for remain-
der of flight.   
Aircraft speed and 
range significantly re-
duced.   Ability to 
hover is unaffected.  
Loss of aircraft if pilot 
cannot find safe land-
ing area within range. 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Aircraft may have lim-
ited glide capability de-
pending on altitude and 
forward speed at time 
of failure.  Pilot must 
find safe landing  
area within range.  
III 1.00E+
00 
5.00E-
01 
Assume 
50% proba-
bility that the 
pilot will find 
safe landing 
area within 
reduced 
range 
5.00E-07 
2B1 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Internal bat-
tery failure 
Battery cell fail-
ure, no runa-
way 
All Loss of output 
from single 
branch within 
battery network. 
Battery output 
Output voltage 
slightly reduced to 
one or more mo-
tors.  Slight degra-
dation of motor 
None.  Pilot still main-
tains control of air-
craft. 
Battery 
fault advi-
sory pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Battery monitoring sys-
tem detects and iso-
lates the fault. Contin-
ued operation with 
IV 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
1.00E-06 
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FMECA 
ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
voltage slightly 
reduced. 
Increased cur-
rent draw from 
remaining bat-
tery cells 
performance dur-
ing hover. 
failed cell may put addi-
tional stress on other 
battery cells which 
must be managed to 
prevent catastrophic 
2B2 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Internal bat-
tery failure 
Battery cell fail-
ure, thermal 
runaway con-
tained 
All Battery cell tem-
perature rises 
rapidly, causing 
thermal runa-
way. Battery 
monitoring sys-
tem detects fail-
ure, disconnects 
and isolates the 
defective 
battery cell(s). 
Reduced battery 
system capacity, 
degradation of bat-
tery output voltage 
provided to one or 
more electric mo-
tors.  Battery may 
catch fire.  Excess 
heat generated 
may affect adja-
cent battery 
cells. 
Reduced system 
power available.    Pi-
lot still maintains con-
trol of aircraft. 
battery 
fault advi-
sory pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Battery cooling and fire 
protection system must 
contain battery temper-
ature to prevent loss of 
aircraft 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
1.00E-06 
2B3 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Internal bat-
tery failure 
Battery cell fail-
ure, thermal 
runaway un-
contained 
All Battery cell tem-
perature rises 
rapidly, causing 
thermal runa-
way. Battery 
catches fire. 
Loss of all 
HVDC output. 
Aircraft fire; possi-
ble damage to 
other flight critical 
systems. No bat-
tery power availa-
ble for electric mo-
tors. 
Motors may still 
operate from 
HVDC provided by 
the engine and 
generator 
Loss of propulsion 
and/or other critical 
systems required for 
flight.  Loss of air-
craft. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot.  Pilot 
detects 
loss of 
power 
Flight control system 
and flight control sur-
faces are powered by a 
low voltage battery 
which is still opera-
tional. 
I 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Catastrophic 
outcome is 
assumed. 
1.00E-06 
2B4 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
1.00E-06 Internal bat-
tery failure 
Complete HV 
system failure; 
no voltage out-
put to power 
electric motors. 
All Loss of all 
HVDC output to 
all motors 
No HVDC power 
available for elec-
tric motors. Flight 
control system and 
control surfaces 
are powered by a 
low voltage battery 
which is still oper-
ational. 
Aircraft descends to 
ground. Glide may be 
possible depending 
upon conditions at 
time of failure.  Loss 
of control of aircraft 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot.  Pilot 
detects 
loss of 
power 
Glide may be possible 
depending on altitude 
and speed at time of 
failure 
I 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Catastrophic 
outcome is 
assumed. 
1.00E-06 
2C1 Provide 
HVDC 
electrical 
power to 
motors 
5.08E-04 Provide cool-
ing of battery 
system 
Battery cooling 
system failure 
All Loss of cooling 
ability for batter-
ies.   
Limited ability to 
hover depending 
upon conditions at 
time of failure.    
Battery may over-
heat and go into 
uncontained ther-
mal  
runaway. 
Loss of propulsion 
and/or other critical 
systems required for 
flight.  Loss of air-
craft. 
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Pilot executes emer-
gency procedures to 
minimize power de-
mand on batteries and 
land as soon as possi-
ble 
I 1.00E+
00 
2.00E-
01 
Assume 
20% proba-
bility that un-
contained 
thermal run-
away will oc-
cur. 
1.02E-04 
3A1 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
2.70E-04 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #1 
ESC #1 failure All No output power 
to Motor #1.  No 
torque provided 
to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #1.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
2.70E-04 
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FMECA 
ID Code 
Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
3A2 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
9.24E-05 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #1 
Motor #1 failure All No motor output 
provided to 
gearbox. No 
torque provided 
to rotor #1. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #1.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
9.24E-05 
3A3 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
5.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #1 
Gearbox #1 
failure 
All No torque pro-
vided to rotor #1. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #1.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
2.00E-
01 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
1.00E-06 
3B1 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
2.70E-04 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #2 
ESC #2 failure All No output power 
to Motor #2.  No 
torque provided 
to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #2.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
2.70E-04 
3B2 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
9.24E-05 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #2 
Motor #2 failure All No motor output 
provided to 
gearbox. No 
torque provided 
to rotor #2. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #2.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
9.24E-05 
3B3 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
5.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #2 
Gearbox #2 
failure 
All No torque pro-
vided to rotor #2. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #2.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
2.00E-
01 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
1.00E-06 
3C1 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
2.70E-04 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #3 
ESC #3 failure All No output power 
to Motor #3.  No 
torque provided 
to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #3.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
2.70E-04 
3C2 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
9.24E-05 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #3 
Motor #3 failure All No motor output 
provided to 
gearbox. No 
torque provided 
to rotor #3. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #3.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
9.24E-05 
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Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
3C3 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
5.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #3 
Gearbox #3 
failure 
All No torque pro-
vided to rotor #3. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #3.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
2.00E-
01 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
1.00E-06 
3D1 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
2.70E-04 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #4 
ESC #4 failure All No output power 
to Motor #4.  No 
torque provided 
to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #4.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
2.70E-04 
3D2 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
9.24E-05 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #4 
Motor #4 failure All No motor output 
provided to 
gearbox. No 
torque provided 
to rotor #4. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #4.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
9.24E-05 
3D3 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
5.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #4 
Gearbox #4 
failure 
All No torque pro-
vided to rotor #4. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #4.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
2.00E-
01 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
1.00E-06 
3E+1 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
2.70E-04 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #5 
ESC #5 failure All No output power 
to Motor #5.  No 
torque provided 
to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #5.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
2.70E-04 
3E+2 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
9.24E-05 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #5 
Motor #5 failure All No motor output 
provided to 
gearbox. No 
torque provided 
to rotor #5. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #5.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
9.24E-05 
3E+3 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
5.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #5 
Gearbox #5 
failure 
All No torque pro-
vided to rotor #5. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #5.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
2.00E-
01 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
1.00E-06 
3F1 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
2.70E-04 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #6 
ESC #6 failure All No output power 
to Motor #6.  No 
torque provided 
to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #6.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
2.70E-04 
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Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
3F2 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
9.24E-05 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #6 
Motor #6 failure All No motor output 
provided to 
gearbox. No 
torque provided 
to rotor #6. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #6.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
9.24E-05 
3F3 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
5.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #6 
Gearbox #6 
failure 
All No torque pro-
vided to rotor #6. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #6.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
2.00E-
01 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
1.00E-06 
3G1 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
2.70E-04 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #7 
ESC #7 failure All No output power 
to Motor #7.  No 
torque provided 
to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #7.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
2.70E-04 
3G2 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
9.24E-05 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #7 
Motor #7 failure All No motor output 
provided to 
gearbox. No 
torque provided 
to rotor #7. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #7.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
9.24E-05 
3G3 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
5.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #7 
Gearbox #7 
failure 
All No torque pro-
vided to rotor #7. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #7.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
2.00E-
01 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
1.00E-06 
3H1 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
2.70E-04 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #8 
ESC #8 failure All No output power 
to Motor #8.  No 
torque provided 
to rotor. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #8.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
Beta = 1 for 
severity III & 
IV 
2.70E-04 
3H2 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
9.24E-05 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #8 
Motor #8 failure All No motor output 
provided to 
gearbox. No 
torque provided 
to rotor #8. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #8.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
1.00E+
00 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
9.24E-05 
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Function Failure 
Rate (λ) 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Mis-
sion 
Phase 
Local Failure 
Effect 
Next Higher Ef-
fect 
End Effect Detection 
Method 
Compensating Provi-
sions 
Sever-
ity 
Code 
Alpha 
(Mode 
Ratio) 
Beta Beta Mode 
Ratio Expla-
nation 
Failure 
Mode Criti-
cality No. 
3H3 Provide 
torque to 
lifting ro-
tors 
5.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide shaft 
power to lift 
rotor #8 
Gearbox #8 
failure 
All No torque pro-
vided to rotor #8. 
No lift available to 
Rotor #8.  Flight 
control system ad-
justs power to 
other rotors to 
maintain control of 
aircraft.   
 Flight handling quali-
ties affected.  Re-
duced maneuverabil-
ity in hover.   
Visual and 
audible 
warning 
provided to 
pilot. 
Flight control system 
adjusts control to re-
maining rotors to main-
tain controlled flight 
III 1.00E+
00 
2.00E-
01 
beta = 1 for 
Category III 
and IV 
1.00E-06 
4A1 Provide 
torque to 
thrust pro-
peller 
2.70E-04 Failure to pro-
vide torque to 
thrust propel-
ler 
Thrust ESC 
failure 
All No power to 
thrust ESC 
Thrust motor 
fails to provide 
output torque to 
propeller. 
No forward thrust 
available for for-
ward flight.  Air-
craft reverts to 
hover for remain-
der of flight.   
Aircraft speed and 
range significantly re-
duced.   Ability to 
hover is unaffected.  
Loss of aircraft if pilot 
cannot find safe land-
ing area within 
range... 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Aircraft may have lim-
ited glide capability de-
pending on altitude and 
forward speed at time 
of failure.  Pilot must 
find safe landing  
area within range.  
I 1.00E+
00 
5.00E-
01 
Assume 
50% proba-
bility that pi-
lot will find 
safe landing 
area within 
reduced 
range 
1.35E-04 
4A2 Provide 
torque to 
thrust pro-
peller 
9.24E-05 Failure to pro-
vide torque to 
thrust propel-
ler 
Thrust motor 
failure 
All No power to 
thrust ESC 
Thrust motor 
fails to provide 
output torque to 
propeller. 
No forward thrust 
available for for-
ward flight.  Air-
craft reverts to 
hover for remain-
der of flight.   
Aircraft speed and 
range significantly re-
duced.   Ability to 
hover is unaffected.  
Loss of aircraft if pilot 
cannot find safe land-
ing area within 
range... 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Aircraft may have lim-
ited glide capability de-
pending on altitude and 
forward speed at time 
of failure.  Pilot must 
find safe landing  
area within range.  
I 1.00E+
00 
5.00E-
01 
Assume 
50% proba-
bility that pi-
lot will find 
safe landing 
area within 
reduced 
range 
4.62E-05 
4A3 Provide 
torque to 
thrust pro-
peller 
5.00E-06 Failure to pro-
vide torque to 
thrust propel-
ler 
Thrust gearbox 
failure 
All No power to 
thrust ESC 
Thrust motor 
fails to provide 
output torque to 
propeller. 
No forward thrust 
available for for-
ward flight.  Air-
craft reverts to 
hover for remain-
der of flight.   
Aircraft speed and 
range significantly re-
duced.   Ability to 
hover is unaffected.  
Loss of aircraft if pilot 
cannot find safe land-
ing area within 
range... 
Visual and 
audible 
alert pro-
vided to pi-
lot 
Aircraft may have lim-
ited glide capability de-
pending on altitude and 
forward speed at time 
of failure.  Pilot must 
find safe landing  
area within range.  
I 1.00E+
00 
5.00E-
01 
Assume 
50% proba-
bility that pi-
lot will find 
safe landing 
area within 
reduced 
range 
2.50E-06 
Criticality Summary I 4.67E-04 
II 0.00E+00 
III 2.92E-03 
IV 1.00E-06 
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 Note:  “Dual Motor 1-2 Fail” is representative 
of all “Dual Motor X-Y Fail” events in Appen-
dix C. 
Note:  “Dual Gear Box (GB) 1 & 2 Fail” is rep-
resentative of all “Dual GB X & Y Fail” events 
in Appendix C. 
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Note:  “Propulsor 1 Failure” is representative of all “Propulsor X Failure” events in Appendix C. 
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Note:  “ESC 1 Fail” is representative of all “ESC X Fail” events in Appendix C. 
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APPENDIX D QUAD-ROTOR FAULT TREE DIAGRAM 
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Note:  “Dual Motor 1-2 Fail” is representa-
tive of all “Dual Motor X-Y Fail” events in 
Appendix D. 
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Note:  “Propulsor 1 Failure” is representative of all “Propulsor X Failure” events in Appendix D. 
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APPENDIX E ALTERNATE CONFIGURATION – QUAD-ROTOR WITHOUT INTERCONNECTING SHAFTS 
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Note:  “Dual Motor 1-2 Fail” is representative 
of all “Dual Motor X-Y Fail” events in Appen-
dix E. 
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Note:  “Propulsor 1 Failure” is representative of all “Propulsor X Failure” events in Appendix E. 
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APPENDIX F LATERAL-TWIN FAULT TREE DIAGRAM 
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APPENDIX G LIFT+CRUISE FAULT TREE DIAGRAM 
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Note:  “Dual Fail 1” is representative of all “Dual Fail X” events in Appendix G.  
All “Dual Fail” events include the failure of all combinations of two (2) lifting propulsors, Propulsor 1 through Propulsor 8. 
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Note:  “Propulsor 1 Fail” is representative of Propulsor 1 through Propulsor 8 events in Appendix G. 
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